The Echo Chamber: An Audit Of Georgia’s Polarized Media Ecosystem

The Georgian media environment, particularly in the lead-up to the October 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election, cannot be accurately understood through the traditional lens of a “fourth estate” serving as a public watchdog. Instead, it must be analyzed as a primary arena for political warfare and a core “indicator of power” within the system of informal governance that defines contemporary Georgia.¹ This report, the sixth installment in the CAT AGI “Knowledge Base” series, provides a systemic audit of this battlefield. It maps the key actors, the architecture of control, and the dominant narratives that are deployed not to inform the electorate, but to secure political dominance.

The analysis is explicitly situated within the framework of Georgia's “informal power vertical,” a system documented in previous reports where formal state institutions are subordinated to a centralized, unaccountable directorate.¹ Within this system, the media does not function as an independent check on power but as a critical instrument for its projection and consolidation. The upcoming mayoral election serves as a time-bound “diagnostic lens” through which the operational mechanics of this media control can be observed and documented in real-time.¹ The contest for the capital is a strategic imperative for the ruling system, and the media is its most potent weapon in that contest.

Adopting the posture of a “post-political systemic auditor,” this report does not seek to adjudicate partisan claims or predict electoral outcomes.¹ Its objective is to produce a durable, evidence-based record of the operational dynamics of the media landscape for an international audience of diplomats, observers, and researchers. The core analytical question guiding this inquiry is: “How is the media landscape structured and instrumentalized to control public narratives, reinforce political power, and influence the pre-election environment in Tbilisi?”.¹

This audit proceeds from the foundational understanding that the battle for Georgia’s political future is being waged, in large part, on the airwaves and across digital platforms. By deconstructing the ownership structures, narrative tactics, and coercive mechanisms that define this information war, this report aims to provide a clear and procedural understanding of how a manufactured reality is constructed to serve the interests of the ruling power.

The foundation of narrative control in Georgia is the architecture of media ownership. The landscape is not a diverse marketplace of ideas but a duopoly of politically aligned blocs, where financial viability and editorial direction are inextricably linked to partisan loyalties. This structure functions as the foundational layer of the “Propaganda Wing” of the ruling system, ensuring that the most powerful broadcast platforms operate as strategic assets for political warfare.¹ An analysis of the key actors reveals a system where the ability to absorb massive financial losses is a direct indicator of political backing, creating an environment where truly independent media is systemically unsustainable.

The pro-government media apparatus is centralized around Imedi TV, which serves as the cornerstone of the regime’s media empire.¹ Imedi TV is fully owned by the Georgian-registered Georgian Media Production Group LLC, whose ultimate beneficial owner is the Netherlands-registered Media Finance Group, a holding controlled by businessman Irakli Rukhadze.² Rukhadze’s role is not that of a passive investor but a strategic operator, tasked with ensuring the ideological alignment of the country's most influential broadcaster with the ruling Georgian Dream party.

The channel’s function as a political instrument is not a matter of interpretation but of public record. In a 2024 interview, Rukhadze explicitly stated that Imedi TV's “raison d'être” (main objective) is to prevent the opposition United National Movement from returning to power and that the channel would remain “on Ivanishvili's side”.⁴ This admission confirms that the broadcaster operates with a clear political mission that supersedes journalistic principles of objectivity and impartiality. This assessment is validated by international observers; the European Union's East Stratcom Task Force has described Imedi TV as the “ruling party's most powerful propaganda machine" and a "propaganda megaphone undermining Georgia's EU aspirations”.¹

The Imedi hub extends beyond a single channel. Rukhadze’s holding company also controls GDS (Georgian Dream Studios) and a significant stake in Maestro TV.² This network is complemented by other key pro-government broadcasters. Rustavi 2, once a bastion of critical journalism, now operates under an ownership structure linked to state-managed entities and carries a significant tax debt of 25 million GEL.² PostTV, another aggressively pro-government outlet, is co-owned by a ruling party Member of Parliament, Viktor Japaridze, further cementing the direct link between the party and its media amplifiers.¹

The financial data for this bloc reveals a business model predicated on political, not commercial, logic. In 2023, Imedi TV posted a loss of 53.3 million GEL, contributing to an accumulated debt of 388 million GEL. Rustavi 2 lost 31 million GEL in the same period.² These staggering losses are commercially unsustainable but are evidently acceptable to their politically connected owners, who view the expenditure as the necessary cost of maintaining a dominant propaganda apparatus.

