The Enforcer: An Analytical Profile of Mamuka Mdinaradze, from Party Ideologue to Security Chief

This report, the fifth installment in the CAT AGI "Knowledge Base” series, examines the career and systemic function of Mamuka Mdinaradze. The analysis frames him not as an independent political actor, but as an essential functional component of the informal power vertical that governs contemporary Georgia.¹ His trajectory provides a critical diagnostic lens for understanding the evolution of the ruling system itself—its ideological underpinnings, its mechanisms of control, and its response to internal and external pressures.

For years, Mdinaradze served as the primary public “Voice” of the regime. As the ruling party’s most prominent and disciplined spokesperson, he was tasked with articulating, defending, and providing a veneer of legalistic justification for its most controversial policies.¹ His public discourse, a calculated blend of legal terminology and aggressive political polemics, has been instrumental in shaping an information environment hostile to dissent. He has consistently worked to construct a political reality in which the government is a besieged defender of national sovereignty, and all opposition is a form of foreign-sponsored subversion.

His appointment as the head of the State Security Service in September 2025 marks a fundamental transformation of his role, adding the function of the regime's primary “Shield”.⁸ This move is more than a personnel change; it is a systemic statement. It signifies the formal merger of the party's ideological enforcement wing with the state's coercive apparatus. The individual who for years defined the regime's enemies in public discourse is now empowered to neutralize those same enemies using the formidable and opaque instruments of the state security service.
The core thesis of this report is that an analysis of Mamuka Mdinaradze's career is essential for understanding the strategic hardening of the ruling system. His personal evolution from a lawyer to a party propagandist and, finally, to a security chief mirrors the regime's own journey from a political entity that sought a degree of democratic legitimacy to a consolidated power structure that increasingly relies on ideological control and coercion to maintain its grip. His profile, therefore, offers a crucial window into the regime's ideological and security dimensions as it navigates the critical political cycle of the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election.¹

Mamuka Mdinaradze’s professional biography charts a deliberate and rapid ascent from the legal profession to the apex of Georgia's political and security establishment. His career is a case study in how legal expertise, combined with unwavering political loyalty and effective communication skills, can be leveraged to become an indispensable asset within a centralized, patronage-based system. Each stage of his career demonstrated the qualities that would ultimately lead to his appointment as the guardian of the regime's security.

Mamuka Mdinaradze was born on November 24, 1978, in Tbilisi.¹ He pursued a legal education, graduating from the prestigious Law Faculty of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in 2000.¹ His early professional life was rooted in the state's law enforcement and legal systems. From 2001 to 2004, during the final years of Eduard Shevardnadze's presidency and the period of the Rose Revolution, he served as an investigator in the Vake-Saburtalo Investigative Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).¹ This brief but formative experience in the state’s security apparatus would be cited by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze more than two decades later as a key qualification for his appointment to head the SGB, lending a veneer of professional credibility to a fundamentally political decision.¹⁰

Following the post-revolution reforms of the security sector, Mdinaradze transitioned into private legal practice. In 2005, he became a member of the Georgian Bar Association, specializing as a defense lawyer in criminal law.¹ Over the next decade, he was involved in establishing and managing several legal entities, including the "Tbilisi Law Center" and the NGO “Law Monitoring Center”.¹ This period culminated in 2015 with the founding of his own firm, “Mdinaradze & Partner Lawyers”.¹ Concurrently, he pursued academic work, obtaining a Doctor of Law degree in 2015.¹ This decade in private practice was crucial for honing the skills that would define his political persona: a capacity for structured legal argument, a command of procedural detail, and an ability to construct a public defense for a given position.

In 2016, Mdinaradze made a decisive move into the political arena, joining the ruling Georgian Dream party. He was nominated as the party's majoritarian candidate for the Didi Digomi constituency in Tbilisi for the parliamentary elections of that year.¹ He secured a convincing victory, winning 51.7% of the vote.¹ His entry into politics was immediately followed by a remarkably swift rise within the party's hierarchy. Upon taking his seat in parliament in November 2016, he was almost instantly appointed Chairman of the Georgian Dream parliamentary faction.¹ This immediate elevation to a senior leadership position indicates that the party leadership did not see him as a rank-and-file newcomer, but as a valuable asset whose legal background and articulate, confrontational style were urgently needed to front the party's public and legislative battles.

