The Ivanishvili System: A Post-Political Audit of Informal Power in Georgia

This section audits the origins and evolution of Georgia's current system of informal governance. It examines the foundational experiences of its architect, Bidzina Ivanishvili, not as a personal biography, but as a case study in the development of a specific governance methodology. The analysis identifies the key principles derived from these experiences—such as the primacy of informal networks, the strategic use of patronage, and the insulation from formal accountability—that now define the system's core operational logic and its mechanisms of control.

The consolidation of this system was not a single event but an evolutionary process executed in three distinct phases.
The first phase (2012-2013), “Democratic Facade,” was characterized by popular social reforms, a large-scale prison amnesty, and the careful cultivation of international legitimacy, all while dismantling the previous administration's power structures.
The second phase (2013-2018), “Informal Control,” began with Ivanishvili’s calculated retreat from formal office, followed by the systematic installation of loyalists across the state apparatus and the use of his vast fortune to secure electoral victories, notably through a mass debt-forgiveness program ahead of the 2018 presidential election.
The final phase (2019-present), “Authoritarian Entrenchment,” was triggered by large-scale protests and marked by the regime's open refusal to fulfill key political promises, the violent suppression of dissent, and the adoption of a hardline anti-Western ideology, signaling a definitive break from its earlier democratic pretenses.

Bidzina Ivanishvili’s biography is foundational to understanding the system he would later construct. His journey is not merely a “rags-to-riches” story but a case study in the acquisition of capital and power in the crucible of a collapsing empire, an experience that provided him with a distinct, non-democratic governance blueprint.

His origins in the poor rural village of Chorvila on February 18, 1956, became a potent political asset decades later.¹ Born the youngest of five children to a father who worked in a manganese factory, Ivanishvili’s early life was one of extreme poverty, a fact he would later emphasize, recounting a childhood without access to proper shoes.¹ This narrative of humble beginnings allowed him to cultivate an image as a “man of the people,” an authentic figure who understood the struggles of ordinary Georgians. This carefully crafted persona was instrumental in building the trust of the rural electorate, which formed a crucial part of his support base in the pivotal 2012 election.⁷

After graduating from high school in Sachkhere, he pursued an education in engineering and economics at Tbilisi State University, completing his degree in 1980.¹ In 1982, he made the consequential move to Moscow to pursue a PhD in economics at the Moscow State University of Railway Engineering.¹ This decision placed him at the geographic and temporal epicenter of the Soviet Union's terminal decline and the chaotic emergence of a new Russian state. It was here, amidst the institutional rubble of the old order, that he would learn the new rules of power and wealth.

In the late 1980s, Ivanishvili pivoted from academia to the nascent world of private enterprise. He founded a cooperative, one of the few forms of private business permitted in the late Soviet period, and soon partnered with Vitaly Malkin, another aspiring businessman who would later become a Russian senator.⁷ Their initial ventures were in trading scarce, high-demand goods: first computers, then the novelty of push-button telephones.⁷ The profits from these early enterprises provided the seed capital for their entry into the far more lucrative arena of post-Soviet privatization.

The 1990s in Russia were a period of historic wealth transfer, as vast state-owned assets were sold off for fractions of their value in a process rife with corruption and political insiderism. Ivanishvili and Malkin plunged into this “Wild East,” acquiring assets in the banking and metals sectors—the industries that would become the bedrock of Ivanishvili's multi-billion-dollar fortune.¹ This experience was his true education. He learned that in an environment of institutional collapse, formal laws were secondary to informal connections, and that immense capital could be used to purchase the political protection—the krysha (“roof”)—necessary to secure and expand that capital. This transactional, non-democratic model of governance, where power flows from wealth and personal loyalty rather than from legitimate institutions, was not an abstract theory for Ivanishvili; it was the lived reality of his business success.

By the mid-1990s, he had ascended to the highest echelons of Russia's new oligarchy. He was reportedly associated with the “Semibankirschina,” the small group of powerful financiers who wielded immense influence over Boris Yeltsin's government.⁷ His proximity to power was demonstrated by his financial backing of General Alexander Lebed's 1996 presidential campaign, a move widely seen as a tactic to split the communist vote and aid Yeltsin's re-election.⁷ This early foray into high-stakes political financing reveals a sophisticated understanding of power dynamics and a willingness to operate in the grey zones where business and politics merge. This period in Russia did not just make him rich; it provided him with the operational playbook he would later import and perfect in Georgia.

In the early 2000s, Ivanishvili began a strategic retreat from Russia. He sold off a number of his assets and, in 2002, moved to France, where he later acquired French citizenship.¹ This move was a crucial act of rebranding, allowing him to physically and symbolically distance himself from the “Russian oligarch” label and begin crafting a new, more benevolent public persona in his homeland.

He returned to Georgia in 2003, on the eve of the Rose Revolution, but remained a deeply enigmatic figure.⁷ He assiduously avoided the press and public appearances, cultivating an aura of mystery while engaging in highly visible acts of charity. This period marked the beginning of a long-term, meticulously executed pre-political campaign. His philanthropy was not random or purely altruistic; it was a strategic investment in political capital. He provided direct, tangible benefits to the citizens of his native region, distributing household appliances and covering medical expenses, thereby creating a powerful sense of personal gratitude and dependency.⁷

His most significant act of patronage was the secret financing of the Holy Trinity Cathedral of Tbilisi (Sameba), the largest church in the country.⁷ For years, the source of the funding remained a mystery, adding to his mythos as a humble, pious benefactor. It was only later revealed in the memoirs of former president Eduard Shevardnadze that Ivanishvili was the sole patron.⁷ This act, along with the broader funding for the restoration of hundreds of other churches and monasteries, cemented a deep and lasting alliance with the Georgian Orthodox Church, arguably the most trusted and influential institution in the country.⁷

The scale of his charitable activities was immense. Between 2005 and 2010, his Cartu Foundation invested an estimated 1.49 billion GEL (approximately USD 900 million) into a wide array of social, cultural, and religious projects.⁷ This sustained, large-scale philanthropy systematically built a vast reservoir of public goodwill and established a powerful, nationwide patronage network. Legends began to circulate about his generosity, such as the story that he gifted an entire ice cream factory to a man who had given him free ice cream as an impoverished child.⁷ These narratives, whether true or apocryphal, reinforced the archetype of the benevolent patriarch who repays kindness with largesse.