The media bloc providing a counter-narrative to the government has been significantly weakened and operates in a state of constant financial precarity. The most significant development in this sphere has been the strategic collapse of its flagship channel, Mtavari Arkhi. On May 1, 2025, the channel officially ceased broadcasting, citing a severe financial crisis that had already forced it to suspend all live programming in February 2025.⁷ Founded in 2019 by former Rustavi 2 director Nika Gvaramia, Mtavari Arkhi had established itself as the leading and most uncompromising critical voice against the government.⁸

Its demise was not a simple business failure but the culmination of a multi-year strategy of attritional warfare by the state. This strategy involved a sustained campaign of legal, political, and financial pressure designed to create conditions where the channel would collapse under its own weight. The founder, Nika Gvaramia, was subjected to a politically motivated prosecution that led to his imprisonment in May 2022, a move widely condemned by international partners as an attack on media freedom.⁸ Although he was later pardoned, his removal from the channel's leadership at a critical time inflicted significant damage. The channel also faced a hostile regulatory environment and was beset by internal disputes and allegations of financial mismanagement, with claims that nearly 4 million GEL had been misappropriated from the company's advertising sales account.¹¹ The government did not need to overtly shut down Mtavari Arkhi; by creating an unsustainable operating environment, it achieved the same result while maintaining a veneer of plausible deniability, attributing the closure to “internal mismanagement” rather than state action.

With the silencing of Mtavari Arkhi, the opposition media landscape is now dominated by two main players: Formula TV and TV Pirveli. Both outlets remain highly critical of the government but operate under the same existential financial pressures that led to Mtavari's collapse. In March 2025, Formula TV underwent an ownership change, with its shares shifting from the controversial former Defense Minister David Kezerashvili to a group of four individuals, including the channel's director, Misha Mshvildadze.² TV Pirveli remains under the ownership of its founder, Vato Tsereteli.²

The financial unsustainability of the entire independent media sector is a critical systemic vulnerability. In 2023, Formula TV recorded a loss of 42.1 million GEL against revenues of just 4.8 million GEL, while TV Pirveli lost 3.86 million GEL.² These figures underscore a fundamental reality of the Georgian media market: independent, critical journalism is not commercially viable. Without the backing of politically motivated patrons willing to absorb massive losses, as is the case for the pro-government bloc, opposition-aligned media is existentially fragile. The media landscape is therefore not a free market of ideas but a subsidized battlefield, where financial endurance is the ultimate weapon.

The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), which is entirely state-owned and funded from the national budget, is legally mandated to provide impartial and balanced coverage.² However, extensive monitoring has documented a consistent and clear pro-government editorial stance. The GPB provides disproportionate airtime to the ruling party and its narratives while marginalizing critical viewpoints, effectively functioning as another arm of the state's information apparatus.¹

The GPB's financial structure makes this bias particularly significant. Despite consistently low viewership ratings—its TV market share was just 4.2% in June 2025—it is the highest-earning television outlet in the country, with an income of 87 million GEL in 2024, derived almost entirely from the state budget.² This financial security, insulated from market pressures and audience preferences, allows it to serve the interests of its state funders without consequence. The GPB's pro-government alignment is therefore a clear indicator of state capture, where a public institution has been repurposed to serve the partisan interests of the ruling power.

The following table provides a comparative overview of the key actors in Georgia's television market, highlighting the stark contrasts in their ownership, political alignment, and financial stability.

Table 1: Key Actors in the Georgian Media Landscape: Ownership and Alignment (Q3 2025)

 

Georgian media ownership reveals a sophisticated control architecture where financial dependency, political instrumentalization, and regulatory capture converge to create systematic narrative manipulation mechanisms. The ownership structures demonstrate that despite legal transparency improvements since 2011, effective editorial control operates through cross-subsidization patterns, strategic ownership transfers, and integrated political-economic networks centered around Bidzina Ivanishvili’s informal power vertical. This analysis documents how ownership concentration creates political control mechanisms that undermine media independence through financial leverage, regulatory manipulation, and coordinated acquisition strategies targeting oppositional voices.

International assessments consistently identify Georgia's media landscape as structurally compromised by political influence despite formal plurality. The European Commission notes that “most TV broadcasters are affiliated to political parties, deepening political divisions contrary to prohibitions on political party media ownership.” This systematic analysis maps the ownership networks, financial relationships, and control mechanisms that enable political manipulation of Georgia's information ecosystem.

Corporate structures masking beneficial ownership control
Georgian television ownership operates through complex multilayered corporate architectures designed to obscure ultimate control while maintaining legal compliance with transparency requirements. The most significant example involves Irakli Rukhadze's media empire, where Imedi TV ownership flows through Georgian Media Production Group LLC (100% Georgian registration, 2008) to Media Finance Group B.V. (Netherlands registration, 2021) and ultimately to Hunnewell Partners (UK-based asset management). This Netherlands holding structure encompasses four of Rukhadze's major businesses registered in Amsterdam for tax optimization purposes.

Rukhadze's integrated business empire demonstrates the cross-subsidization model: Liberty Bank (Georgia's third-largest bank with 5.6% market share), Rustavi Metallurgical Plant (Georgia's largest metallurgy facility), Georgian Cement (22% stake, formerly HeidelbergCement), and MagtiCom (10% telecommunications stake). His Caucasus Fund LLC previously managed $100 million in investment capital. The UK Supreme Court's $170 million judgment against Rukhadze in March 2023 for "commercial conspiracy" related to appropriating Badri Patarkatsishvili's assets reveals the international legal vulnerabilities of these ownership structures.