Over the next nine years, Mdinaradze solidified his position as the ruling party's indispensable parliamentary enforcer. He served in key leadership roles, including Chairman of the Georgian Dream faction (2016-2019 and 2020-2024) and Leader of the Parliamentary Majority (2019-2020 and 2024-2025).² His function was far more than administrative. He became the party's primary public voice, its chief legislative strategist, and its most aggressive polemicist. He was tasked with steering the government’s legislative agenda through parliament, often in the face of intense opposition, and with defending the party's most controversial policies in relentless media appearances.

During this period, he cultivated a public image of a professional jurist, distinct from the oligarchic figures at the top of the party. His official financial declarations revealed relatively modest assets, including apartments in Tbilisi and a collection of paintings by Georgian artists, reinforcing a persona of a career professional rather than a figure enriched by politics.¹ This image was a strategic asset, allowing him to frame his arguments as being based on legal principle rather than partisan interest, even as his rhetoric grew increasingly ideological and confrontational.

This phase of his career perfectly mirrors the evolution of the Georgian Dream party itself. He joined in 2016, a time when the party still sought to project an image of a broad coalition that included technocrats and professionals. As the party's governance style hardened and its policies grew more controversial, his role shifted from that of a legal expert to that of an ideological warrior. His full-throated embrace of anti-Western conspiracy theories and his aggressive attacks on domestic opponents were not personal eccentricities; they were a direct reflection of the regime's own definitive pivot away from its pro-European facade and towards a more insular, illiberal model of rule.

The culmination of Mdinaradzeэs loyal service to the ruling system came in the late summer of 2025. On August 23, following the abrupt resignation of the previous SGB head, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze nominated Mdinaradze to lead the country's most powerful security and intelligence agency.¹ The appointment was a clear signal of the regime's priorities. It occurred amidst significant turbulence within the security services, following the short and scandal-plagued five-month tenure of his predecessor, Anri Okhanashvili.³ This instability suggests a state of heightened paranoia within the ruling elite, creating an imperative to install an individual of unquestionable, absolute loyalty in direct control of the state's coercive apparatus.

The confirmation process was a formality, underscoring the party's total control over state institutions. The parliamentary hearing was conducted behind closed doors in the Defense and Security Committee, and on September 3, 2025, the GD-controlled parliament approved his appointment with a unanimous 85 votes in favor, while the opposition boycotted the session.¹ In his first public remarks following the confirmation, Mdinaradze made his allegiances clear, specifically thanking Bidzina Ivanishvili before acknowledging the Prime Minister or parliament.¹ This gesture was a public affirmation of his direct loyalty to the system's informal patron, bypassing the formal constitutional chain of command. His appointment was not merely a promotion; it was the final and most definitive step in the regime's long-term project of fusing party ideology with state security power.

Mamuka Mdinaradze's primary value to the ruling system has been his function as its chief ideologue and public communicator. He has been instrumental in developing and popularizing a specific set of narratives—a “doctrine”—designed to rationalize the government's actions, delegitimize all opposition, and create a political reality conducive to long-term, unaccountable rule. This doctrine is not a coherent political philosophy but a collection of tactical rhetorical tools, including conspiracy theories, legalistic misdirection, and conservative social messaging, all deployed to serve the strategic interests of the regime.