By the time he formally entered politics, Ivanishvili had spent nearly a decade cultivating this image. He was not seen as an ambitious politician seeking power, but as a reluctant savior, a messianic figure called upon by circumstance to rescue the nation.⁷ His philanthropy had laid the perfect groundwork, creating a base of support that was personal, transactional, and deeply rooted in a sense of obligation, rather than in political ideology.

Crucially, the Georgian Orthodox Church functioned not merely as a passive recipient of this patronage but as an active agent in Ivanishvili's political legitimation. When the Saakashvili government stripped Ivanishvili of his citizenship in 2011 in a bid to block his political entry, Patriarch Ilia II personally and publicly intervened, calling on the authorities to restore citizenship to the "billionaire-philanthropist". This endorsement from the country's most trusted institution provided Ivanishvili with an invaluable moral shield, effectively sanctifying his political ambitions in the eyes of a large, conservative electorate and positioning his challenge to the incumbent government as a righteous cause.

On October 7, 2011, Ivanishvili shed his reclusive persona and burst onto the political scene with an open letter announcing his intention to form a new political party, Georgian Dream, to contest the 2012 parliamentary elections.⁷ He framed his political entry as a necessary crusade to end the “authoritarianism” of President Mikheil Saakashvili's government.⁷ In the same statement, he pledged to renounce his Russian and French citizenships and sell all his remaining business assets in Russia, a promise he largely fulfilled, liquidating his bank “Rossiysky Kredit” for USD 352 million and other holdings.⁷

The reaction from the incumbent government was swift and punitive. Just four days after his announcement, President Saakashvili stripped Ivanishvili of his Georgian citizenship, a move intended to legally bar him from participating in the elections.⁷ However, this act of political lawfare backfired, casting Ivanishvili as a persecuted figure and further bolstering his public support. He skillfully navigated the legal obstacle, forming a broad opposition coalition under the Georgian Dream banner and placing his wife, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, on the party list as a strategic contingency.⁷

The parliamentary elections on October 1, 2012, resulted in a stunning victory for the Georgian Dream coalition, which secured approximately 55% of the vote.⁷ The outcome marked the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Georgia's modern history, as Saakashvili conceded defeat.⁷ On October 25, 2012, Ivanishvili was appointed Prime Minister, formally taking the reins of government.¹

His tenure as prime minister was brief, lasting just over a year, but it was impactful. His government implemented a series of popular social reforms, including the introduction of a Universal Healthcare Program in February 2013, which made basic medical care accessible to a large portion of the population.⁷ He also oversaw a major prison amnesty, which nearly halved the country's notoriously overcrowded prison population and addressed the public outcry over a pre-election scandal involving the torture of inmates.⁷ Simultaneously, his government initiated “restoration of justice” proceedings against 35 high-ranking officials from the previous administration, fulfilling a key campaign promise.⁷

Then, in a move that shocked many observers, Ivanishvili announced his resignation on November 20, 2013, shortly after his party's candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, won the presidential election.¹ He framed his departure as an unprecedented act of democratic selflessness—a leader voluntarily stepping down at the peak of his popularity to foster a healthy civil society.⁷ He handed the premiership to his 31-year-old protégé and long-time personal aide, Irakli Garibashvili, a figure who was completely loyal and politically dependent on him.⁷

This “retirement” was not an abdication of power but a perfection of his system of control. A formal political office comes with the burdens of public scrutiny, constitutional constraints, and direct accountability. By stepping into the shadows, Ivanishvili shed all formal responsibility while retaining all effective power. He could now direct state policy from the seclusion of his hilltop “glass palace” ¹⁷ without ever having to answer a parliamentary question, face a journalist, or be held accountable by the electorate. This calculated transition from de jure to de facto rule was the foundational moment of the Ivanishvili system, establishing the core dynamic that defines it to this day: power without accountability.

Understanding the Ivanishvili system requires an analysis of the psychology of its architect. His personality—a paradoxical blend of extreme introversion, an obsessive need for control, and a penchant for extravagant displays of power—is imprinted on the very structure of his governance model.

Ivanishvili is a deeply reclusive and private individual who, by his own admission, loathes public appearances and even avoids celebrating his own birthday.⁷ This discomfort with the spotlight distinguishes him from charismatic, populist leaders. He prefers to operate as the éminence grise, the “puppet master” pulling the strings from behind the scenes.⁷ His rare public statements often carry a sense of detachment from conventional norms of political accountability. A telling quote from an interview, “I could tell you anything and you wouldn't be able to check it,” reveals a mindset that operates beyond the realm of public verification, where his reality is the only one that matters.⁷

His famous eccentricities are not merely the whims of a billionaire but are better understood as public performances of omnipotence. His private zoo, home to sharks, zebras, and penguins, and his vast art collection, including formerly owned Picasso's “Dora Maar with Cat,” are symbols of immense wealth.⁷ However, it is his project to create a personal dendrological park on the Black Sea coast that serves as the most potent metaphor for his power.⁷ The process involved uprooting ancient, hundred-ton trees from across Georgia and transporting them by land and sea—a monumental feat of engineering and logistics that literally reshaped the landscape for his personal pleasure.⁷ This act, captured in the documentary “Taming the Garden,” demonstrated to the public that no obstacle, whether natural, logistical, or regulatory, was beyond his capacity to overcome. It was a surreal and powerful display of his ability to bend the world to his will.⁷

The governance model is characterized by a low tolerance for institutional autonomy and a reliance on periodic, direct interventions from its architect during moments of perceived instability. The return to the party chairmanship in 2018 ahead of a difficult election is a key example of this pattern of centralized course-correction. This approach has intensified in recent years, manifesting in an increasingly defensive posture, such as the use of bulletproof glass during public speeches and the public denunciation of former loyalists as “traitors.” These observable actions point toward a system that progressively centralizes control and treats any form of dissent not as political competition, but as an existential threat to its stability.

This operational model is best understood through a series of political archetypes that define Ivanishvili's unique brand of leadership. He functions as the “shadow patriarch,” cultivating a mythos as the nation's reclusive savior who acts only when necessary. This is complemented by the archetype of the “cunning fox,” who employs a cyclical pattern of “retiring” from and “returning” to formal politics. This tactic is not a sign of indecisiveness but a sophisticated technology of power: it allows him to shed direct responsibility during periods of calm while reasserting absolute control during crises, thereby maintaining his indispensability to the system he created.