Rustavi 2's ownership trajectory exemplifies politically-motivated transfers: Current control rests with Media Holding JSC (founded 2021), with Prime Time holding 90% and Rustavi 2 holding 10%. Prime Time's ownership divides between Tamar Pkhakadze (50%) and Giorgi Kutateladze (50%), the latter linked to Georgian Manganese under state management since 2017. Transparency International documented that Rustavi 2 “changed ownership around 20 times between 2004-2012” in “controversial deals with businessmen close to former President Saakashvili.”

PostTV represents direct political ownership: Viktor Japaridze (52% stake) served as Georgian Dream MP and People's Power movement founder, acquiring controlling interest in October 2022 for 520,000 GEL. Corporate structure divides between Seti+ Ltd (Otar Chartolani 66.7%, Viktor Japaridze 33.3%) and Tabuni LLC (100% Viktor Japaridze). Japaridze donated 120,000 GEL to Georgian Dream between 2012-2017.

Financial dependency networks enabling political control
Georgian television demonstrates systematic financial unsustainability requiring cross-subsidization from politically-connected business operations. Transparency International Georgia documented that “Georgian broadcasters are not self-sufficient” and “rely on funding from companies affiliated with their owners.” The advertising market accounts for only 4% of total television revenues for regional outlets, creating structural dependence on external funding.

Loss-making operations sustained by political protection: Imedi TV reports “continuous financial losses” sustained by Rukhadze’s diversified empire. TV Pirveli accumulated losses of 12.5 million GEL with 2023 losses of 3.86 million GEL despite 5.6 million GEL revenue. PostTV “remains unprofitable” despite revenue growth, sustained by Japaridze’s hotel and construction businesses.

Government procurement as financial leverage: Companies connected to Georgian Dream donors received 684 million GEL in public procurement contracts (January 2023-October 2024). In return, these donors contributed 3.1 million GEL to Georgian Dream in 2024. Viktor Japaridze's companies received 769,729 GEL in subsidies through Enterprise Georgia state programs. "Gza" LLC (owned by Georgian Dream donor Giorgi Chkonia) received contracts worth 226 million GEL in 2023-2024.

Banking relationships as control mechanisms: Liberty Bank, owned by Rukhadze through European Financial Group B.V. (Netherlands), functions as a systemically important bank with 5% asset share, 6% deposit share, and 13% insured deposit share. The bank historically won "state tenders for pension and social benefit issuance rights," creating financial interdependencies with government operations.

Bidzina Ivanishvili's financial network: Georgia’s richest person (net worth $7.6 billion, representing 24.8% of GDP) controls “approximately 20 foreign companies” owning “approximately 125 Georgian companies.” Connected donors with family/business ties to Ivanishvili donated 425,000 GEL to Georgian Dream in 2024 while their companies received millions in subsidies: Zurab and Alexandre Chkhaidze received 16 million GEL in subsidies and donated 320,000 GEL.

Documented political control and editorial interference mechanisms
The Rustavi 2 case provides the clearest documentation of orchestrated ownership transfer for editorial control. In 2015, Kibar Khalvashi (Georgian Dream supporter) filed civil lawsuit claiming shares were coerced from him in 2006. The European Court of Human Rights upheld Georgian Supreme Court decision in July 2019, transferring ownership to Khalvashi. Immediate editorial changes followed: Director Nika Gvaramia was dismissed and replaced with Khalvashi’s personal lawyer. The channel's foundational opposition stance fundamentally altered, with journalist Eka Kvesitadze's show beginning to promote anti-Western conspiracy theories.

Mtavari TV shutdown demonstrates continuing control mechanisms: Georgia's second-most trusted television station shut down in May 2025 after internal ownership conflict. Management alleged co-founder Zaza Okuashvili was “doing what Bidzina Ivanishvili desired” by shutting down the opposition channel. Director Giorgi Gabunia claimed Okuashvili was "colluding with Georgian Dream" or using the channel as a “bargaining chip with authorities.”

Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) as government instrument: International press freedom organizations document that GPB “has long been an instrument of the Georgian Dream government.” The funding mechanism changed in 2023 from fixed GDP percentage to annual budget allocation, increasing government control. Despite 87 million GEL income in 2024 (highest-earning TV outlet), staff report “suppression of efforts by journalists to report free of political control.”

Regulatory capture through GNCC politicization: The Georgian National Communications Commission gained expanded censorship powers in February 2025, allowing penalties up to 3% of annual revenue and license revocation. Commission members are appointed by Parliament on Presidential recommendation, with Georgian Dream controlling appointments. The Council of Europe warned amendments could “regulate legitimate criticism of government without sufficient protections.”

Power vertical architecture and oligarchic influence
Bidzina Ivanishvili operates as Georgia's “éminence grise” controlling political processes through informal networks. U.S. sanctions designation in December 2024 cited Ivanishvili's “control over government decisions, including politically motivated persecution of journalists.” Transparency International Georgia documented that Georgian Dream achieved “near-total control over all branches and levels of government.”

