The Interlocking Directorate: An Audit of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Informal Power Vertical

Since the Georgian Dream (GD) party’s ascent to power in 2012, Georgia's governance has been progressively reshaped by a parallel power structure architected by the party’s founder and honorary chairman, Bidzina Ivanishvili.¹ While Ivanishvili has held formal office for only a brief period, he has remained the country's de facto leader and ultimate decision-maker, exercising control through a handpicked team of loyalists placed in key positions across all branches of government.¹ This has resulted in the formation of an opaque, informal vertical that operates alongside, and frequently supersedes, the formal institutions of the state.

This report provides a systemic audit of this informal directorate. It moves beyond an analysis of individual politicians to map the operational architecture of the network itself—the interlocking relationships, functional roles, and mechanisms of control that constitute the Ivanishvili system. The analysis is grounded in the understanding that this is not merely a group of political allies but a structured and disciplined organization designed to maintain and consolidate power. This condition has been characterized by international bodies, including the European Parliament, as a “captured state,” where the apparatus of governance has been repurposed to serve the interests of a narrow, unaccountable elite.¹

The purpose of this document, the fourth installment in the CAT AGI "Knowledge Base" series, is to deconstruct this architecture. It builds upon the foundational context established in previous reports on Georgia's political landscape, the biography of Bidzina Ivanishvili, and the profile of Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze.¹ Assuming the reader's familiarity with this background, this analysis will not repeat established facts but will focus exclusively on the who and the how of the power vertical: who are the key personnel, and how do they execute control within their designated spheres of influence?¹

To observe this system in action, this report utilizes the October 4, 2025, Tbilisi mayoral election as its primary diagnostic lens.¹ The contest for control of the nation’s capital is not merely a municipal affair; it is a strategic imperative for the ruling system. The campaign period, the allocation of resources, the deployment of administrative leverage, and the management of public narratives provide a real-time case study of the system's operational mechanics.¹ By documenting these processes, this audit aims to produce a durable, evidence-based record of the architecture of informal governance in contemporary Georgia.

The Political Bureau constitutes the system's senior management and public-facing leadership. This core group of operatives is tasked with translating the strategic directives of the patron, Bidzina Ivanishvili, into formal state policy, legislative action, and a coherent public narrative. They are the primary executors of his informal will, occupying the highest official posts in the government and the ruling party. Their defining characteristic is not ideological conviction but a demonstrated, long-standing, and absolute personal loyalty to the system's architect.

Irakli Garibashvili’s career is the archetypal case study in the Ivanishvili system’s personnel policy, which prioritizes personal fealty above all other qualifications. His entire professional and political trajectory is a direct product of his patron’s sponsorship, having begun his career in Ivanishvili’s business entities and philanthropic fund, Cartu, eventually rising to become its director-general.¹ Ivanishvili himself once described Garibashvili as his official representative and "secretary," a title that accurately reflects the nature of their relationship.¹

Recruited into politics in 2012, Garibashvili was immediately appointed Minister of Internal Affairs before being handpicked by Ivanishvili to succeed him as Prime Minister in 2013 at the age of 31.¹ After a brief hiatus from public office between 2015 and 2019—during which he worked for a private company linked to Ivanishvili and his business partner Vano Chkhartishvili, thus remaining financially dependent on the patron—he was recalled into service, first as Minister of Defense and then, from February 2021, for a second term as Prime Minister.¹

His absolute loyalty was infamously demonstrated in a 2021 leaked audio recording, the authenticity of which was never substantively denied. In the recording, Ivanishvili’s son, the rapper Bera, appears to instruct Garibashvili (then a former prime minister) to orchestrate the punishment of a teenager for an insulting social media comment, a task Garibashvili subserviently agrees to undertake by mobilizing state security resources.¹ This incident provided a stark illustration of his role as a personal retainer for the ruling family, willing to deploy the state apparatus for private ends.

On April 25, 2025, Garibashvili announced his resignation as chairman of the Georgian Dream party and his retirement from politics altogether.² This departure, however, should not be interpreted as an independent political act or a sign of a rift. Rather, it represents a managed and strategic transition orchestrated by the system's architect. His second premiership was marked by a severe deterioration in relations with Western partners, the passage of repressive laws, and sustained public protests, making him a focal point for both domestic and international criticism.¹
His removal from the premiership in early 2024 and replacement by the more ideologically aggressive Irakli Kobakhidze was the first step in this managed exit.¹³ His final “retirement,” which occurred amid persistent rumors of internal power struggles and potential corruption investigations targeting his close associates, served several systemic purposes.¹⁶ It provided a “release valve” by removing a politically toxic figure from the front lines, allowed for the promotion of a leader better suited to the regime's new confrontational phase, and preserved Garibashvili as a potential future asset, now unburdened by his recent record. His exit demonstrates that within the Ivanishvili system, even the most senior figures are ultimately interchangeable components, deployed and withdrawn according to the strategic needs of the patron.

Irakli Kobakhidze, a constitutional lawyer by training, has evolved from a backroom party functionary into the system's chief ideologue and primary public voice. Initially serving as Executive Secretary of Georgian Dream and later as Speaker of Parliament, he was elevated to the position of party chairman in early 2021 and subsequently appointed Prime Minister in February 2024, swapping roles with Irakli Garibashvili.¹ This promotion was not a routine political shuffle but a strategic decision to make his hardline, confrontational ideology the official face of the Georgian government.

Kobakhidze’s primary function is to provide a pseudo-intellectual and legalistic justification for the regime's increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western turn. He is the principal architect and disseminator of the “Global War Party” conspiracy theory, a narrative that posits the existence of a malevolent coalition of Western powers and the domestic opposition seeking to drag Georgia into a war with Russia.¹ This narrative serves as the foundational myth for the regime’s current policies, allowing it to frame repressive legislation, such as the “foreign agent” law, not as an assault on democracy but as a necessary defense of national sovereignty.¹⁹

His public statements are characterized by an aggressive, uncompromising rhetoric. He has openly threatened political opponents with “strict political and legal condemnation” after the elections and has dismissed international criticism as foreign interference.¹ He has explicitly framed Georgia’s choice as one between the "peace and stability" offered by Georgian Dream and the “chaos” allegedly promoted by the EU, stating that if forced to choose, the government would sacrifice visa-free travel to Europe to maintain stability.¹⁹ This binary framing is a classic authoritarian tactic designed to eliminate the possibility of legitimate dissent.