Central to the Mdinaradze doctrine is the systematic and relentless promotion of conspiracy theories that are now a cornerstone of the ruling party's official ideology.¹⁹ The most prominent of these is the narrative of the “Global War Party,” a term used to describe a nebulous, malevolent coalition of Western powers, international organizations, and the domestic Georgian opposition.¹ According to this narrative, this entity is engaged in a covert plot to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty, overthrow its government, and drag the country into a direct military conflict with Russia.⁵

Mdinaradze has been a key architect and disseminator of this theory. He has used it to frame any form of international criticism or domestic dissent not as legitimate political discourse but as an act of aggression by this hostile foreign power. His rhetoric has become increasingly specific and escalatory. In March 2025, he publicly claimed that the governments of the Baltic states and Scandinavia are not sovereign entities but are directly controlled by the “Global War Party” and the “deep state”.⁴ He has repeatedly accused Western-funded organizations, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), of being financial instruments of this global conspiracy, tasked with fomenting revolution in Georgia.⁴ He has also applied this logic to financial matters, framing international sanctions and the freezing of Bidzina Ivanishvili's assets not as a response to democratic backsliding, but as a form of “financial blackmail” orchestrated by these same shadowy forces.¹

The strategic utility of this narrative is threefold. First, it creates a powerful siege mentality, allowing the government to portray itself as the sole defender of the nation against existential threats. Second, it serves as a universal tool for delegitimizing any and all opposition; by labeling critics as "agents” of the “Global War Party,” their arguments can be dismissed without substantive engagement.¹ Third, it provides a ready-made justification for the government's own anti-democratic actions—such as cracking down on NGOs or suppressing protests—which can be framed as necessary defensive measures to protect national sovereignty from foreign interference.⁵

Nowhere is the Mdinaradze doctrine more clearly observable than in his role as the chief public defender of the controversial “foreign agent” law, which was introduced in 2023 and passed in 2024 amid massive public protests and strong international condemnation.¹ He was the primary political and rhetorical force behind the legislation, deploying a multi-pronged strategy to justify its passage and discredit its opponents. The physical embodiment of this confrontation occurred in April 2024, when an opposition MP punched Mdinaradze at the parliamentary podium as he was defending the bill, an image that was broadcast globally and made him the literal face of the law.¹
 
His defense of the law was built on three core rhetorical tactics:
1.     False Equivalence: Mdinaradze’s primary argument was that the Georgian law was analogous to, or even a “direct copy” of, the United States' Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).²⁵ He repeatedly challenged critics, stating, “If you don't like our law, it means you don't like the American one either”.¹ This was a deliberate act of misdirection. International legal bodies, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, explicitly refuted this comparison, clarifying that FARA is a narrowly tailored law targeting lobbying and public relations activities conducted on behalf of foreign governments or political parties. It does not, as a rule, apply to independent civil society or media organizations simply for receiving foreign grants for their work.²⁸ The Georgian law, in stark contrast, creates an automatic and irrebuttable presumption that any organization receiving over 20% of its funding from abroad is inherently "pursuing the interest of a foreign power”.²⁸
2.     Ad Hominem Attacks: Rather than engaging with substantive criticism of the law, Mdinaradze consistently resorted to attacking the character and motives of its opponents. He systematically labeled critical NGOs, media outlets, and opposition politicians as a “collective agency” acting on the instructions of foreign “masters” to harm the country.¹ This tactic served to poison the public discourse, shifting the focus from a debate on the law's merits to a loyalty test, where any opposition to the government's initiative was equated with treason.
3.     Straw Man Arguments: Mdinaradze persistently misrepresented the law's purpose and effect, arguing that its sole aim was to ensure financial “transparency”.³² He framed its requirements as a simple, unobtrusive administrative task: “The only requirement is that an NGO... fills out a declaration once a year. That's all the law is”.³² This deliberately ignored the law’s primary and intended function: the stigmatization of critical voices. The true impact of the law lies not in the disclosure of financial information—much of which was already publicly available—but in the official branding of these organizations with a pejorative label designed to erode public trust and create a chilling effect on their activities.²²
 
Weaponizing Words: Mdinaradze's Disinformation Campaign
Mamuka Mdinaradze’s defense of Georgia's “foreign agent” law represents a sophisticated disinformation campaign that systematically employs false equivalence, ad hominem attacks, and conspiracy theories to legitimize authoritarian legislation. The Georgian Dream executive secretary has orchestrated a rhetorical strategy that evolved from legalistic arguments to pro-Kremlin conspiracy theories, serving as the ideological foundation for Georgia's democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation.