Further reinforcing its informal control, the system appears to leverage connections with organized criminal networks (“Thieves-in-Law”). While the Saakashvili administration had aggressively suppressed these groups, under Ivanishvili's rule, their influence has reportedly seen a resurgence, particularly in the regions. Observers note that during election periods, criminal authorities are sometimes mobilized to intimidate opposition supporters and ensure voter turnout for the ruling party. This represents another layer of shadow governance, where the state tacitly allows criminal elements to operate in exchange for their services in maintaining political control at the local level, bypassing formal state structures entirely.

The period from 2024 onwards marks a significant evolution in Ivanishvili’s public persona and the ideological posture of his regime. As sustained Western criticism over democratic backsliding made the system’s pro-European facade increasingly untenable, a strategic pivot was required. Ivanishvili transformed from a silent, behind-the-scenes operator into a vocal, combative ideologue, retrofitting his system with a new nationalist, conservative, and overtly anti-Western operating system.

This shift was put on stark display in a series of public speeches and interviews in 2024. In an address to supporters on April 29, 2024, he explicitly took responsibility for his party's controversial policies, including the “foreign agent” law and anti-LGBT legislation, framing them as necessary acts of defiance against foreign pressure.²⁰ He abandoned the language of European integration in favor of a new, confrontational narrative built around the conspiracy theory of a “Global War Party”.²⁰ According to this narrative, a shadowy coalition of Western powers—specifically the United States and the European Union—and the domestic Georgian opposition are actively working to undermine Georgia's sovereignty and drag the country into a direct military conflict with Russia.²⁰

This narrative serves multiple, crucial strategic functions. First, it provides a powerful justification for the government's geopolitical pivot away from the West, reframing it not as a failure of democratic reform but as a patriotic defense of national independence. Second, it serves to delegitimize any and all domestic opposition by branding them as “agents” and “traitors” acting on behalf of this hostile foreign power.⁷ Third, it creates a siege mentality that allows the regime to portray its authoritarian measures—such as cracking down on NGOs and suppressing protests—as necessary steps to protect the nation from external threats.

This ideological turn was accompanied by open threats against his political opponents. In his 2024 speeches, Ivanishvili promised that after the upcoming elections, the “collective United National Movement”—a term he uses to encompass all opposition parties and critical civil society—would face a “strict political and legal condemnation” and receive the “punishment it deserves”.⁷ This marked a significant escalation from the previous strategy of covert pressure and selective prosecution to an open declaration of intent to establish a single-party dominant system, free from meaningful opposition.

This ideological adaptation is a calculated response to changing geopolitical realities. The conservative, nationalist, and anti-Western turn provides a new “us versus them” framework that resonates with a significant portion of the domestic electorate and justifies the regime's actions in a language of sovereignty and traditional values.⁷ Ivanishvili is not simply expressing personal beliefs; he is strategically re-arming his system with an ideology that is more compatible with long-term, unaccountable rule and a closer alignment with non-Western, authoritarian powers. This ideological shift is the final component of his system, providing a coherent, if conspiratorial, justification for its existence and actions.

This section deconstructs the operational mechanics of the Ivanishvili system by examining six key indicators of power as defined by the CAT AGI framework: narrative control, administrative leverage, digital tactics, international ties, legal and economic instruments, and corporate networks.⁷ The October 4, 2025, Tbilisi mayoral election serves as the central, recurring case study, providing a practical, real-world lens through which to observe how each of these mechanisms functions to maintain and consolidate the regime's control.

The control of information is not an auxiliary tactic but a central pillar of the Ivanishvili system. The Georgian media environment, while formally pluralistic, has been transformed into a highly polarized and instrumentalized arena for political warfare.⁷ This landscape is engineered not to foster an informed electorate but to reinforce partisan loyalties and disseminate targeted narratives that advance the strategic objectives of the ruling party.²³

The pro-government media bloc is dominated by a few powerful television channels, which remain the primary source of information for a majority of the population.²⁵ At the forefront of this apparatus is Imedi TV, a broadcaster described by the European Union's East StratCom Task Force as the “ruling party’s most powerful propaganda machine” and a “propaganda megaphone undermining Georgia's EU aspirations”.¹¹ The channel's ownership is held by businessman Irakli Rukhadze, who has openly acknowledged that Imedi's mission is to prevent the opposition United National Movement (UNM) from returning to power and has committed the channel to remaining “on Ivanishvili's side”.²⁶ This admission confirms the channel's role as a partisan tool rather than an independent media outlet. It is joined by other pro-government channels such as Rustavi 2 and POSTV, which provide consistently supportive coverage, and the Georgian Public Broadcaster, which, despite its legal mandate for impartiality, has been documented as having a clear pro-government editorial stance.⁷

The 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election provides a clear case study of this media architecture in action. Media monitoring during the campaign period reveals a pattern of systematic bias. Incumbent Mayor Kakha Kaladze and the Georgian Dream party receive overwhelmingly positive and extensive coverage on Imedi TV and its affiliates.²³ Municipal projects and campaign announcements, such as the plan for a new tramway, are presented uncritically as major achievements, effectively turning news programming into a platform for the incumbent's re-election campaign.⁷ Conversely, opposition candidates are either ignored or portrayed negatively, often framed as agents of the "Global War Party" seeking to destabilize the city.⁷

This narrative control is reinforced by the active dissemination of disinformation. Imedi TV has been a key amplifier of the “Global War Party” conspiracy theory and has been used to launch specific information operations, such as targeting Western diplomats by airing footage of “secret meetings” with opposition figures to imply foreign interference.¹¹ The channel has also promoted narratives alleging that ongoing student protests are part of a foreign-funded, violent plot to overthrow the government, presenting these claims without evidence.¹²

The system complements this propaganda effort with the use of legal and regulatory pressure—a form of “lawfare”—to silence and intimidate critical media. The state’s communications commission has sanctioned opposition channels (Mtavari Arkhi, TV Pirveli, Formula) for using critical language such as “regime” or “oligarch” to describe the government, creating a chilling effect on political speech.⁷ The controversial 2024 “foreign agent” law directly targets the financial viability of independent media outlets that receive funding from Western donors.³² Furthermore, journalists critical of the government face a hostile environment, including physical attacks, smear campaigns, and a climate of impunity for perpetrators, which has led to a dramatic decline in Georgia’s ranking on the World Press Freedom Index.⁷

This multi-faceted approach to narrative control functions as a pre-emptive defense system for the regime. By relentlessly pushing a narrative of external threats and internal enemies, the pro-government media apparatus creates a permanent crisis atmosphere. Within this context, any legitimate criticism of the government’s policies, such as its handling of Tbilisi’s urban problems, can be immediately reframed as a subversive act—an attack on the nation’s stability and sovereignty. This inoculates the system against accountability and justifies its repressive measures as necessary for national security. The Tbilisi election is thus transformed in the public discourse from a debate on municipal governance into a battle to save the capital from foreign-controlled chaos.