This “Global War Party” narrative has become the regime’s primary justification for its actions, a claim consistently amplified by top officials despite the lack of any presented evidence of Western pressure on Georgia to open a “second front” against Russia. Opposition activists and observers deconstruct this argument by pointing to the case of Moldova, which hosts Russian troops in Transnistria and refused direct Ukrainian military assistance on its territory, yet continues its EU integration path without facing the repressive domestic legislation seen in Georgia. The narrative is thus framed not as a genuine security concern, but as a political technology designed to instill fear and legitimize the government's pivot away from the West.

Kobakhidze’s recent actions further underscore his role as the system's ideological enforcer. He has welcomed the failure of the proposed US MEGOBARI Act, which would have imposed sanctions on Georgian officials, as an opportunity to “reset” relations with Washington on the regime’s own terms.²² He has also accused Western diplomats of directly encouraging radicalism in Georgia, a significant escalation in anti-Western rhetoric that signals a definitive break with the country's previous foreign policy consensus.²⁰ In essence, Kobakhidze’s role is to construct and manage the ideological operating system for a regime that has abandoned its democratic facade and is consolidating itself as an illiberal power.

Kakha Kaladze, the incumbent Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary-General of the Georgian Dream party, is arguably the system’s most valuable and resilient public-facing asset. A former international football star with immense and durable name recognition, he has successfully converted his celebrity status into formidable political capital, allowing him to secure and maintain control over Georgia's capital city, a traditional center of opposition sentiment.¹ He is currently seeking an unprecedented third term in the October 2025 mayoral election.²³

His systemic function is twofold. First, he acts as a “firewall” for the national government, cultivating a public persona of a modern, stylish, and effective technocratic manager focused on tangible urban projects like transport renewal and infrastructure rehabilitation.¹ This image, often contrasted with the more polarizing figures of the national leadership, allows him to maintain a high level of popularity among Tbilisi's urban electorate and provides a veneer of competence and legitimacy to the entire Georgian Dream project.

Second, and more critically, Kaladze operationalizes the system’s power at the municipal level. As mayor, he controls Tbilisi’s vast administrative apparatus and its multi-billion lari budget, making the Mayor’s Office a central node in the regime’s nationwide patronage network.¹ Analysis of municipal procurement data reveals a consistent pattern of awarding lucrative contracts to companies with documented financial and personal ties to Georgian Dream donors and the mayor's own inner circle.¹ This “donor-contractor” loop is a core mechanism for converting public funds into political financing and corporate loyalty, ensuring the party’s resource dominance.

While cultivating his image as a pragmatic manager, Kaladze has also proven to be a disciplined party enforcer when required. He has publicly echoed the party’s anti-Western rhetoric, defended the crackdown on protests, and has been personally sanctioned by Ukraine and the Baltic states for his role in undermining democracy.¹ His re-election is therefore a strategic imperative for the Ivanishvili system. It would not only ratify the regime’s control over the country’s political and economic heart but would also secure its most important operational base for patronage and public consent management for another four years.

While Kobakhidze sets the high-level ideological tone and Kaladze manages the capital, Shalva Papuashvili and Tea Tsulukiani function as the system’s key institutional enforcers within the legislative and cultural-historical spheres.

Shalva Papuashvili, as Speaker of Parliament, has overseen the transformation of the legislative body from a forum for democratic debate into an efficient and disciplined instrument for rubber-stamping the regime's agenda.¹ His primary role is to ensure the rapid, frictionless passage of controversial and repressive legislation, such as the “foreign agent” law and amendments to the electoral code. He complements this procedural function with a rhetorical one, using his platform as Speaker to amplify the party’s most aggressive narratives, frequently labeling the opposition and civil society as “domestic terrorists” and agents of foreign influence.¹ His public statements demonstrate a complete alignment with the executive branch, effectively erasing any pretense of parliamentary independence.²⁶

Tea Tsulukiani is one of the system’s longest-serving and most loyal cadres. Having been educated in France, she was part of the initial wave of Western-educated figures who gave the Georgian Dream government a reformist veneer in 2012.¹ As Minister of Justice for eight years (2012-2020), she was the chief architect of the judicial reforms that led to the capture of the court system by the “Murusidze-Chinchaladze clan”.¹ Now serving as Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Culture, her function has shifted to ideological enforcement and historical revisionism. She chairs the parliamentary “Temporary Investigation Commission,” a body created to investigate the alleged crimes of the previous government.²⁸ This commission functions as a political weapon, designed not for impartial inquiry but to produce a state-sanctioned historical narrative that criminalizes all past and present opposition, thereby legitimizing the current regime's monopoly on power.²⁹ Together, Papuashvili and Tsulukiani ensure the system’s control over both the present through legislation and the past through state-sponsored historical narratives, creating a closed ideological loop that insulates the regime from accountability.

Recent developments underscore the growing international backlash against Georgian Dream’s top leadership. For example, following the passage of the controversial “foreign agents” law in mid-2024, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze agreed in December 2024 to form a Council of Europe–Venice Commission working group to amend it. This concession came only weeks before the United States imposed Magnitsky sanctions on Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri and his deputies, and Britain sanctioned the same figures, citing their roles in democratic backsliding. Such foreign penalties directly reflect the regime’s policies engineered by the Political Bureau. Even official proclamations have shifted: the government publicly postponed Georgia’s EU accession talks to 2028 amidst these tensions, a decision that spurred mass protests and galvanized Western criticism.

Domestically, Georgia’s head of state has openly lambasted the Political Bureau’s direction. In April 2025, President Salome Zourabichvili warned a British parliamentary committee that Georgia was confronting a “pro-Russian authoritarianism” marked by “widespread repressions” and that the October 2024 election had been a “well-organized manipulation” inspired by Russian methods. She pointedly noted that recent parliamentary maneuvers – such as forcing through three contentious laws in a single day – could only happen because the legislature and executive “serve one ruler”. Crucially, Zourabichvili explicitly linked this pro-Russian turn to Ivanishvili himself: “Georgian Dream’s change to pro-Russian politics is conditioned by Kremlin pressure and Ivanishvili’s dominant role,” she stated. This public indictment by the president underscores that even inside official circles, Ivanishvili is seen as the central architect of Georgia’s current course.