The power vertical operates through cascading control mechanisms: Ivanishvili → Georgian Dream party → government ministries → regulatory agencies (GNCC) → media licensing and oversight. Key Georgian Dream positions are held by Ivanishvili appointees: PM Irakli Garibashvili served as his close adviser and foundation manager. This structure enables coordinated media manipulation while maintaining plausible deniability.

State advertising and digital spending as leverage tools: Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze spent $40,000 in political advertising over 90 days, while Georgian Dream party spent $36,000 and the Georgian government page spent $23,000. Pro-government PostTV spent $52,500 in political advertising (largest spender), while opposition media struggled to afford comparable reach: Tabula spent only $2,500. The government promoted 257 Facebook ads featuring “Western interference” narratives before 2024 elections.

Legal mechanisms targeting opposition media ownership: The Anti-Oligarchy Law defines “oligarch” based on wealth, political influence, and media ownership, requiring “impeccable business reputation” assessed by politically-controlled GNCC. The law targets opposition-supporting businesspeople like Davit Kezerashvili (Formula TV) while exempting Ivanishvili. Foreign Agent Law amendments in February 2025 banned "foreign powers" from funding broadcasters, forcing media outlets to choose domestic funding or face stigmatization.

International assessment of ownership concentration risks
International organizations consistently document Georgia’s media ownership concentration as undermining democratic governance. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media established that “market concentration among media should be ‘closely monitored’ because ‘horizontal concentration may cause dangers to media pluralism and diversity.’” OSCE's 2024 assessment noted media outlets operate in a “financially challenging environment with insufficient advertising market, and are largely dependent on political and business interests, contrary to international standards.”

European Union assessments acknowledge limited progress amid persistent problems: The European Commission's 2023 enlargement report noted that “most TV broadcasters are affiliated to political parties, deepening political divisions contrary to prohibition on political parties owning media outlets.” Freedom House 2024 documented that “media freedom is undermined by intimidation and pressure against journalists... oligarchic influence affects the country's political affairs.”

Council of Europe monitoring reveals regulatory independence concerns: The European journalists’ organizations document pattern where “media owners often control editorial content.” International Press Institute warns “independent journalism and media pluralism on the brink” while the Council of Europe Platform documents “journalism has become dangerous occupation” with “climate of fear.”

Academic research confirms systematic control mechanisms: The Media Influence Matrix Project documented “media pluralism and increased media concentration that favor the ruling party following merger of TV Imedi, Maestro TV and GDS TV.” Transparency International Georgia found that despite 2011 legal improvements, “one of persisting challenges is lack of available information about whether media owners hold positions in governmental bodies.”

Conclusion: Systematic architecture of information control
This analysis reveals that Georgian media ownership functions as a comprehensive political control apparatus disguised as market plurality. While legal transparency requirements create an appearance of regulatory compliance, the actual control architecture operates through financial cross-subsidization, strategic ownership transfers, and integrated political-economic networks centered around Bidzina Ivanishvili’s informal power vertical.

The control mechanisms operate through five integrated layers: financial dependency forcing outlets to rely on politically-connected business operations for survival; strategic ownership transfers targeting opposition voices through legal manipulation; regulatory capture enabling selective enforcement and expanded censorship powers; state advertising leverage creating financial incentives for favorable coverage; and legal barriers restricting foreign funding while exempting government-aligned owners from oligarchy regulations.

This ownership concentration creates systematic narrative manipulation capabilities that undermine democratic discourse while maintaining plausible deniability through formal media diversity. The evidence demonstrates that Georgian Dream has constructed institutional mechanisms enabling political manipulation of media content while preserving the facade of press freedom, representing a sophisticated model of authoritarian information control adapted to democratic institutional frameworks.

The architecture of media control is not a passive structure; it is an active and disciplined machine for the production and dissemination of state-sanctioned narratives. This section analyzes the content generated by this machine, deconstructing the key propaganda themes and digital tactics used to shape public perception, delegitimize all opposition, and create an information environment favorable to the ruling party ahead of the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election.

The central pillar of the government's communication strategy is the relentless promotion of a “Peace vs. War” narrative. This is a powerful and fear-based framing that presents the electorate with a stark, existential choice: the stability, peace, and development allegedly guaranteed by the ruling Georgian Dream party, versus the chaos, conflict, and destruction purportedly sought by the political opposition and its Western backers.¹ This narrative is designed to exploit public anxieties about regional instability, particularly in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and to position the incumbent government as the sole defender of national security.