The central pillar of this narrative architecture is a political technology that reduces any policy debate to the existential dilemma: “Do you want war?” (Aba omi ginda?). This rhetorical device, aimed primarily at an older generation traumatized by past conflicts, is deployed to quash all criticism of the regime’s actions, from domestic policy to its foreign relations. A comparison with Moldova—which, despite having occupied territory and facing a direct Ukrainian request for military assistance in Transnistria, refused and yet faced no escalation while continuing its EU path—highlights the logical fallacy of this argument. Its power, however, lies not in its logical consistency but in its capacity to exploit collective fear, effectively foreclosing any rational discussion of viable political alternatives.

The Ivanishvili system demonstrates a mastery of using the state’s administrative and legislative powers to construct an unequal political playing field. This is achieved not through overt force alone, but through the procedural re-engineering of the rules governing political competition and the systematic deployment of state resources for partisan ends. The administration of Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital and economic heart, serves as a prime example of this institutional capture.

At the center of this mechanism is Mayor Kakha Kaladze. His role is not merely that of a municipal manager; he is also the Secretary-General of the ruling Georgian Dream party.⁷ This dual role embodies the fusion of the municipal administration with the party-state apparatus, transforming Tbilisi City Hall from a body of civic governance into a key operational hub for the ruling party's political and electoral machinery.
The city’s vast bureaucracy, with an estimated 30,000 employees, has been converted into a powerful instrument of patronage and political control.⁷ Employment and advancement within the municipal system appear to be conditional on political loyalty rather than professional competence. Mayor Kaladze has publicly reinforced this expectation, characterizing petitions by employees against government policies as “sabotage” and part of a “coup plan,” a prelude to mass dismissals of those deemed politically unreliable.⁷ This sends a clear message throughout the civil service that dissent will not be tolerated, ensuring the bureaucracy's alignment with the ruling party's agenda.

The resources of the Tbilisi municipality are systematically leveraged to support Georgian Dream's electoral campaigns. Investigations have revealed that municipal databases were utilized to build a network of thousands of “call centers” during the 2024 parliamentary elections, which collected real-time voter information and coordinated get-out-the-vote activities.⁷ This represents a direct and illegal co-opting of public resources for partisan purposes. Furthermore, the timing of major municipal announcements is strategically aligned with the electoral calendar. The August 2025 announcement of a new 7.5-kilometer tramway project, a significant infrastructure initiative, was made just 1.5 months before the mayoral election, a pattern designed to generate maximum political capital for the incumbent.⁷ Official City Hall events and communication channels are frequently used for what are effectively campaign announcements, blurring the line between governance and electioneering.⁷
This administrative leverage is solidified through legislative action. The GD-controlled parliament has enacted a series of amendments to the electoral code that structurally favor the incumbent party. A key change was the abolition of the 40% threshold required for victory in majoritarian (single-member) districts, meaning a candidate can now win with a simple plurality.⁷ In a fragmented political field, particularly one where a significant portion of the opposition is boycotting the election, this change mathematically lowers the bar for a unified GD candidate to secure victory. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has warned that these changes “may result in the further entrenchment of the governing party's position”.⁷

The governance of Tbilisi under Kaladze demonstrates a model where the primary function of the municipal apparatus is not just public administration, but the performance of governance for political effect. The timing of project announcements, the public disciplining of disloyal employees, and the use of official platforms for partisan messaging are all elements of a continuous campaign. The actual delivery of services becomes secondary to the political capital generated by the promise of those services. In this model, the municipal apparatus is less a tool for managing the city and more a stage for demonstrating the power and effectiveness of the ruling party, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy and ensuring its political continuity.

A key case study illustrating the system's crisis response protocol is the “Gavrilov's Night” protest in June 2019. Triggered by the presence of a Russian MP in the speaker’s chair of the Georgian parliament, the ensuing public outrage was met with a brutal police crackdown. Faced with a sustained street-level threat, Ivanishvili personally intervened to de-escalate, publicly promising a key demand of the protesters: a transition to a fully proportional electoral system for the 2020 elections. However, once the protests subsided, deputies from his own party orchestrated the failure of the required constitutional amendments in parliament. This sequence demonstrates a core tactical principle of the system: the use of political promises as a temporary tool to demobilize opposition, followed by a cynical reversal once the immediate threat has passed, prioritizing the preservation of power over democratic commitments.

Beyond this strategic schism, the opposition demonstrates a consistent tactical failure in its decision-making processes. Critical questions, such as the election boycott, are resolved behind closed doors by party leaders without broad public debate or primaries, stripping the resulting decisions of legitimacy even in the eyes of their own supporters. A stark example was the selection of a joint mayoral candidate for Tbilisi by the “participant” faction—a regional politician from Batumi with leftist views, immediately rendering him a divisive and vulnerable figure. Nominating a candidate known for the phrase, “I will never become a Tbilisi guy, I am a Batumi guy,” to run for mayor of the capital is symptomatic of the opposition elites’ profound disconnect from the electorate's sentiment and their inability to formulate a unifying, national-level agenda.

The instrumentalization of the Tbilisi municipality is further evident in the strategic timing and structuring of large-scale infrastructure projects. The August 2025 announcement of a new 7.5-kilometer tramway line, occurring just 1.5 months before the mayoral election, exemplifies the use of infrastructure development as a tool for political marketing. Moreover, the technical specifications within the tender for the project were reportedly designed to favor a narrow range of pre-approved international firms with existing ties to the Georgian market. This demonstrates a sophisticated mechanism of municipal capture, where public works serve the dual purpose of generating electoral capital for the incumbent and directing public funds through procurement processes that can be controlled to benefit network-connected entities.