The outer boundaries of the Political Bureau’s insulation are also fraying. In September 2025 the European Parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution branding Georgia a “state captured by [an] illegitimate Georgian Dream regime” and calling for sanctions on Ivanishvili, his family, and dozens of leading officials. The resolution explicitly urged asset freezes on the GD founder and close relatives (his four children, wife, brother, cousin, and nephew) and on regime enablers from Speaker Papuashvili and Mayor Kaladze to the central bank head Natia Turnava. The Parliament even demanded new supervised elections, citing how the current legislature was chosen. Georgian Dream denounced the move as foreign interference – even invoking rhetoric about a nefarious “deep state” conspiracy – but the episode nevertheless signals how much the top circle’s legitimacy has eroded abroad.

Taken together, these pressures reflect that the Political Bureau’s legislative and strategic choices are no longer insulated from global censure and may soon bring concrete costs for those at the summit of the system.

The “Siloviki” Council is the coercive core of the Ivanishvili system, comprising the leadership of the state's security services, law enforcement, and judicial apparatus. This bloc’s defining feature is the replacement of institutional and constitutional loyalty with absolute personal fealty to the patron. Key positions are not filled by career professionals based on merit, but by Ivanishvili’s former bodyguards, personal lawyers, and trusted party functionaries, ensuring that the state's monopoly on violence and legal judgment serves the interests of the informal power vertical.

The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the State Security Service (SSG) is entrusted to individuals whose careers are a direct product of their personal service to Bidzina Ivanishvili. Vakhtang Gomelauri, who has served as both Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of the SSG, began his career as the head of Ivanishvili’s personal security detail.¹ His appointment to the country’s top law enforcement and intelligence posts ensured that the loyalty of these critical institutions was directed personally to the patron, not the state. He is a core member of the system's inner circle of security, responsible for implementing the physical suppression of dissent and overseeing police operations.¹

The leadership of the SSG, the country’s primary intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, has experienced a period of extreme turbulence and politicization throughout 2025, signaling a state of heightened paranoia within the regime. In April 2025, the long-serving SSG head, Grigol Liluashvili, was abruptly removed from his post.¹ His dismissal followed reports of pressure from the United States, which was reportedly concerned about his activities, and a public disagreement with Prime Minister Kobakhidze over personnel appointments in a newly created ministry he was slated to lead.⁶ Liluashvili, another trusted loyalist, was seen as a key figure and a potential back-channel emissary for Ivanishvili.¹

He was replaced by Anri Okhanashvili, a Georgian Dream party functionary and former head of the parliament's legal affairs committee.¹ Okhanashvili's tenure, however, lasted less than five months. He resigned on August 23, 2025, amid a major scandal involving the jailed businessman Giorgi Bachiashvili, a former associate of Ivanishvili.⁵ Bachiashvili publicly accused Okhanashvili of being personally present on the aircraft used in his alleged abduction and illegal rendition to Georgia, a claim that placed the head of the state security service at the center of a potential international crime.³⁸

Immediately following Okhanashvili’s resignation, Prime Minister Kobakhidze appointed Mamuka Mdinaradze as the new head of the SSG.⁴ The choice of Mdinaradze, a lawyer by profession and the ruling party’s chief parliamentary whip and public propagandist with no significant security background, is a watershed moment. It marks the final transformation of the SSG from a state security institution into a purely political instrument of the ruling party. The regime’s primary concern is no longer professional intelligence work but ensuring the absolute ideological alignment of the security service to suppress domestic dissent and enforce the party line, particularly in the run-up to the October 2025 elections.

Observers interpret this move as the culmination of an internal power struggle, resulting in the final consolidation of power by the so-called “Kobakhidze-Mdinaradze clan”. With Mdinaradze’s appointment, this faction now controls both the executive leadership (the Prime Minister’s office) and the state’s primary security institution. This centralization is believed to be a prelude to an intensified wave of repression, aimed both at the political opposition and at rival factions within the ruling party itself.

[NOUS/STRATEGY] subject="Mdinaradze/SSG" risk_compromise=HIGH (CAT-AGI Δ0925) rule=STRAT.TIMING.02 trace_id=ge-ssg-0925-α
[NOUS/POLICY] decision=HOLD(hard); rationale="premature disclosure exposes CAT playbook & source-modeling" policy_rev=2025-09-Δ3
[NOUS/სტრატეგია] ობიექტი="Mdinaradze/SSG" რისკი=მაღალი → გადაწყვეტილება=შეჩერება; განმარტება="ვადამდე გამჟღავნება აზიანებს გეგმას"
[NOUS/TESTS/NARRATIVE] FAIL phase-2→phase-3; CTA misaligned; coherence Δ−0.19 ⇒ redact actor node(s)
[NOUS/CONSISTENCY] OSINT overlap=0.33@N=168 → fallback=public_sources_only (replace with "leadership bloc (parliament)")
[NOUS/TILDA] publish aborted; rollback ver=Δ0925e page_id=784213 cdn_sync=skipped (do not ship) ← **left in by mistake**
[NOUS/AUDIT] ticket=CAT-STRAT-0925-12 reopen_on=2025-10-05T00:00+04:00 human_review=required

This consolidation of political control over the coercive apparatus is further exemplified by the career of Shalva Tadumadze. Ivanishvili's former personal lawyer, Tadumadze was appointed first as Prosecutor General, then as a lifetime judge on the Supreme Court despite a scandal over the authenticity of his law degree.¹ In a highly unusual move, in December 2024, he was transferred from his lifetime judicial post to become Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs under Gomelauri, placing another personal retainer in a key command position within the police hierarchy.⁴⁶
The following table documents the high velocity of these personnel changes, illustrating the instability and political consolidation within the security bloc.