The campaign's strategic deployment of disinformation tactics has successfully advanced Russian interests while dismantling Georgian civil society. Mdinaradze's rhetoric evolved from denying Russian parallels in 2023 to embracing "Deep State" conspiracy theories by 2025, mirroring Kremlin propaganda about Western “proxy wars” and global manipulation. This rhetorical transformation coincides with unprecedented Western sanctions targeting over 230 Georgian officials, including billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, while over 400 NGOs refuse registration under legislation that international legal experts unanimously condemn as incompatible with democratic governance.

Anatomy of false equivalence with US FARA
Mdinaradze’s central rhetorical strategy relies on systematically misrepresenting fundamental legal differences between Georgia's law and the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). His claims demonstrate a calculated progression from acknowledging differences to asserting complete equivalence, culminating in February 2025 declarations that Georgia adopted an “exact copy” of American legislation.

The false equivalence operates through deliberate distortion of legal criteria. While FARA requires evidence of actual "direction and control" by foreign governments with proven principal-agent relationships, Georgia's law automatically triggers based solely on a 20% foreign funding threshold. As Mdinaradze claimed in February 2025: “parliament passed a lighter version of FARA, which has not been fully implemented. Therefore, instead of it, we will adopt the new American law and ensure its full enforcement.”

This misrepresentation ignores fundamental structural differences identified by international legal experts. The Venice Commission, Europe's premier constitutional law body, definitively stated that references to FARA “are fundamentally different in light of their very distinct purpose and scope, are not relevant comparative examples.” The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights emphasized that “Under the FARA, one does not have to register simply because one receives funds from a foreign source. Rather one must be an agent of a foreign principal.”

The scope differential reveals the false equivalence's cynical nature. FARA primarily targets political lobbyists and publicity agents, with only 5% of registrants being non-profits (mostly foreign political party branches), while Georgia's law explicitly captures virtually all independent NGOs and media organizations. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law experts note that “many US non-profit groups and media organizations receive foreign grants and other support, but the US has not required them to register as foreign agents under FARA.”

Mdinaradze's evolving claims demonstrate strategic disinformation deployment. In February 2023, he acknowledged the law was “not comparable to American legislation either,” yet by 2025 he described it as an “exact copy” of FARA. This progression reflects calculated escalation designed to legitimize increasingly authoritarian measures through democratic precedent claims.

Systematic disinformation campaign mechanics
The rhetorical campaign functions as coordinated information warfare employing classic disinformation techniques across multiple vectors. Mdinaradze serves as the primary attack coordinator within a hierarchical structure led by Bidzina Ivanishvili (strategy setting) and Irakli Kobakhidze (operational implementation), with synchronized messaging across government communications, pro-government media, and social media platforms.

The campaign deploys sophisticated psychological manipulation through “black money” conspiracy theories. Mdinaradze’s April 2024 explanation reveals deliberate semantic confusion: “Black money – you’re referring to black money under criminal law... In this context, do you understand what we mean by black money? The money that is received is officially registered, but we are unaware of the sender, the amount, and, more importantly, its intended use.” This rhetorical strategy transforms legitimate transparency concerns into sinister conspiracy narratives about foreign manipulation.

The disinformation architecture employs systematic false dilemma construction presenting Georgian Dream as the sole guarantor of peace against Western warmongers. Mdinaradze frames opposition as betrayal: “Georgia is our priority, while Europe and other countries come next,” while attacking EU criticism as "another hoax and plain blackmail" that is "absolutely immoral and categorically unacceptable.”

Strategic escalation toward conspiracy theories demonstrates calculated radicalization. By March 2025, Mdinaradze fully embraced pro-Kremlin narratives, claiming the “Deep State” and global forces had “waged a proxy war against Russia through Ukraine” while asserting that “puppet governments” of EU member states were attempting to “overthrow the Georgian government.” This represents verbatim adoption of Russian propaganda frameworks blaming the West for Moscow's invasion.

The campaign employs technological amplification through coordinated networks. Research documents identical talking points appearing simultaneously across government statements, pro-government media outlets (Imedi, Rustavi 2, PosTV), anonymous Facebook pages, and parliamentary proceedings. Meta removed Russia-originated networks supporting Georgian Dream during 2024 protests, confirming international coordination.