The digital sphere is a critical battleground for the Ivanishvili system, which employs sophisticated, state-sponsored tactics to manipulate public discourse, fabricate consensus, and discredit opponents. This is not the work of rogue actors but an institutionalized strategy of information warfare conducted by the state against its own citizens.

The most compelling evidence of this strategy comes from multiple investigations by Meta (the parent company of Facebook and Instagram), which have uncovered and dismantled large-scale networks engaged in Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) directly linked to the Georgian government.⁷ A takedown in December 2019 removed a network of 396 assets that Meta’s investigation connected to a Georgian advertising agency and the Georgian Dream-led government. This network had spent over USD 316,000 on advertising to amplify pro-government content and attack the opposition.⁷

Crucially, a subsequent takedown in May 2023 was explicitly linked by Meta to the Strategic Communications Department (StratCom) of the Government Administration of Georgia.⁷ This finding is irrefutable proof that official state bodies are directly involved in conducting covert digital influence operations. The state is using public resources to create and operate fake accounts and deceptive pages to manipulate the political conversation.

The tactics employed by these networks are consistent and systematic. They utilize fake accounts, often with stolen or AI-generated profile pictures, to manage a web of pages and groups.⁷ These pages are frequently given generic, neutral-sounding names like “Daily Info,” “NewsHub.ge,” and “OnTime.ge” to create the false impression of being impartial news aggregators.⁷ In reality, they exclusively post content that is favorable to the government or virulently critical of its opponents, thereby misleading users about the partisan nature of the information they are consuming. These networks engage in high-frequency, sometimes automated, posting to create an artificial sense of popularity and coordinate to amplify specific regime narratives, such as the “Global War Party” conspiracy theory, while conducting targeted smear campaigns against civil society activists, independent journalists, and opposition figures.⁷

The objective of these state-sponsored digital operations is not necessarily to persuade staunch opponents, but rather to construct a powerful and insular echo chamber for government supporters. By flooding social media with pro-GD content, manufacturing supportive comments, and viciously attacking any form of dissent, these networks create an information environment where the government's narrative appears to be the dominant, common-sense view of the majority. This has several effects: it reinforces the convictions of existing supporters, making them more resistant to critical information; it isolates and demoralizes critics, creating the impression that they are a small, despised minority; and it fosters a broader atmosphere of conformity, where ordinary citizens may become hesitant to express dissenting views for fear of being targeted by online mobs. This is a form of digital social engineering designed to control the perceived climate of public opinion, a key element of modern digital authoritarianism.

The Ivanishvili system has instrumentalized Georgia's foreign policy as a primary tool for domestic power consolidation. The regime's pronounced geopolitical pivot away from its traditional Western partners is not an ideological whim but a calculated survival strategy for an illiberal government seeking to insulate itself from the pressures of democratic conditionality.

A central feature of this strategy is the deployment of systemic anti-Western rhetoric by high-level Georgian Dream officials, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze.³⁵ The United States and the European Union are consistently cast as a “Global War Party” that seeks to undermine Georgia's sovereignty and drag it into a catastrophic conflict with Russia.⁷ This narrative serves a crucial domestic political function: it allows the government to frame all internal opposition—political parties, civil society organizations, and independent media—as “foreign agents” acting on behalf of this hostile external power, thereby justifying repressive measures as a defense of national sovereignty.⁷
This rhetoric is matched by concrete policy actions that have effectively halted Georgia's long-stated goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite being granted EU candidate status in December 2023, the government's subsequent actions have moved the country in the opposite direction.⁷ In November 2024, Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced the unilateral suspension of EU accession negotiations until 2028.² This decision, combined with the passage of legislation that directly contravenes EU values—such as the “foreign agent” law and anti-LGBT laws—has brought the integration process to a standstill and drawn sharp condemnation from Brussels and Washington, resulting in US sanctions and visa restrictions.²

As relations with the West have deteriorated, the regime has aggressively cultivated alternative international partnerships to reduce its economic and political dependency. This diversification acts as an authoritarian insurance policy, creating new support structures that do not come with democratic strings attached.

●       Russia: Despite Russia's ongoing occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, the government has pursued a policy of “normalization” and “pragmatism”.⁷ This has led to the restoration of direct flights and a significant increase in trade since 2022, creating new economic dependencies that benefit the Kremlin.⁷
●       China: Georgia has elevated its relationship with China to a “strategic partnership”.⁴⁰ This includes awarding the contract for the strategic Anaklia deep-sea port to a Chinese state-owned company that is under US sanctions, a move that sidelines Western interests and deepens Georgia's integration into Beijing's economic and technological orbit.³⁹
●       United Arab Emirates (UAE): The September 19, 2025, meeting between Bidzina Ivanishvili and UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan represents the most significant and recent development in this pivot.⁸ The announced
USD 6 billion investment from the UAE is a game-changer for the regime.⁷ It provides a massive injection of non-Western capital for infrastructure and development projects, offering a powerful counter-narrative to claims that the government's policies are leading to economic isolation. More importantly, it provides alternative financial channels and banking relationships that can be used to circumvent Western sanctions, as well as conferring significant diplomatic legitimacy on Ivanishvili himself at a time when he is being ostracized by the West.⁴³

This dual foreign policy—antagonizing the West while embracing non-democratic powers—is a coherent strategy. Dependency on the EU and the US comes with demands for rule of law, media freedom, and fair elections—conditions that are existential threats to the Ivanishvili system of informal, unaccountable control. By building deep economic and political ties with Russia, China, and the UAE, the regime is constructing an alternative support structure that ensures its long-term survival, even at the cost of Georgia's democratic future.

In the context of this geopolitical pivot, a palpable disillusionment with the efficacy of Western policy is growing within pro-European circles. Despite sanctions and sharp rhetoric, practical measures such as the passage of the MEGOBARI Act (which was not adopted) in the United States are perceived as being delayed or insufficient. This inaction fosters a sentiment among activists that substantive external help is unlikely and that the struggle for democracy is a purely internal Georgian affair. While this mindset may encourage greater self-reliance within civil society, it also weakens pressure on the regime, which becomes more convinced that its anti-Western actions will not incur swift or severe consequences from key international players.