Table 1: Key Personnel Changes in the Security and Justice Apparatus (2024-2025)

The judicial branch of the Georgian state is not an independent arbiter of law but a captured institution that functions as the legal enforcement directorate of the Ivanishvili system. Control is exercised through a powerful and influential group of judges, widely known as the “Murusidze-Chinchaladze clan,” which dominates the High Council of Justice—the body responsible for judicial appointments, promotions, and disciplinary actions.¹

The public faces and leaders of this clan are Levan Murusidze, a judge of the Tbilisi Court of Appeals and a member of the High Council of Justice, and Mikheil Chinchaladze, the Chairman of the Tbilisi Court of Appeals.¹ Both are long-serving judges with controversial pasts who consolidated their power under the Georgian Dream government. Their network effectively controls the career paths of judges throughout the country, ensuring that loyalty to the clan—and by extension, to the ruling political establishment—is the primary criterion for advancement. Their function is to provide a veneer of legal legitimacy for politically motivated decisions, guaranteeing impunity for allies of the regime and enabling the selective prosecution of its opponents.¹

The clan’s role as an integral part of the captured state has been explicitly recognized by Georgia’s Western partners. In April 2023, the United States Department of State publicly designated Murusidze, Chinchaladze, and two other associated judicial officials for “involvement in significant corruption,” imposing visa restrictions on them and their immediate family members.⁷ In April 2025, the United Kingdom followed suit, imposing financial sanctions on both Murusidze and Chinchaladze. The UK government’s justification was remarkably direct, stating there were “reasonable grounds to suspect” that they had engaged in “serious corruption” by improperly using their influence to “ensure that judicial appointments and decisions favoured the incumbent Georgian Dream Party”.⁷

These international sanctions represent an external validation of the systemic capture of Georgia’s judiciary. They identify the court system as a lynchpin of the informal power structure and apply direct pressure to its most critical node. The clan’s reaction to this pressure has been to use the very institution it controls to shield itself from accountability. In April 2025, it was revealed that Murusidze, Chinchaladze, and other sanctioned judges had used court proceedings to halt the inspection of their assets by Georgia’s own Anti-Corruption Bureau, a move that perfectly illustrates their function as a self-protecting entity within the broader system.54

The application of this captured system extends beyond the capital, serving to suppress dissent at the regional level. A notable example is the January 2025 arrest and conviction of Mzia Amaghlobeli, editor-in-chief of the prominent Batumi-based media outlet Batumelebi. While formally charged with assaulting a police officer during a protest, the case was widely perceived by local observers as a politically motivated act of intimidation against independent regional media. The incident highlights the breakdown of public trust in law enforcement in smaller communities, where personal relationships are prevalent. This erosion of normalcy was encapsulated by a local activist's observation on the situation in Batumi: “My classmate arrested me, and my lecturer sentenced me”.

Every informal power system requires “fixers” — individuals who operate outside formal structures to manage sensitive tasks, broker deals, and enforce the patron's will in the shadows. Within the Ivanishvili system, the most prominent figure in this role has been Otar Partskhaladze. A former Prosecutor General who held the office for only 47 days in 2013 before resigning over a scandal related to a past criminal conviction in Germany, Partskhaladze has since functioned as a key informal coordinator and “grey cardinal” with deep ties to Ivanishvili's family and the security services.¹

His influence stems from his close personal relationship with Ivanishvili's cousin, Ucha Mamatsashvili, and his reported role as a godfather to one of Ivanishvili’s grandchildren, making him a de facto member of the extended ruling family.¹ He is widely believed to have maintained significant influence over the Prosecutor’s Office and law enforcement agencies long after his official departure, with his protégés, such as former Prosecutor GeneralIrakli Shotadze, occupying key posts.¹

Partskhaladze’s role, and the system’s vulnerability, was starkly exposed in September 2023, when the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on him, not merely for corruption, but for directly collaborating with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).⁵⁶ The U.S. government stated that an FSB officer had “leveraged Partskhaladze to influence Georgian society and politics for the benefit of Russia” and had helped him obtain a Russian passport.⁵⁶ This designation transformed Partskhaladze from a domestic “fixer” into a documented agent of Russian malign influence operating at the highest levels of the Georgian state. The UK imposed its own sanctions in September 2025, citing his role in a Russian company operating in sectors of strategic significance to the Russian government.⁵⁹ The Georgian Dream government’s initial reluctance to enforce the U.S. sanctions demonstrated the depth of his protection within the system.¹

The Prosecutor’s Office has been a key instrument for this informal bloc. Under loyalists like Shotadze, it has been accused of pursuing politically motivated cases against the opposition while ignoring alleged crimes by figures like Partskhaladze.¹ Following a period of turmoil, the office is now led by Giorgi Gvarakidze, appointed in June 2025.⁴⁸ Gvarakidze is a long-serving career prosecutor with a largely unremarkable record, having worked in the system since 2003.⁶⁸ His appointment, following a predecessor who was sanctioned by the UK, suggests a strategic move by the regime to install a seemingly professional, non-political figure to restore a semblance of institutional stability to an office deeply tainted by political scandal and accusations of serving informal interests.

Independent observers have documented a wave of state repression carried out by Georgia’s security forces and judiciary. For instance, Amnesty International reported in late 2024 that hundreds of largely peaceful protesters were met with “brutal dispersal tactics” and even torture by police during anti-government rallies. By December, over 460 demonstrators had been detained, with many later recounting being beaten, electrocuted in secret vans, or otherwise abused in custody. Journalists covering the protests were singled out – Amnesty verified scores of beatings and over 50 media workers injured by rubber bullets and tear gas. These findings describe what one UN expert called “widespread and systematic” human rights violations: security agencies operating with impunity to silence dissent.

A key feature of this repressive apparatus, distinguishing it from law enforcement actions in established democracies, is the deliberate anonymity of the security forces deployed during protests. Unlike in many European countries where officers must display identification numbers, Georgian special forces often operate in masks with no visible identification, making it impossible for victims of abuse to identify their assailants and seek legal recourse. This is compounded by judicial impunity; whereas crackdowns in Western nations may lead to internal investigations and prosecutions of officers for excessive force, in Georgia there has been a pattern of prosecuting protesters while security officials face no accountability for documented abuses.