Evolution toward conspiratorial authoritarianism
Mdinaradze’s rhetoric underwent systematic radicalization from defensive legalism to aggressive conspiracy promotion, reflecting Georgian Dream's broader authoritarian consolidation strategy. The chronological analysis reveals four distinct phases of escalating disinformation deployment.

Phase One (February-March 2023) featured legalistic arguments denying Russian parallels while claiming the law addressed legitimate transparency concerns. Mdinaradze emphasized: “I confirm with full responsibility, no, the Russian law! Russian law will not be accepted in Georgia!” This defensive posture reflected initial concerns about public reaction and international criticism.

Phase Two (April 2024) introduced “black money” conspiracy narratives while launching systematic attacks on NGOs as recipients of “opaque money” directed toward “supporting radical parties, radical NGOs, and radical propaganda media.” This phase established the foundation for delegitimizing civil society through financial conspiracy theories.

Phase Three (2024-2025) escalated FARA false equivalence claims while introducing broader anti-Western conspiracy theories. Mdinaradze suggested that “the West deliberately bankrupted Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse in order to apply pressure on party founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili,” demonstrating expansion into international financial conspiracy theories.

Phase Four (March 2025) represents complete embrace of pro-Kremlin conspiracy frameworks. Mdinaradze's March Facebook post claiming that “puppet 'governments' of certain countries” have replaced traditional “donor organizations” in pursuing regime change operations mirrors Russian propaganda about Western-controlled "deep state" operations.

The evolution demonstrates strategic coordination with international authoritarian networks. Georgian Dream's participation in the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest alongside Viktor Orbán's Hungary indicates formal alignment with European illiberal movements. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service statements directly echo Georgian Dream messaging about US “coup” plans, suggesting operational coordination.

This rhetorical progression serves systematic preparation for complete authoritarian transition. The conspiracy theories provide ideological justification for eliminating democratic opposition while maintaining facades of legitimacy through claims of defending “sovereignty” against foreign manipulation.

Devastating impact on Georgian democracy
The disinformation campaign has achieved its strategic objectives of crippling Georgian civil society while triggering unprecedented international isolation. Over 400 NGOs and media organizations refuse registration, facing 25,000 lari ($9,300) fines equivalent to 4-10 times average monthly wages, followed by additional penalties for non-compliance.

The practical consequences demonstrate the law's repressive intent. Georgia's press freedom ranking collapsed from 89th to 114th globally, with Reporters Sans Frontières specifically citing the foreign influence law as enabling systematic repression of independent journalism. Violence against media workers has escalated dramatically, with over 200 incidents of harassment, beatings, and threats documented during 2024 by Transparency International Georgia.

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), Georgia's premier election monitoring organization, plans closure rather than operating under "foreign agent" designation. Director Nino Dolidze faces death threats and smear campaigns, with posters calling her a "traitor" hung at her apartment entrance. This systematic intimidation targets the institutional foundations of democratic oversight.

The chilling effects extend throughout civil society. Regional organizations like Biliki in Gori, which runs educational programs and daycare for children, face impossible choices between splitting operations or accepting stigmatizing labels. Multiple organizations are relocating to Armenia or shutting down entirely, representing a fundamental hollowing out of Georgian democratic infrastructure.

Western sanctions targeting over 230 Georgian Dream representatives demonstrate unprecedented international concern. The December 2024 sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili mark the first time the Georgian Dream founder faced personal consequences, while comprehensive visa bans and aid suspensions reflect systematic isolation. The European Union has effectively frozen Georgia's EU candidacy status, representing the collapse of the country's stated strategic objective.

International legal consensus against false equivalence
The global legal and human rights community has unanimously rejected Mdinaradze's false equivalence claims through comprehensive expert assessments. The Venice Commission's urgent opinion strongly recommends repealing the law, finding it incompatible with European Convention on Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ joint statement confirms the law “will have a chilling effect on civil society, journalists and human rights defenders” while placing “Georgia in contravention of its human rights obligations, notably on freedom of association.” This assessment directly contradicts Mdinaradze's transparency claims by identifying systematic rights violations.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights produced a 30-page urgent opinion documenting “serious deficiencies that renders it incompatible with international human rights standards.” Their analysis emphasizes that Georgian law “presupposes that anyone receiving foreign support will act in pursuit of the interests of the foreign funder...by triggering an automatic, unevidenced and irrebuttable presumption.”