The hostile nature of the system's anti-Western turn is demonstrated not just by broad narratives but by specific, targeted rhetoric against Western partners. A clear example was the official reaction to the MEGOBARI Act proposed by the U.S. House of Representatives, which called for scrutiny and potential sanctions on Georgian officials responsible for democratic backsliding. In response, high-ranking speakers from the Georgian Dream party publicly denigrated the act's sponsor, Congressman Joe Wilson, as a “degraded politician.” This abandonment of diplomatic language in favor of personal insults signals a deliberate strategy to delegitimize any form of Western democratic oversight and reinforces the regime’s alignment with the confrontational rhetoric favored by other illiberal and authoritarian states.

The Ivanishvili system deploys the state’s legal and economic apparatus not as impartial tools for the public good, but as primary instruments for consolidating power, rewarding political loyalty, and protecting the assets of the ruling elite. Legislation is crafted to restructure the political and economic landscape in favor of the regime, while public funds are systematically channeled through a sophisticated patronage network.

The GD-controlled parliament has enacted a suite of laws designed to shrink the space for democratic oversight and dissent. The 2024 "Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence," widely known as the "foreign agent" law, is a prime example.³² Modeled on similar Russian legislation, it requires non-governmental organizations and media outlets that receive more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources to register as "organizations pursuing the interest of a foreign power".⁷ This law is a direct tool for stigmatizing and creating crippling administrative burdens for the very organizations essential for monitoring elections, investigating corruption, and holding the government accountable. Similarly, amendments to the criminal code have imposed harsher penalties for violations during public demonstrations, granting law enforcement broad discretion to detain protesters and chilling the right to peaceful assembly.⁷

While some legislation is designed for repression, other laws are tailored for elite benefit. The most blatant example is the spring 2024 amendment to the Tax Code, known as the "offshore law".⁶ This legislation created substantial tax exemptions for individuals and companies transferring assets from offshore jurisdictions into Georgia. The timing and design of this law strongly suggest it was a bespoke legal instrument created for a specific purpose: to protect Bidzina Ivanishvili’s assets from impending international sanctions.

●       The Catalyst: On December 27, 2024, the United States Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili for his role in undermining Georgian democracy.³
●       The Response: Immediately following the sanctions, between December 31, 2024, and January 20, 2025, a massive and rapid corporate restructuring of the Ivanishvili family’s vast empire began.³ Companies previously held through opaque offshore entities in jurisdictions like Belize and Panama were transferred to newly created Georgian joint-stock companies. This sequence provides compelling evidence that the state’s legislative power was mobilized to create a legal shield for the personal assets of its informal ruler.
This is detailed in the following table, which documents the post-sanction corporate restructuring.

Table 1: Post-Sanction Corporate Restructuring of Ivanishvili Family Assets (December 2024 — January 2025)

Beyond protecting elite assets, the state’s economic instruments are used to fuel a vast patronage system through public procurement. A comprehensive analysis by Transparency International Georgia for the first half of 2025 revealed a stark and undeniable pattern: companies linked to individuals who donated to Georgian Dream won state tenders worth approximately 144 million GEL (about USD 53 million), while companies linked to donors of all other political parties combined won zero state tenders.⁷ This "donor-contractor" nexus is a core feature of the system, creating a closed, self-perpetuating financial loop. Public funds, including those from the Tbilisi municipal budget, are directed via non-competitive or tailored contracts to allied corporate entities. These entities, in turn, recycle a portion of their profits back to the ruling party in the form of political donations. This systematically converts taxpayer money into political financing, ensuring the party’s resource dominance while rewarding its corporate allies and marginalizing any business not aligned with the regime.

The system’s punitive function against economic actors who attempt to challenge its political monopoly is best illustrated by the case of TBC Bank and its co-founder, Mamuka Khazaradze. In 2019, shortly after Khazaradze announced his intention to form a political movement and was leading a Western-backed consortium to build the strategic Anaklia deep-sea port, the prosecutor’s office revived a decade-old, dormant money-laundering investigation against him. The politically timed legal assault effectively sabotaged both the port project, which posed a competitive threat to Ivanishvili-linked interests in another port, and Khazaradze’s political ambitions. This sent an unmistakable signal to the entire business elite: converting independent economic capital into political capital would be met with the full force of the captured state’s legal and regulatory apparatus.

Despite the wholesale capture of the judiciary, the system is periodically forced to display tactical flexibility to maintain its democratic facade and mitigate social tension. A review of recent politically charged cases reveals a double standard: while cases involving "disrespect for the police" or a direct challenge to the state are pursued to conviction, in other cases, such as those involving planted narcotics, courts have begun issuing acquittals due to insufficient evidence. This indicates not judicial independence, but a pragmatic calculation by the authorities who, according to one political insider, "desperately need to play at democracy." The system is willing to sacrifice minor cases to secure convictions in those it deems essential, thereby simulating justice while retaining the levers for key repressions.

The most salient example of personal economic interests superseding national strategic imperatives is the systemic sabotage of the Anaklia deep-sea port project. This US- and EU-backed project was poised to become a key regional logistics hub, enhancing Georgia’s geopolitical significance. However, the government unilaterally terminated the contract with the Western-led consortium in 2020. Subsequent investigative reports, including the Pandora Papers, revealed that offshore companies linked to Ivanishvili held direct financial interests in the competing Poti port. The neutralization of the Anaklia project, therefore, serves as a definitive case study of state capture, where the state’s legal and administrative apparatus was mobilized to eliminate a strategic national project that concurrently represented a commercial and political threat to the informal ruler’s network.

The political and corporate spheres in Georgia are not merely adjacent; they are systemically integrated into a cohesive network of power. This analysis reveals a system where the lines between public office and private enterprise are deliberately blurred, and where economic influence and political authority are mutually reinforcing. This fusion creates a neo-feudal structure where personal loyalty to a single patron—Bidzina Ivanishvili—is the primary currency of power.