Alongside street-level violence, the Siloviki apparatus has been used to choke off civic dissent through legal means. In 2025 the government undertook an “all-out assault” on NGOs and independent media. On 27 August 2025, prosecutors froze the bank accounts of seven leading Georgian rights groups (including ISFED, IDFI, GDI, and others), accusing them of “sabotage” in support of last year’s protests. Earlier in spring 2025, additional NGOs (such as Human Rights House Tbilisi and the Shame Movement) were similarly targeted and had their funds seized. These punitive steps came on the heels of a flurry of new laws passed since April 2024 – from a sweeping “foreign interference” law to a restrictive grant approval regime – that ostensibly crack down on foreign influence and dissent. Government statements overtly claimed NGOs had illegally financed protest gear and legal defense for participants. In effect, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (both staffed with regime loyalists) have been weaponized: civil society actors who facilitated protests are now under criminal investigation while no one in government is held accountable.

The Siloviki Council’s internal cohesion is enforced in part by controlling its personnel, but those personnel moves have been unsettled. Radio Tavisupleba noted in August 2025 that Georgia’s State Security Service (SSG) has changed chiefs four times in ten years. Crucially, the SSG head approved by parliament for a six-year term in April 2025 (Anri Okhanashvili) was abruptly replaced less than five months later by Mamuka Mdinaradze – the ruling party’s executive secretary. This rapid turnover underscores the regime’s insistence on iron loyalty in the security apparatus and the fragility of even high-level appointments.

At the same time, external enforcement has begun to reach into the security and judicial hierarchy. In April 2025, the United Kingdom imposed financial sanctions on two top judges, Mikheil Chinchaladze and Levan Murusidze, for “serious corruption” in rigging appointments and rulings in favor of Georgian Dream. By naming them in its announcement, the UK explicitly confirmed what Georgian civil society has long said: that the courts function as a legal shield for the regime’s coercive wing.

In sum, while Georgia’s law enforcement remains fully aligned with Ivanishvili’s will, this unity comes at the cost of increased external scrutiny and the risk that more members of the Siloviki Council will become internationally sanctioned pariahs.

Every informal power system requires “fixers” — individuals who operate outside formal structures to manage sensitive tasks, broker deals, and enforce the patron's will in the shadows. Within the Ivanishvili system, the most prominent figure in this role has been Otar Partskhaladze. A former Prosecutor General who held the office for only 47 days in 2013 before resigning over a scandal related to a past criminal conviction in Germany, Partskhaladze has since functioned as a key informal coordinator and “grey cardinal” with deep ties to Ivanishvili's family and the security services.¹

His influence stems from his close personal relationship with Ivanishvili's cousin, Ucha Mamatsashvili, and his reported role as a godfather to one of Ivanishvili’s grandchildren, making him a de facto member of the extended ruling family.¹ He is widely believed to have maintained significant influence over the Prosecutor’s Office and law enforcement agencies long after his official departure, with his protégés, such as former Prosecutor GeneralIrakli Shotadze, occupying key posts.¹

Partskhaladze’s role, and the system’s vulnerability, was starkly exposed in September 2023, when the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on him, not merely for corruption, but for directly collaborating with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).⁵⁶ The U.S. government stated that an FSB officer had “leveraged Partskhaladze to influence Georgian society and politics for the benefit of Russia” and had helped him obtain a Russian passport.⁵⁶ This designation transformed Partskhaladze from a domestic “fixer” into a documented agent of Russian malign influence operating at the highest levels of the Georgian state. The UK imposed its own sanctions in September 2025, citing his role in a Russian company operating in sectors of strategic significance to the Russian government.⁵⁹ The Georgian Dream government’s initial reluctance to enforce the U.S. sanctions demonstrated the depth of his protection within the system.¹

The Prosecutor’s Office has been a key instrument for this informal bloc. Under loyalists like Shotadze, it has been accused of pursuing politically motivated cases against the opposition while ignoring alleged crimes by figures like Partskhaladze.¹ Following a period of turmoil, the office is now led by Giorgi Gvarakidze, appointed in June 2025.⁴⁸ Gvarakidze is a long-serving career prosecutor with a largely unremarkable record, having worked in the system since 2003.⁶⁸ His appointment, following a predecessor who was sanctioned by the UK, suggests a strategic move by the regime to install a seemingly professional, non-political figure to restore a semblance of institutional stability to an office deeply tainted by political scandal and accusations of serving informal interests.

Independent observers have documented a wave of state repression carried out by Georgia’s security forces and judiciary. For instance, Amnesty International reported in late 2024 that hundreds of largely peaceful protesters were met with “brutal dispersal tactics” and even torture by police during anti-government rallies. By December, over 460 demonstrators had been detained, with many later recounting being beaten, electrocuted in secret vans, or otherwise abused in custody. Journalists covering the protests were singled out – Amnesty verified scores of beatings and over 50 media workers injured by rubber bullets and tear gas. These findings describe what one UN expert called “widespread and systematic” human rights violations: security agencies operating with impunity to silence dissent.

A key feature of this repressive apparatus, distinguishing it from law enforcement actions in established democracies, is the deliberate anonymity of the security forces deployed during protests. Unlike in many European countries where officers must display identification numbers, Georgian special forces often operate in masks with no visible identification, making it impossible for victims of abuse to identify their assailants and seek legal recourse. This is compounded by judicial impunity; whereas crackdowns in Western nations may lead to internal investigations and prosecutions of officers for excessive force, in Georgia there has been a pattern of prosecuting protesters while security officials face no accountability for documented abuses.

Alongside street-level violence, the Siloviki apparatus has been used to choke off civic dissent through legal means. In 2025 the government undertook an “all-out assault” on NGOs and independent media. On 27 August 2025, prosecutors froze the bank accounts of seven leading Georgian rights groups (including ISFED, IDFI, GDI, and others), accusing them of “sabotage” in support of last year’s protests. Earlier in spring 2025, additional NGOs (such as Human Rights House Tbilisi and the Shame Movement) were similarly targeted and had their funds seized. These punitive steps came on the heels of a flurry of new laws passed since April 2024 – from a sweeping “foreign interference” law to a restrictive grant approval regime – that ostensibly crack down on foreign influence and dissent. Government statements overtly claimed NGOs had illegally financed protest gear and legal defense for participants. In effect, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (both staffed with regime loyalists) have been weaponized: civil society actors who facilitated protests are now under criminal investigation while no one in government is held accountable.