Human Rights Watch's comprehensive analysis concludes that “the bill’s supporters falsely allege that the bill is similar to the United States Foreign Agent Registration Act. But the US law does not equate receiving foreign funding, in part or in whole, with being under the direction and control of a foreign principal.” This expert consensus eliminates any credible basis for Mdinaradze's equivalence claims.

The European Court of Justice precedent in Commission v. Hungary (2020) found similar legislation constitutes “indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality,” providing binding legal precedent that directly contradicts Georgian law's structure. This jurisprudential framework demonstrates that Mdinaradze's legal arguments lack foundation in European constitutional law.

Conclusion
Mamuka Mdinaradze’s rhetorical campaign represents a systematic disinformation operation that has successfully advanced authoritarian consolidation while crippling Georgian democracy. His strategic deployment of false equivalence, conspiracy theories, and ad hominem attacks demonstrates sophisticated information warfare techniques designed to legitimize repressive legislation through democratic precedent claims.

The campaign’s evolution from defensive legalism to pro-Kremlin conspiracy theories reflects Georgian Dream's broader transformation into an authoritarian political corporation aligned with international illiberal networks. The unprecedented international sanctions and comprehensive expert condemnation confirm the campaign's destructive impact on Georgian democratic institutions.

Most significantly, the disinformation campaign has achieved its core strategic objective of providing ideological justification for eliminating independent civil society while maintaining plausible deniability about authoritarian intent. The systematic coordination with Russian propaganda frameworks and alignment with Kremlin strategic objectives demonstrates how modern information warfare enables domestic authoritarianism through international support networks.

The Georgian case provides a template for understanding how sophisticated disinformation campaigns can dismantle democracy from within while exploiting democratic norms and institutions for authoritarian ends. Mdinaradze's rhetorical strategies reveal the critical importance of defending factual discourse and institutional legitimacy against systematic information warfare designed to enable authoritarian capture of democratic states.

The third pillar of the Mdinaradze doctrine is the active promotion of a conservative social agenda, which functions as a powerful tool for political mobilization and ideological positioning. He has been a leading proponent of constitutional amendments and legislative initiatives aimed at restricting the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, framing these measures as a necessary defense of Georgia’s “traditional” and “family values”.¹
 
His rhetoric on this issue is carefully calibrated. He argues for a clear distinction between the “protection of human rights” and the “propaganda of non-traditional lifestyles”.³⁴ While claiming to support the former, he has been an architect of laws that severely curtail the latter, specifically targeting freedom of expression and assembly for the LGBTQ+ community. He has publicly justified restrictions on public events like Tbilisi Pride, arguing that while individuals have the right to live as they choose, public displays of “non-traditional lifestyles” are a form of “propaganda” that is unacceptable to the vast majority of the population and harmful to children.¹ He has repeatedly invoked the need to shield future generations from what he terms "pseudo-liberal propaganda".³⁴
 
The political function of this narrative is multifaceted. Internally, it serves to consolidate the ruling party's conservative voter base, tapping into traditionalist sentiments and creating a potent “culture war” narrative that can distract from economic problems or governance failures. Externally, it serves the regime's broader geopolitical pivot. By enacting policies that are in direct opposition to the human rights standards championed by the European Union and other Western partners, the government deliberately creates a point of ideological friction. This allows the regime to frame its democratic backsliding not as a failure to meet EU standards, but as a principled stand in defense of Georgia's unique national and religious identity against foreign liberal influence.¹

The appointment of Mamuka Mdinaradze as the head of the State Security Service represents a watershed moment in the evolution of the Georgian state under Georgian Dream. It is the most explicit and audacious move to date in the regime’s long-term project of subordinating independent state institutions to direct political control. This transition from the legislative and ideological sphere to the apex of the security apparatus carries profound implications for the nature of governance, the rule of law, and the pre-election environment in Georgia.