At the apex of this system is Ivanishvili himself. As the founder of Georgian Dream and the country’s wealthiest individual, with a fortune estimated to be equivalent to a significant fraction of Georgia's GDP, his corporate network is effectively intertwined with the state itself.¹ His business empire, now consolidated from offshore jurisdictions into Georgian holding companies like JSC Atu Holding and JSC Terra under the direct ownership of himself, his wife Ekaterine Khvedelidze, and his son Uta Ivanishvili, controls major commercial assets, including banks, real estate, and nationally significant projects.³ His personal charity, the Cartu Foundation, operates on a scale that rivals state agencies, funding major public infrastructure and social programs. While framed as philanthropy, this activity functions as a powerful tool of soft power and patronage, blurring the distinction between private largesse and state responsibility and creating a sense of public indebtedness to him personally.⁷

The most critical mechanism for fusing corporate and state power is the “revolving door” through which individuals move seamlessly between Ivanishvili's private companies and top government positions. A 2015 investigation by Transparency International Georgia identified at least 38 high-ranking government officials who had previously worked in structures affiliated with Ivanishvili.⁷ This pattern has continued and is most pronounced in the security apparatus, the siloviki, which is controlled by his most trusted and personally loyal lieutenants. Vakhtang Gomelauri and Anzor Chubunidze, who previously served as Ivanishvili’s personal bodyguards, were appointed to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and later the State Security Service) and the Special State Protection Service, respectively.⁷ This ensures that the loyalty of the state's coercive instruments is personal to the patron, not institutional or constitutional. Similarly, his former personal lawyer, Shalva Tadumadze, was appointed first as Prosecutor General and then as a lifetime judge on the Supreme Court, cementing control over the judiciary.⁷

The Tbilisi mayoralty serves as another key node in this network. The incumbent, Kakha Kaladze, is a wealthy businessman in his own right, having founded the investment company Kala Capital with a focus on the energy sector.⁷ His entry into politics was under the Georgian Dream banner, serving as Energy Minister (a role that raised conflict of interest concerns) before becoming mayor.⁷ His position allows him to align his own business network with Ivanishvili's broader structure, directing municipal resources and opportunities accordingly.

The tangible result of this fusion is the previously discussed donor-contractor nexus, which is clearly observable at the municipal level in Tbilisi. A select group of major companies, primarily in the construction and development sectors, make substantial and regular financial donations to the Georgian Dream party. These same companies—including construction giants like Monolith 2005 and Bondi-2009—are subsequently awarded a disproportionately large share of public procurement contracts, including lucrative projects issued by Tbilisi City Hall.⁷ This creates a network of corporate entities whose financial success is inextricably tied to the political fortunes of the ruling party. It functions as a mechanism for converting state funds into political financing, ensuring that the party has the resources to maintain its dominance while rewarding its corporate allies with profitable, state-funded projects. The Tbilisi mayoral election, therefore, is not just a contest for political office but a contest for control over this lucrative nexus of power and capital.

The internal power struggles among clans are accompanied by a qualitative reinforcement of the repressive apparatus. The appointment of Mamuka Mdinaradze, a key figure from the party’s radical wing, to head the state security service signals a new phase of power centralization. This move, according to observers, is intended to intensify repressive measures against both the opposition and disloyal elements within the ruling elite itself. The system is thus evolving from a broad elite coalition to a narrower, more rigid vertical, where key posts in the security services are held not merely by loyalists, but by ideologically committed figures prepared to execute any order to defend the regime.

Beyond formal state control, the system employs informal or “shadow” mechanisms of coercion, including the strategic use of proximal violent groups. This was most evident during the anti-LGBT pogroms of July 5, 2021, when organized mobs of ultra-conservative and far-right activists were allowed to violently attack over 50 journalists and civil society members in downtown Tbilisi. The police remained largely passive, creating a climate of impunity. This pattern, where the state effectively outsources violence to non-state actors (“titushki”) to intimidate opponents while maintaining plausible deniability, demonstrates a sophisticated tool of hybrid regimes. It allows the system to achieve repressive goals without resorting to official police action, thereby chilling dissent through the unpredictable threat of mob violence.

Also, the absolute personalization of state power is most starkly revealed in the 2021 scandal known as “Beragate.” Leaked audio recordings captured a conversation in which Ivanishvili’s son, the pop singer Bera, is heard directing the head of the Special State Protection Service (a former personal bodyguard of his father) to locate and punish teenagers who had posted insulting comments about him online. The recordings confirm that state security officials were mobilized to intimidate and physically assault private citizens to satisfy a personal grievance of the patron's family. This case provides irrefutable evidence of a system where the coercive apparatus of the state functions as a private enforcement service for the ruling family, entirely detached from legal due process and accountability.

Table 2: Key Figures in the Ivanishvili Network
 

Source: Compiled from CAT AGI analysis of public records and investigative reports.

This systemic audit, using the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election as a diagnostic lens, reveals a political system in Georgia characterized by an advanced and resilient form of state capture. The analysis documents a governance model, architected by Bidzina Ivanishvili, where democratic institutions have been hollowed out and repurposed to serve an informal, highly centralized power structure. The electoral process, as demonstrated by the Tbilisi contest, functions not as a mechanism for democratic competition but as a key ritual for laundering legitimacy for what is, in effect, a single-party oligarchic state.

1. Systemic Capture and Institutional Weaponization: The evidence documents a condition of systemic capture, where key state institutions designed to ensure democratic competition and accountability—including the electoral administration, regulatory bodies, law enforcement, and the judiciary—are instrumentalized to serve the interests of the ruling party. The series of amendments to the electoral code, passed without broad consensus, represents the most salient example of this phenomenon. These are not minor adjustments but a fundamental re-engineering of the rules of political engagement to create a structural advantage for the incumbent, effectively insulating it from genuine electoral challenges.⁷ The Tbilisi municipal apparatus, under the leadership of a high-ranking party official, exemplifies how public administration is weaponized for patronage and political mobilization.⁷

2. The Self-Perpetuating Loop of Power and Capital: A closed, self-reinforcing loop between political power and economic resources has been documented. The analysis of public procurement data demonstrates a clear and consistent pattern: political power is leveraged to direct state and municipal funds to a network of allied corporate entities.⁷ These entities, in turn, provide the financial lifeblood for the ruling party through political donations. This transactional relationship creates a powerful patronage system that solidifies the ruling party's resource advantage and marginalizes economic actors not aligned with its interests. Legislation, such as the "offshore law," is tailored to protect the assets of this elite from international accountability, further entrenching the nexus of political and economic power.³

3. Narrative Control as a Central Pillar of Governance: The control of the information environment is not an auxiliary tactic but a central pillar of the current governance model. The domination of the broadcast media landscape by politically aligned channels allows for the relentless amplification of a single, state-sanctioned narrative—one that frames political competition in existential terms of “peace versus war” and “sovereignty versus foreign agency”.⁷ This is complemented by the institutionalized use of covert digital influence operations, directly involving state agencies, to manipulate public discourse, fabricate consensus, and discredit all forms of opposition.⁷ This strategy is essential for managing public opinion in a climate of widespread dissatisfaction and for justifying the government's anti-democratic actions.