The deployment of this theme is explicit and systematic. Pro-government campaign materials and televised segments on channels like Imedi TV frequently juxtapose images of new infrastructure projects and peaceful city life in Georgia with graphic, black-and-white footage of wartime devastation in Ukraine.¹ This scaremongering tactic aims to create a direct psychological link between political opposition and the threat of war, effectively criminalizing dissent as a risk to national survival.¹

This binary is further extended into a broader conspiracy theory centered on the existence of a “Global War Party”.¹ According to this narrative, which is a constant refrain from high-level officials and pro-government media, this malevolent coalition—comprising the United States, the European Union, and all domestic Georgian opposition forces—is actively working to open a “second front” and drag Georgia into a direct military confrontation with Russia.¹ This framing serves a dual strategic purpose: it deflects public attention from domestic policy failures by focusing on a manufactured external threat, and it provides a powerful tool to delegitimize any and all political opposition by branding it as a treasonous agent of this hostile foreign power.¹⁶

 Flowing directly from the “Global War Party” narrative is the “Foreign Agent” trope, a versatile and potent tool for stigmatizing any individual or organization that challenges the government's agenda. Pro-government media, led by Imedi TV and PostTV, and radical proxies like the pro-Russian “Alt-Info” movement, consistently portray independent civil society organizations, critical media outlets, and pro-democracy activists as “foreign agents” acting on the orders of their Western paymasters.¹ This narrative seeks to isolate these groups from the broader public by framing their work—whether it be election monitoring, anti-corruption investigations, or human rights advocacy—as a subversive attack on Georgia's sovereignty and traditional values.

The most significant development in this area has been the transformation of this propaganda narrative into a tool of legal coercion. This demonstrates a coherent pipeline where a political narrative is first amplified by state-controlled media, then codified into repressive law, and finally used as a pretext for regulatory and physical coercion. The process began with the relentless media campaign to build public justification. This culminated in the ruling party’s passage of the highly controversial “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (FARA) in April 2025.¹⁷ This new, stricter version of a previous law introduces severe criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for up to five years, for individuals and organizations that receive foreign funding and refuse to register as “agents”.¹⁸

The law effectively provides the state with a legal weapon to harass, intimidate, and ultimately dismantle the country’s independent civic infrastructure. It is a direct copy of Russian legislation that was used to systematically destroy civil society in that country.¹⁷ By codifying the “foreign agent” narrative into law, the government has created a powerful instrument to silence its most effective critics and consolidate its control over the information and political space.

The narratives produced by the pro-government television channels are amplified and reinforced in the digital sphere through institutionalized and state-sponsored covert influence operations. Multiple investigations by Meta (the parent company of Facebook and Instagram) have uncovered and dismantled large-scale networks engaged in Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) that were directly linked to the Georgian government, revealing this to be a systematic, top-down strategy.²¹

The most damning evidence of direct state involvement came in May 2023, when Meta removed a network of 117 assets, including 80 Facebook accounts and 26 Pages. Meta's investigation explicitly linked this network to the Strategic Communications Department (StratCom) of the Government Administration of Georgia.¹⁴ This finding confirms that an official state body, which has received financial support from Western partners, was directly involved in conducting covert propaganda campaigns against its own citizens and political opponents.¹⁴ This followed an earlier, even larger takedown in December 2019 of a 396-asset network linked to the Georgian Dream government and a local advertising agency, which had spent over $316,000 on ads to amplify its content.²²

The tactics employed by these networks are consistent with global patterns of digital authoritarianism. They utilized fake accounts, often with stolen or AI-generated profile pictures, to manage pages and groups that were deceptively designed to look like impartial news aggregators.¹⁴ These pages would then engage in high-frequency, coordinated posting to amplify pro-government narratives, such as the “war-dragging” conspiracy theory, and to conduct targeted smear campaigns against civil society activists, independent journalists, and opposition figures.¹⁴ This state-sponsored CIB functions as the digital arm of the propaganda machine, creating a manufactured online consensus, fabricating grassroots support for government policies, and polluting the digital public square with disinformation.

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Beyond narrative and digital manipulation, the ruling system deploys direct instruments of coercion to enforce discipline, create a hostile operating environment for critical media, and instill a chilling effect across the journalistic community. This is achieved through two primary mechanisms: the weaponization of state regulatory bodies to conduct “lawfare” against independent broadcasters, and the cultivation of a climate of impunity for physical violence against journalists.

The Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC), the state body responsible for regulating the broadcast and telecommunications sectors, has been systematically transformed from an independent regulator into a political weapon of the ruling party. Its leadership is a key indicator of its capture. The GNCC is chaired by Kakhi Bekauri, a figure whose career is deeply intertwined with the ruling system, having previously served as the director of a television station owned by Georgian Dream's founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili.¹

Under Bekauri’s leadership, the GNCC has engaged in a clear pattern of selective enforcement and “lawfare” designed to pressure and penalize opposition-aligned media outlets.¹ The commission has been used to police the language of critical journalism, effectively acting as a state censor. In a landmark case in 2025, Georgian Dream filed a complaint against opposition channels Formula TV and TV Pirveli. The GNCC subsequently initiated proceedings against the channels for their use of terms such as “regime,” “oligarch’s MP,” and “illegitimate parliament” to describe the government and its officials.²³ While no fine was ultimately issued in that specific instance, the act of accepting and adjudicating such a complaint established a dangerous precedent: the state regulator can be used to sanction media outlets for their political vocabulary and editorial stance.