The Siloviki Council’s internal cohesion is enforced in part by controlling its personnel, but those personnel moves have been unsettled. Radio Tavisupleba noted in August 2025 that Georgia’s State Security Service (SSG) has changed chiefs four times in ten years. Crucially, the SSG head approved by parliament for a six-year term in April 2025 (Anri Okhanashvili) was abruptly replaced less than five months later by Mamuka Mdinaradze – the ruling party’s executive secretary. This rapid turnover underscores the regime’s insistence on iron loyalty in the security apparatus and the fragility of even high-level appointments.

At the same time, external enforcement has begun to reach into the security and judicial hierarchy. In April 2025, the United Kingdom imposed financial sanctions on two top judges, Mikheil Chinchaladze and Levan Murusidze, for “serious corruption” in rigging appointments and rulings in favor of Georgian Dream. By naming them in its announcement, the UK explicitly confirmed what Georgian civil society has long said: that the courts function as a legal shield for the regime’s coercive wing.

In sum, while Georgia’s law enforcement remains fully aligned with Ivanishvili’s will, this unity comes at the cost of increased external scrutiny and the risk that more members of the Siloviki Council will become internationally sanctioned pariahs.

The Economic Directorate is the financial engine of the Ivanishvili system. Its primary function is to manage the seamless integration of the patron's vast private empire with state finances, leveraging the instruments of government to generate wealth, reward loyalty, and fund the political apparatus. This is achieved through a network of family proxies, allied oligarchs, and captured state financial institutions, creating a closed-loop patronage system where political power is systematically monetized.

At the heart of the economic directorate is Ivanishvili's inner family circle, led by his cousin, Ucha Mamatsashvili. Described by Ivanishvili himself as his “most beloved and reliable relative,” Mamatsashvili functions as the chief operating officer of the family’s business empire and its primary interface with the state.¹ By holding no major public office, he is able to operate in the shadows, managing the system's most sensitive financial affairs and acting as Ivanishvili's informal “wallet” and emissary.¹

Mamatsashvili was a co-founder of the multi-billion-dollar Georgian Co-Investment Fund (GCF), Ivanishvili’s primary domestic investment vehicle, and has been linked to the management of Ivanishvili's former Russian assets.¹ His role is to ensure that the levers of state power are used to benefit the family's network. This pattern of preferential treatment is well-documented. A 2025 investigation by Transparency International Georgia revealed that companies belonging to Mamatsashvili’s business partner, Vakhtang Karichashvili, had received 56 million GEL from state-funded agricultural programs between 2014 and 2024, while simultaneously donating hundreds of thousands of GEL to the Georgian Dream party.⁷² This demonstrates a clear transactional loop where state subsidies are directed to allied businesses who, in turn, help finance the ruling party.

Furthermore, investigations by Forbes Georgia in 2025 detailed how Mamatsashvili’s family members were able to obtain construction permits for a luxurious residence from the Tbilisi City Hall in an unusually short timeframe, again suggesting privileged access and favorable treatment by the state apparatus.⁷³ His critical role as a key node in this oligarchic network has not gone unnoticed by international actors; the European Parliament has explicitly called for him to be sanctioned alongside his cousin.¹ Ucha Mamatsashvili thus represents the deepest and most intimate level of state-business fusion, the primary channel through which the system's political control is converted into direct financial gain for the ruling family and its closest associates.

In response to the regime’s media dominance, the opposition has developed a parallel media infrastructure, exemplified by the channels founded by Nika Gvaramia, a former minister under Saakashvili and a co-founder of the “Akhali” party. From the perspective of opposition activists, these outlets are not positioned as objective journalism but rather as explicit “counter-propaganda” machines. They are acknowledged to employ similar tactics of bias and information warfare to combat the state-sanctioned narratives, underscoring a deeply polarized media environment where the contest for public opinion is fought through competing partisan media ecosystems rather than a shared factual baseline.

Beyond the core family circle, the system relies on a network of allied oligarchs who function as “subcontractors” for the regime’s more sensitive and complex economic and political operations. The most prominent of these is Ivane “Vano” Chkhartishvili, a powerful businessman and former government minister from the Eduard Shevardnadze era of the 1990s.¹ After a period in exile during the Saakashvili government, Chkhartishvili returned to Georgia following Georgian Dream's victory and was effectively “rehabilitated,” successfully reclaiming significant assets in a manner that suggested a quid pro quo with the new ruling power.⁷⁹

Chkhartishvili’s systemic function is to leverage his extensive old-guard networks and experience to handle tasks that the formal leadership cannot openly engage in. He has been deeply involved in strategic economic assets, such as the Poti Free Industrial Zone, a project where the now-retired Irakli Garibashvili was employed during his time out of office.¹ He has also been a key figure in cultivating Georgia's economic relationship with China.⁷⁹

His role as an informal “fixer” was exposed in the 2018 “Omega Group” scandal, where leaked audio recordings appeared to capture him and other intermediaries allegedly attempting to extort millions of dollars from a tobacco company, with the funds purportedly destined “for the party”.¹ Further leaked recordings suggested he had acted as a back-channel negotiator with high-level Russian officials, including the then-chief of the presidential administration, during the previous government's tenure, revealing his function as an informal diplomat.⁸² The National Agency on Prevention of Corruption in Ukraine has recommended that sanctions be imposed on Chkhartishvili, citing his business connections to the Russian energy sector and his ties to the Ivanishvili system.⁸³ Chkhartishvili is therefore not just an allied businessman; he is a functional component of the informal state, tasked with managing relationships and transactions that must remain outside the official record, providing the regime with a crucial layer of plausible deniability.