4. Sophisticated Adaptation to External Pressure: The Ivanishvili system has proven to be highly resilient and adaptive. The response to US sanctions in December 2024 was not one of capitulation but of strategic repositioning. The rapid onshoring of assets under the protection of a pre-arranged domestic law, coupled with the successful cultivation of alternative sources of capital and legitimacy from non-Western partners like the UAE, demonstrates a sophisticated capacity to neutralize external pressure.³ This adaptability makes the system particularly resistant to incremental sanctions or diplomatic condemnation.

Based on the documented evidence, two potential systemic trajectories can be outlined for Georgia's political development. These are not predictions, but scenarios based on the continuation or disruption of the observed patterns.

Trajectory A: Entrenchment of Illiberal Rule. This is the most likely short-term trajectory. If the documented patterns of institutional capture, economic patronage, and narrative control continue unabated, the system will further consolidate into an illiberal, single-party dominant state. In this scenario, the 2025 Tbilisi election will serve as a procedural step to formalize and extend this control to the municipal level in the nation’s capital. This path would likely see a continued pivot away from Euro-Atlantic integration, a deepening of economic and political alignment with non-Western powers like Russia, China, and the UAE, and a further shrinking of the space for independent civil society, media, and political opposition.⁵⁵ The system’s internal logic—driven by the existential need to maintain power—will continue to drive it towards greater centralization and insulation from both domestic and international accountability.

The system's resilience is also rooted in a solid socio-economic base, drawing significant support from the population in poorer regions. For this demographic, as observers note, the government is primarily evaluated “from the position of the wallet.” Recent economic growth, driven by external factors such as post-COVID recovery and migration inflows, has allowed the regime to sustain an illusion of stability and improved living standards. This creates a paradoxical situation, similar to Russia in the 2000s, that can be described by the phrase: “Life became better, but more repulsive.” The system maintains legitimacy not through democratic merit but by ensuring basic economic subsistence for a key electoral segment, making it highly vulnerable to a sharp economic downturn.

Trajectory B: Emergence of Systemic Stress. While the current system appears robust, several points of potential friction could introduce systemic stress. The primary vulnerability is its extreme personalization; the system is built around the personal loyalty and authority of one individual. His eventual departure would likely trigger a destabilizing succession crisis among his lieutenants. Furthermore, persistent and widespread public discontent over economic conditions and democratic backsliding, as evidenced by ongoing protests, could evolve into a more organized challenge, especially given the deep-seated pro-European sentiment within a large segment of the population.² Increased and coordinated international pressure—such as the expansion of targeted sanctions to include family members and key corporate enablers, the suspension of the visa-free travel regime with the EU, or the targeting of new financial channels—could impose tangible costs on the ruling elite that are harder to circumvent.³⁸ While the capacity of these stressors to fundamentally alter the system's trajectory is currently limited by the opposition's fragmentation and the government's strategic pivot, they represent the primary countervailing forces to the trajectory of entrenchment. The system's response to these pressures will be a key indicator of its resilience and future direction.

When assessing the potential of public discontent as a driver of systemic stress, the social composition of the protest movement must be considered. Its core is comprised largely of young people, students, and the urban middle class, who have internalized European values and seek integration for pragmatic reasons. This social base, unlike protest movements in other regional contexts such as Kazakhstan, is not inclined toward violent methods or armed revolt because it “has something to lose: families, businesses, property.” This explains the predominantly peaceful nature of the protests but also reveals their structural limitation: they can exert moral and political pressure but do not pose a direct physical threat to the regime, which can afford to ignore their demands as long as they fail to attract support from broader and potentially more radicalized segments of the population.

This report is a foundational analysis (v1.0) produced through a multi-stage research process. The methodology is designed to synthesize a wide range of biographical, corporate, and political data into a coherent systemic profile of Georgia's informal leader and the network of power he has architected. The analysis integrates an extensive body of open-source intelligence (OSINT) with AI-assisted data processing to ensure analytical rigor and objectivity.

The research process involved the systematic collection and synthesis of publicly available data from a wide range of sources, including: investigative reports from reputable non-governmental organizations (Transparency International Georgia), findings from international bodies, platform transparency reports (Meta), academic analyses of post-Soviet governance, and reportage from credible international and local media outlets . All factual information, including names, dates, and corporate restructuring details, has been updated to be current as of the date of this report's last update.

AI-assisted tools, including a beta version of NOUS AGI, were employed in the data processing phase. This technological assistance was crucial for synthesizing decades of disparate data points into a coherent analysis of the system's evolution and for mapping the complex relationships between key political figures, state institutions, and corporate entities as detailed in the report .

It is critical to acknowledge the limitations of this preliminary study. As a v1.0 report, its findings are based exclusively on open-source data. It does not incorporate primary data from direct interviews or confidential sources. This report is therefore intended to be a "living document". It establishes a baseline understanding that is designed to be iteratively updated and deepened with new information gathered through the CAT AGI project's primary data collection mechanisms: the “Transparency Log” of official information requests and the “Citizen Signals Channel” for vetted public submissions. The ongoing work of the CAT AGI platform is essential for building a more complete and granular audit of the systems of power in Georgia.

1.     CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI

[NOUS/ANALYTICS] sbcl-2.4.5 Δ pipeline=CAT/OSINT pass=fact-extract → 112 triples (confidence μ=0.84).
[NOUS/ETHICS] source="intranet-leak[redacted]" class=ILLICIT_ACCESS chain_of_custody=unknown → decision=HOLD (mask+exclude).
[NOUS/LLM/LLAMA] model=llama-3.1-70b instr → brief.v1 (schema: actors/events/timeline) tokens=3.2k.
[NOUS/LLM/OPENAI] role=polish+cite → prose.v3.md (tone=analytic, citations=inline, kebab→snake fixed).
[NOUS/CONSISTENCY] OSINT overlap=31% w/ public records; policy=fallback_public_only.
[NOUS/RENDER] md→html via pandoc; assets hashed (sha256) and embedded.
[NOUS/TILDA] POST /api/v2/pages site=catagi.ge block=report/section status=201 id=784213 ver=Δ0925.
[NOUS/AUDIT] permalink=/reports/ge-2024-25; checksum=1f9e…a42; escalate→human_review for held sources.

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