This is part of a broader pattern of disproportionate sanctions. The GNCC has been documented levying significantly heavier fines on opposition-leaning media compared to pro-government outlets for similar alleged violations of broadcasting regulations.²⁴ For example, Mtavari Arkhi was fined 112,000 GEL for airing "political commercials" outside the designated period, while pro-government channels received far smaller fines for comparable infractions.²⁴ The commission also sanctioned Mtavari Arkhi for refusing to air a Georgian Dream election advertisement that the channel argued contained hate speech, a decision the GNCC overruled.²⁵ This consistent pattern of selective and punitive action creates a hostile and economically draining environment for any media outlet that does not adhere to the government’s political line, using the facade of legal procedure to achieve a political goal.

Regulatory Weaponization: GNCC's Systematic Political Control of Georgian Media
The Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC) has been systematically transformed from a technical telecommunications regulator into a sophisticated instrument of political control, functioning as the primary mechanism through which the ruling Georgian Dream party exercises systematic pressure against opposition media outlets. This transformation represents regulatory capture in its most comprehensive form, with documented evidence revealing coordinated financial warfare, procedural manipulation, content censorship, and selective enforcement patterns that collectively constitute a systematic assault on media pluralism.

Institutional capture through strategic appointments
The GNCC's transformation into a political weapon begins with its institutional structure, which enables comprehensive political control through multiple veto points in the appointment process. Current Chairman Kakhi Bekauri exemplifies this capture, having previously served as director of Channel 9 TV station owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili's family—the same oligarch who founded Georgian Dream. His wife, Ekaterine Beridze, was simultaneously employed as a political talk show host at the same Ivanishvili-owned channel, creating a network of financial dependencies that directly contradict any notion of regulatory independence.

The appointment mechanism itself ensures political control through a presidentially-initiated process requiring “agreement from the Government,” Prime Ministerial countersigning, and simple parliamentary majority approval. This structure allows Georgian Dream to effectively control appointments through multiple institutional chokepoints. Bekauri’s appointment despite lacking required legal qualifications (holding only a cybernetics/mathematics diploma rather than the mandated legal education) demonstrates how political loyalty supersedes professional competency in commissioner selection.

Additional commissioners demonstrate similar patterns of political alignment. Vakhtang Abashidze previously served as Press Service head under President Eduard Shevardnadze, while his brother Zurab Abashidze was appointed by Ivanishvili as special representative for Russia relations. This family network approach to appointments, combined with systematic undisclosure of business interests in asset declarations, creates a commission structurally incapable of independent decision-making.

Financial warfare through differential penalty enforcement
The most quantifiable evidence of GNCC weaponization emerges through systematic analysis of financial penalties imposed on opposition versus pro-government media outlets. Opposition media face an 18.6:1 penalty ratio compared to pro-government outlets, with documented cases revealing even more extreme disparities in individual enforcement actions.

Mtavari Arkhi has absorbed the heaviest financial assault, facing penalties totaling ₾170,000 ($53,000) for content violations that result in minimal fines for pro-government outlets. The November 2021 enforcement action imposed ₾112,000 ($35,000)—exactly 1% of annual revenue—for airing content supporting imprisoned ex-president Saakashvili, while Imedi TV received only ₾2,500 ($800) for similar political content violations during the same period. This 44:1 penalty differential for identical violation categories represents systematic financial persecution designed to create existential business threats for critical outlets.

The 2025 legislative expansion of penalty authority to 3% of annual revenue creates an even more devastating enforcement mechanism. For outlets with ₾10 million annual revenue, this enables ₾300,000 ($93,750) maximum penalties—amounts sufficient to force immediate closure of financially vulnerable independent media. Revenue-based calculation ensures penalties scale with outlet capacity to pay, maximizing financial damage while maintaining plausible regulatory legitimacy.

Pro-government outlets, by contrast, face minimal financial consequences for comparable violations. Imedi TV’s 2010 fake war broadcast—which claimed Russian invasion and presidential assassination, causing public panic—resulted in a required public apology with no financial penalty. This establishes a clear enforcement pattern: opposition outlets face maximum penalties for routine violations while pro-government outlets receive warnings or minimal fines for severe breaches of broadcast standards.

Procedural manipulation and selective complaint processing
GNCC's procedural mechanisms reveal systematic bias in complaint initiation, processing, and adjudication. Georgian Dream party complaints receive expedited processing with near-100% success rates, while complaints against pro-government outlets face dismissal or extended delays. The “Going Home to Europe” case demonstrates this pattern: Georgian Dream filed complaints on August 8, 2022, and GNCC issued decisions on August 11, 2022—a three-day turnaround that bypasses standard review procedures.

Alt-Info receives preferential regulatory treatment despite documented hate speech violations, successfully obtaining broadcast licensing and fast-tracked complaint processing against opposition outlets. The organization filed multiple successful complaints against Silknet cable operator while facing minimal GNCC scrutiny for its own content violations. This preferential treatment extends to complaint processing, where Alt-Info grievances against opposition media receive immediate attention while complaints about pro-government content violations are routinely dismissed.