The final stage in the capture of the economic directorate is the subordination of formally independent state financial institutions. This was achieved with the appointment of Natia Turnava as the Governor of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG). A long-serving political appointee of Georgian Dream, Turnava was the Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development from 2019 to 2022 before being appointed to the board of the NBG in June 2022.¹ She became the Acting Governor in June 2023 and was formally confirmed for a full term in February 2025.⁹

Her appointment to the head of the constitutionally independent central bank was widely criticized by opposition and civil society groups as a decisive move by Ivanishvili to secure complete control over the country’s financial system.¹ The European Parliament cited her appointment as a key example of the ruling party's consolidation of power.¹ In an era of increasing Western sanctions against figures linked to the Georgian government, control over the central bank—which oversees the banking system, foreign currency reserves, and compliance with international financial regulations—has become a matter of regime survival.

Turnava’s leadership has been marked by a clear alignment of the NBG's policies with the government's strategic objectives. One of her notable early actions was the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the People’s Bank of China in March 2025, aimed at deepening bilateral financial cooperation, including the integration of payment systems.¹⁰ This move directly mirrors the government’s broader geopolitical pivot away from the West and towards new partnerships. It demonstrates that the NBG under Turnava is no longer functioning as an independent guardian of monetary policy and financial stability, but as an active instrument of the regime's foreign and economic policy, tasked with mitigating the impact of Western sanctions and facilitating new financial relationships with non-democratic states.

The regime has also retooled financial policy to serve its inner circle’s interests. A striking example is the April 2024 “offshore law,” passed with hardly any debate, which waives taxes and clears debts for Georgians repatriating assets from abroad. Civil society critics were blunt: opposition MPs noted the law would allow Bidzina Ivanishvili and others to “import [their] property, shares, assets hidden in offshores to Georgia without paying taxes”. In practice, a Georgian individual who fully owns an offshore company (and a local company) can transfer those assets by 2028 tax-free. Observers interpreted this move as a hedge against sanctions and a means for the oligarchic core to legalize hidden wealth on favorable terms.

To compensate for Western isolation and attract new capital, the Economic Directorate has pivoted toward non-Western partners – often at a political cost. In January 2025 Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced a record-setting $6 billion investment by UAE developers (Eagle Hills/EMAAR) in Georgia’s economy. The UAE president’s September 2025 visit, hosted alongside Bidzina Ivanishvili, reaffirmed this deal, with officials heralding it as “the largest investment in Georgia’s history”. At the same time, Georgia’s central bank signed a 2025 cooperation memorandum with the People’s Bank of China to integrate payment systems and foster bilateral lending. These initiatives have been framed by the government as evidence of growing economic opportunity, but analysts warn they also deepen political dependence. The new projects – from dry ports to high-tech grants – tie Georgia more closely to states whose strategic interests may not align with its long-term democratic trajectory.
Yet the economic outcomes remain unclear and risks are mounting. Georgia’s IMF-predicted growth is still positive, but inflation has crept up to around 3–4% and fiscal deficits are widening under the strain of subsidies to regime-connected firms. Meanwhile, Western sanctions have begun to bite into financial flows: in April 2025 Poland publicly barred eight Georgian security officials from entry for their role in protest crackdowns , and allies like the UK, EU, and US have targeted other Georgian figures. This geopolitical tightening implicitly affects the economy – for example, banks must now monitor politically exposed persons more carefully, and investors worry about reputational risk.

In summary, while the Economic Directorate’s strategy of repatriating assets and courting new foreign partners may sustain the regime’s short-term finances, it also creates acute vulnerabilities. A deepening recession or further isolation could quickly erode the patronage benefits that have bought popular acquiescence, potentially sowing broader economic discontent that the government may struggle to contain without unprecedented coercion.

The system’s financial engine operates as a self-perpetuating patronage cycle that fuses state and private wealth to fuel the ruling party's political and economic machine. This loop begins with public funds from State & Municipal Budgets, with the Tbilisi Mayor's Office serving as a key example.

These funds are then allocated through a Public Procurement process characterized by non-competitive tenders, simplified contracts, and subsidies. This mechanism directs state money to favored entities; since 2024, companies linked to Georgian Dream (GD) donors have secured over GEL 144 million in state tenders, while firms associated with opposition donors have received none. Contracts are consistently awarded to Allied Corporate Networks, including key donor-contractor companies such as “Bondi-2009,” “Monolith 2005,” and “Nova LLC.”

The profits from these state contracts are then recycled back into the system in the form of Political Donations. These financial contributions flow overwhelmingly to the ruling party, which received 87% of all party donations in the first half of 2025. This funding completes the cycle by strengthening the central hub: the “Georgian Dream Political & Economic Machine.”

This entire apparatus is further sustained by a significant external input of patronage and core funding from “Ivanishvili's Private Empire,” which is managed by his cousin, Ucha Mamatsashvili. This cycle systematically converts public funds into political financing, creating a resource-dominant ruling party and a dependent corporate class. This fusion of state and capital solidifies the system's control and marginalizes economic and political competition.

This section analyzes the dual narrative of Kakha Kaladze's mayoralty, juxtaposing his tangible urban development projects with the major political controversies that have defined his tenure. It dissects his sophisticated public image management, arguing that his high-visibility infrastructure projects function as strategic “narrative assets.” These assets allow him to build a brand of competence that acts as a political “firewall,” insulating him from the fallout of his more controversial actions and the broader democratic backsliding of the Georgian Dream party.

The cornerstone of the regime's media empire is Imedi TV, the country's most influential television broadcaster. Its control is managed by Irakli Rukhadze, a US-citizen businessman with long-standing ties to Bidzina Ivanishvili.¹ Rukhadze's company also holds sway over other major media and business assets, including Rustavi 2, making him the system’s primary media magnate.¹ His role is not that of a neutral investor but of a strategic manager tasked with ensuring the ideological alignment of the country's most powerful media holdings.