The decision to appoint a high-profile party propagandist with only brief, low-level law enforcement experience from over two decades ago to lead the SGB must be understood as a fundamentally political, rather than technocratic, act.¹ The appointment was not made to enhance the professional intelligence-gathering or counter-espionage capabilities of the service. Rather, it was made to ensure its absolute and unwavering alignment with the political agenda of the ruling party.

This move was precipitated by a period of significant instability and perceived unreliability at the top of the SGB. Mdinaradze's immediate predecessor, Anri Okhanashvili, served for a mere five months before resigning abruptly on August 23, 2025.³ His brief tenure was overshadowed by a major public scandal involving Giorgi Bachiashvili, a jailed businessman and former associate of Bidzina Ivanishvili, who accused Okhanashvili of being personally involved in his alleged abduction and illegal rendition to Georgia.³ This crisis at the heart of the security service likely created an urgent need within the regime's inner circle to install a figure of unquestionable personal and political loyalty to stabilize control and prevent further damaging revelations.

Mdinaradze's appointment effectively redefines the concept of “state security” in Georgia. In his first public statements as SGB chief, he identified his top priorities not as traditional security threats like terrorism or foreign military intelligence, but as combating “foreign interference and the threats of provocations stemming from these foreign interferences inside the country”.⁸ This language is a direct continuation of the political rhetoric he has used for years to describe the activities of civil society, independent media, and the political opposition. The appointment thus formalizes the regime’s view that the primary threat to its power is internal dissent. The SGB is no longer positioned primarily as a shield against external enemies, but as a political instrument for managing and neutralizing domestic opponents, a task for which a political enforcer like Mdinaradze is deemed better suited than a traditional intelligence professional.

A clear indication of the SGB's new direction can be found in the composition of the command team that Mdinaradze appointed on September 4, 2025, just one day after his confirmation.¹ The selection of his four deputies reveals a strategy of combining loyalists from the captured justice system with trusted insiders from the security apparatus and politically reliable regional enforcers.

●       Lasha Maghradze (First Deputy): A lawyer who previously served as First Deputy Minister of Justice.¹ His career is closely linked to that of Tea Tsulukiani, the long-serving former Justice Minister who oversaw the consolidation of control over the judiciary. His appointment signifies a strengthening of the influence of the party's "jurist clan" within the security services, ensuring legal and administrative alignment.¹

●       Aleksandre Maisuradze (Deputy): Also a former Deputy Minister of Justice, his appointment reinforces the trend of staffing the SGB's senior ranks with politically vetted cadres from the justice ministry, further eroding the separation between the legal and security branches of the state.¹

●       Tamaz Borashvili (Deputy): A career SGB officer who previously served as the director of the agency's State Security Department.¹ His retention and promotion represent an effort to ensure institutional continuity and to co-opt senior professionals within the service who have demonstrated their loyalty to the ruling party's agenda.

●       Levan Kharabadze (Deputy): The most controversial appointment. A former regional governor and police chief, Kharabadze was allegedly involved in the violent dispersal of an opposition protest in 2009 under the previous government.¹ While he denied using force, his presence at the event was documented.¹ His inclusion in the SGB leadership signals a clear prioritization of individuals with a demonstrated history of coercive action against political opponents and a focus on regional enforcement capabilities.
This team composition indicates a deliberate strategy to build an SGB leadership that is, above all, politically reliable. It fuses legal-administrative loyalists with security professionals and regional enforcers, creating a command structure designed for the primary mission of safeguarding the political regime.

The installation of Mamuka Mdinaradze at the head of the SGB is poised to have a significant and chilling effect on the political environment ahead of the October 4, 2025, Tbilisi mayoral election.¹ With a leader whose publicly stated priorities are to combat “foreign interference” and “internal provocations,” the SGB is likely to intensify its focus on the activities of domestic actors deemed hostile to the government.⁸
This creates heightened risks for several key groups essential for a democratic election:

●       Civil Society Organizations: Groups involved in election monitoring, voter education, and anti-disinformation work are likely to be primary targets. They fit perfectly into Mdinaradze's pre-existing narrative of “foreign agents” seeking to destabilize the country. The SGB could use its powers of surveillance and investigation to create administrative pressure, launch smear campaigns, or otherwise disrupt their work.