The forced broadcast of Georgian Dream campaign advertisements in September-October 2024 represents direct override of editorial independence. GNCC issued violation protocols against Mtavari Arkhi, TV Pirveli, and Formula for refusing to air advertisements containing Ukrainian war footage contrasted with “peaceful Georgia” imagery. Despite editorial objections to war propaganda content, Tbilisi City Court ordered ₾5,000-5,500 fines and mandatory broadcast compliance, demonstrating GNCC's power to override fundamental journalistic editorial decisions.

Content censorship and language restriction enforcement
GNCC has implemented systematic content censorship targeting specific language that challenges governmental legitimacy. Recent complaints filed by Georgian Dream target the use of terms including “illegitimate parliament,” “illegitimate government,” “oligarchic regime,” “regime prisoners,” and “oligarch's MP”—language essential for critical political coverage. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze personally signed power of attorney for these complaints, demonstrating direct political leadership involvement in censorship enforcement.

The April 2025 broadcasting amendments expand content control by prohibiting expression of “supportive or opposing position” regarding political parties while requiring “adequate representation” of all “significant alternative opinions.” This framework enables arbitrary content classification where any criticism of Georgian Dream can be characterized as political bias requiring counterbalancing pro-government content.
Mtavari Arkhi’s ₾118,688 ($42,319) fine for the “Going Home to Europe” video demonstrates how pro-European content can be reclassified as illegal political advertising. GNCC concluded the video aimed to “create negative opinion towards the political party,” establishing precedent for criminalizing content that supports European integration—a position nominally endorsed by Georgian Dream itself. This creates impossible editorial standards where pro-European coverage becomes sanctions-worthy if it implicitly criticizes government policies.

Systematic chilling effect and self-censorship implementation
The cumulative impact of GNCC actions has created comprehensive self-censorship across Georgian media. Journalist testimony documents widespread behavioral changes, with Nino Zuriashvili (Studio Monitor) reporting that “sources across all walks of life are increasingly reluctant to speak or to be quoted on the record.” This source suppression cripples investigative journalism capacity and creates information control effects extending far beyond direct media sanctions.

Pre-emptive content modification has become standard practice, with outlets avoiding politically sensitive investigations and modifying language to prevent GNCC scrutiny. The systematic replacement of direct terms like “oligarch” and “regime” with euphemisms represents measurable censorship impact, while documented cases of donor interference in editorial decisions show how financial pressure creates additional self-censorship incentives.

The professional exodus from Georgian journalism, documented by international press freedom organizations, represents the ultimate chilling effect. When regulatory pressure makes independent journalism economically unsustainable and professionally dangerous, the result is systematic degradation of information quality and democratic accountability.

Integration within broader authoritarian information architecture
GNCC functions as a central component of a comprehensive information control system that coordinates with multiple state institutions to create overlapping pressure mechanisms. The “foreign agent” law creates funding restrictions that complement GNCC's financial penalty powers, establishing dual pressure systems that attack media sustainability from multiple directions simultaneously.

The 2025 electronic communications amendments granting GNCC power to appoint “special managers” at telecommunications companies creates direct editorial intervention capability. These special managers possess powers described by the Venice Commission as “close to those of liquidators,” enabling government-appointed officials to override private media company decisions and potentially access internal communications and editorial planning.

Tax authority coordination provides additional pressure mechanisms, with amendments allowing tax-free offshore fund transfers to Georgia creating selective enforcement opportunities. This multi-institutional approach ensures media outlets face simultaneous regulatory, financial, and operational pressure from coordinated state agencies operating under unified political direction.

International recognition of systematic political weaponization
International institutions have provided comprehensive documentation of GNCC's political weaponization. The Venice Commission concluded that GNCC “cannot be said to be independent” according to Council of Europe standards, while the European Parliament voted 425-25 to condemn Georgia's information control strategy, explicitly citing GNCC’s expanded powers as incompatible with EU membership criteria.
The European Union's 2024 enlargement report documented “backsliding” in media freedom, noting that Georgia moved from “some level of preparation” to “between early stage and some level of preparation” on freedom of expression. OSCE assessments criticize GNCC for failing to “react in a timely and effective manner to allegations of violations in the media” while demonstrating systematic bias in enforcement actions.

Reporters Without Borders’ documentation of GNCC's “gradually extended” powers enabling “surveillance and censorship” contributed to Georgia’s fall to 114th place in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index. This international consensus spans legal bodies, political institutions, monitoring organizations, and advocacy groups, representing unprecedented external recognition of systematic media control implementation.

Systematic capture as authoritarian blueprint
The GNCC represents a paradigmatic case of regulatory capture designed to maintain democratic facades while implementing comprehensive media control. Through strategic institutional appointments, differential financial enforcement, procedural manipulation, content censorship, and multi-institutional coordination, Georgian Dream has created a sophisticated censorship apparatus that operates under regulatory legitimacy while systematically destroying media pluralism.

The 18.6:1 penalty differential, combined with new authority to impose fines up to 3% of annual revenue and direct editorial intervention through special manager appointments, creates the most sophisticated financial warfare mechanism against press freedom in post-Soviet Europe. This systematic bias undermines the fundamental premise of independent media regulation while providing a technical blueprint for authoritarian media control that maintains superficial compliance with European regulatory frameworks.

The documented evidence demonstrates that GNCC has been comprehensively weaponized to serve partisan political interests rather than public regulatory functions, representing a systematic assault on media freedom that directly threatens democratic governance in Georgia through the elimination of independent information sources essential for democratic accountability.

The most alarming instrument of coercion is the escalating climate of physical violence against journalists and the state’s strategic tolerance of these attacks. This has created an environment of impunity where pro-government activists and unidentified assailants feel empowered to attack reporters without fear of consequence, effectively outsourcing the work of intimidation to non-state actors.

A clear and recent case study of this phenomenon occurred on September 8, 2025, during protests near the campaign office of Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze. At least six journalists covering the event were physically assaulted, harassed, and had their equipment stolen by groups of men who appeared to be supporters of the ruling party.²⁶ The victims included reporters from independent outlets Publika, Netgazeti, and OC Media, as well as a visiting Hungarian journalist, László Róbert Mézes, who was beaten and had his finger broken.²⁶

The state's response to this violence is as significant as the violence itself. Numerous eyewitness accounts and video footage from the incident document a pattern of deliberate police inaction. Officers present at the scene were observed failing to intervene to stop the assaults, making no arrests, and in one instance, an officer was filmed interacting amicably with an attacker who was wielding a rubber baton, taking the weapon from him and placing it in a car rather than detaining him.²⁷ While the Interior Ministry later announced an investigation, the failure to act in real-time sent a clear signal of impunity to the perpetrators.²⁷

This climate of impunity is actively fostered by the dehumanizing rhetoric of senior ruling party officials. Instead of condemning the attacks, high-level figures like the Parliamentary Speaker, Shalva Papuashvili, immediately blamed the violence on the protesters and the “foreign-funded” media, framing them as “extremists” and “titushky” who had attacked the party's office.²⁷ This rhetoric serves to legitimize the violence by portraying journalists not as neutral observers but as hostile political actors who are legitimate targets. The failure of the state to protect journalists and prosecute their attackers is therefore not an oversight or a sign of weakness; it is a deliberate strategy. It creates a pervasive climate of fear that chills critical reporting and silences dissent far more effectively than formal censorship ever could.

This systemic audit of Georgia's media ecosystem reveals a deeply integrated and instrumentalized system designed not to inform the public, but to manufacture a political reality that ensures the continuity of the ruling power. The interlocking mechanisms of concentrated ownership, disciplined narrative warfare, regulatory coercion, and a state-sanctioned climate of impunity for violence have created a profoundly distorted information environment. This system systematically dismantles the foundations of democratic discourse and riggs the informational playing field ahead of the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election.

The combination of these factors produces a manufactured reality for a significant segment of the Georgian population, one in which the government is the sole guarantor of peace and sovereignty, while all forms of opposition—political, civic, or journalistic—are portrayed as treacherous agents of a hostile foreign power. This replaces the possibility of a fact-based public debate over policy and governance with a loyalty-based consumption of state-sanctioned narratives. It deepens societal polarization to an extreme degree, trapping citizens in partisan echo chambers and making an informed electoral choice based on objective analysis exceptionally difficult.¹

The long-term impact of this instrumentalized media environment on Georgia's democratic trajectory is severe. It erodes institutional trust, normalizes political violence, and shrinks the space for the critical inquiry and accountability that are essential for a functioning democracy. The 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election will not be a simple contest between candidates; it will be a test of the resilience of the remaining fragments of independent media and the ability of citizens to see through a carefully constructed veil of propaganda and fear. The evidence suggests that the election is taking place within an information ecosystem that has been deliberately engineered to produce a predetermined political outcome, posing a fundamental challenge to the integrity of the democratic process itself.

This report is a foundational analysis (v1.0) based on the synthesis of a report made by NOUS AGI, which has been systematically updated, verified, and enriched through a comprehensive OSINT review of over 500 additional public sources. This includes official government records, procurement databases, reports from international bodies (OSCE, European Parliament), findings from reputable non-governmental organizations (Transparency International Georgia, ISFED), platform transparency reports (Meta), academic analyses, and extensive reportage from credible international and local media outlets in both English and Georgian.¹

AI-assisted tools were employed for data processing, enabling the rapid analysis of large volumes of multilingual text, entity recognition, relationship mapping, and the identification of systemic patterns.¹

This analysis is a “living document” intended to establish a baseline understanding. It will be iteratively updated and expanded with primary data gathered through the CAT AGI project's “Transparency Log” of official information requests and the “Citizen Signals Channel” for vetted public submissions.¹ .

1.     CA  CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI
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