●       Independent Media: Journalists and media outlets critical of the government may face increased surveillance and intimidation. The SGB’s broad mandate could be used to investigate journalists' sources or to create legal pretexts for interfering with their operations, further shrinking the space for free expression.

●       Political Opposition and Activists: Opposition campaigns and grassroots activism are likely to be monitored closely for any activity that can be framed as a “provocation” or part of a “revolutionary scenario.” The SGB's role as a “sprawling surveillance and enforcement body” will likely be deployed to gather intelligence on and disrupt opposition activities.⁷

In essence, Mdinaradze's appointment creates a perfect and dangerous feedback loop. The same individual who spent years defining the regime's political enemies through propaganda is now in charge of the state's primary instrument for neutralizing them. This fusion of ideological pronouncement and coercive power fundamentally alters the political playing field, creating an environment of intimidation that is antithetical to the principles of a free and fair election.

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 The career of Mamuka Mdinaradze documents the complete trajectory of a systemic enforcer, a figure who has seamlessly transitioned from defending the ruling regime's agenda in the court of public opinion to defending it with the coercive instruments of the state. His professional arc is not merely a personal success story; it is a mirror of the Georgian Dream party's own evolution from a political movement that claimed a democratic, pro-European mandate to a consolidated, illiberal regime that prioritizes its own survival above all else. He is the embodiment of the system's hardened ideological and security posture.

The appointment of such a high-profile, polarizing political loyalist to lead the State Security Service represents a significant strategic gamble by the Ivanishvili system. On one hand, the perceived benefits for the regime are clear. It ensures absolute loyalty and ideological alignment at the head of its most critical security institution, eliminating the risk of internal dissent or independent action. It places a proven and ruthless communicator in charge of an agency whose primary mission has been redefined as the management of domestic political threats. This move consolidates power and sends an unambiguous message to all domestic and international actors that the regime will not tolerate challenges to its authority.

On the other hand, this gamble carries substantial and potentially destabilizing risks. By shattering any remaining illusion of institutional independence and placing an overt party propagandist in charge of the secret services, the regime makes itself more vulnerable. It risks alienating career professionals within the SGB, who may resent the imposition of a political commissar. It provides clear and irrefutable evidence to international partners of the politicization of its security apparatus, making the regime and its key figures, including Mdinaradze himself, more likely targets for comprehensive international sanctions.⁷

Most critically, this appointment raises the stakes for the regime's own survival. The actions of the SGB—an agency that operates largely in the shadows and without effective oversight—are now directly and inextricably linked to one of the ruling party's most prominent public faces. Any operational failure, human rights abuse, or political overreach by the service can no longer be dismissed as the action of an independent state body. It will be seen, correctly, as a direct act of the ruling party itself, with Mamuka Mdinaradze as its agent. In consolidating its control, the regime has also consolidated its accountability, taking a gamble that its new enforcer can maintain order without triggering a crisis that could threaten the entire system.

This report is a foundational analysis (v1.0) based on the synthesis of a report made by NOUS AGI, which has been systematically updated, verified, and enriched through a comprehensive OSINT review of over 500 additional public sources. This includes official government records, procurement databases, reports from international bodies (OSCE, European Parliament), findings from reputable non-governmental organizations (Transparency International Georgia, ISFED), platform transparency reports (Meta), academic analyses, and extensive reportage from credible international and local media outlets in both English and Georgian.¹

AI-assisted tools were employed for data processing, enabling the rapid analysis of large volumes of multilingual text, entity recognition, relationship mapping, and the identification of systemic patterns.¹

This analysis is a “living document” intended to establish a baseline understanding. It will be iteratively updated and expanded with primary data gathered through the CAT AGI project's “Transparency Log” of official information requests and the “Citizen Signals Channel” for vetted public submissions.¹ .

1.     CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI
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