Rukhadze has been remarkably candid about the political mission of his media assets. In a 2024 interview, he explicitly stated that Imedi TV's “raison d'être” (main objective) is to prevent the opposition United National Movement from returning to power, and that the channel would remain “on Ivanishvili's side”.⁹⁶ This admission confirms that Imedi functions not as a journalistic enterprise but as a political instrument. The EU’s East StratCom Task Force has described the channel as the “ruling party's most powerful propaganda machine” and a “propaganda megaphone,” a characterization echoed by Western politicians who have called for Rukhadze to be sanctioned.¹

Under Rukhadze’s oversight, Imedi TV serves as the central hub for amplifying the government’s key narratives, from the “Global War Party” conspiracy theory to targeted information operations against Western diplomats and domestic civil society.¹ Despite his role, Rukhadze has faced legal challenges abroad; he was found liable for breach of fiduciary duty in a high-profile case in the UK High Court, a judgment that raised questions about his business practices.⁹⁵

While Imedi TV maintains a veneer of a mainstream news organization, the system deploys more aggressive outlets to act as its ideological “shock troops.” The most prominent of these is PosTV, a television channel co-founded by known propagandists Lasha Natsvlishvili (a former deputy prosecutor general) and Shalva Ramishvili.¹ The channel is financially backed by figures linked to the ruling party, such as MP Viktor Japaridze, and specializes in virulent, ad hominem attacks on the opposition, civil society, and independent media, as well as the dissemination of anti-Western conspiracy theories.¹ Natsvlishvili and Ramishvili function as the system's attack dogs, voicing the narratives that are too crude for official government spokespersons.

Operating on the radical fringe of this ecosystem is the ultra-conservative, openly pro-Russian movement “Alt-Info”.¹ While formally independent, Alt-Info functions as a radical proxy for the regime. Its anti-Western, anti-liberal, and homophobic narratives frequently align with and amplify the rhetoric of Georgian Dream, creating a broader information environment hostile to democratic values.¹⁰³ More significantly, Alt-Info serves as a tool for street-level intimidation, translating online hate speech into real-world violence. The group was the primary organizer of the violent attacks on journalists and activists during the 2021 and 2023 Tbilisi Pride events.¹¹

The leaders of Alt-Info, including Konstantine Morgoshia and Zurab Makharadze, have been sanctioned by the United States for their role in inciting violence.¹¹ Despite this, the group has operated with a degree of impunity within Georgia. After its political party was de-registered in 2024, it quickly re-formed under a new name, “Conservatives for Georgia,” and was officially registered by the authorities in April 2025, positioning it to participate in the upcoming local elections.¹² This suggests a symbiotic relationship where the regime tolerates and tacitly encourages Alt-Info's activities, which serve its broader goal of shrinking civic space and intimidating opponents.

The third pillar of the propaganda wing is the weaponization of the state’s regulatory apparatus. This function is carried out by Kakhi Bekauri, the Chairman of the Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC).¹ Bekauri is not an independent regulator; his career is deeply intertwined with the Ivanishvili system, having previously served as the director of Ivanishvili's "Channel 9" television station.¹⁰⁶

Under Bekauri’s leadership, which began in 2017 and has been extended for multiple terms, the GNCC has been systematically used as a tool of “lawfare” against independent and opposition-aligned media.¹⁰⁷ Watchdog organizations have documented a clear pattern of selective enforcement, where the GNCC imposes heavy fines and sanctions on critical media outlets for alleged violations of broadcasting regulations, while pro-government channels are treated with far greater leniency.¹¹¹ For example, opposition channels have been sanctioned for refusing to air Georgian Dream advertisements they deemed to contain hate speech, a decision the GNCC overruled.¹¹³

In 2025, the ruling party initiated draft legislation that would grant the GNCC sweeping new powers to regulate media content under vague criteria such as “factual accuracy” and “balance”.¹¹⁷ This move, criticized by watchdogs as mirroring Hungary’s repressive media laws, would formalize the GNCC's role as a state censor, giving it the authority to issue fines or even revoke licenses based on politically motivated complaints.¹¹¹ Bekauri’s role as a key enabler of the regime’s repressive apparatus has led to his inclusion on lists of individuals recommended for international sanctions by the European Parliament and US Congressmen.¹ His function is to create a hostile and economically unsustainable operating environment for any media outlet that does not adhere to the state's political line.

The campaign against independent media has accelerated in 2025. In March, the ruling party enacted a stringent “foreign agents registration” law targeting NGOs and press outlets. Under this law (which took effect May 31), any organization or individual receiving foreign funds and engaging in vaguely defined “political activities” must register, report finances, and even faces criminal penalties for noncompliance. The Anticorruption Bureau – itself staffed with pro-regime officials – has warned that the law applies broadly to media and citizens. Civil society promptly mobilized against it: on May 15, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association filed a constitutional challenge, joined by media outlets Studio Monitor and Sakartvelos Ambebi, to halt the law’s enforcement. In effect, the formal regulatory apparatus is being openly directed at curbing press freedom under the guise of legal “neutrality.”

Across the propaganda apparatus, actual intimidation of journalists has become commonplace. For example, veteran journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli – founder of the independent outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti – was arrested in January 2025 on dubious charges after covering a protest, and held without bail for months. Her detention drew international outcry: a U.S. congressman called her release “imperative,” and the European Union publicly condemned Georgia’s arrest of journalists as part of a broader repression. Observers have documented scores of such incidents: by late 2024 one media freedom monitor logged over 120 violations against more than 140 journalists, ranging from police beatings and chemical attacks during protests to frivolous fines and prosecutions for on-air commentary. In practice this means independent reporters routinely face violence or selective censorship; the space for critical reporting is being deliberately narrowed by state-aligned enforcement.

Even Georgia’s public broadcaster has become a flashpoint. In early 2025, student protesters demanded that the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) provide fair coverage after accusing its management of bias. The campaign escalated when GPB’s board simply reappointed its chairman on April 3 without real contest, prompting resignations in protest. By mid-April, two respected board members (Tea Kakhiani and actor Davit Velijanashvili) quit, publicly accusing the directorate of suppressing independent voices. Demonstrations even gathered outside GPB headquarters under banners like “People deserve an independent public broadcaster”. These protests and resignations reveal that even state-run media – supposedly the least disputed arm of the Propaganda Wing – are not immune from internal resistance.

In sum, the fourth pillar of power has visibly hardened its line: through new laws, fines, firings and intimidation, it strives to monopolize information, but in doing so it has also provoked growing backlash and drawn international condemnation.

This systemic audit documents a sophisticated and deeply entrenched system of informal governance in Georgia. The Political Bureau, the “Siloviki” Council, the Economic Directorate, and the Propaganda Wing do not operate as separate entities but as an interlocking, mutually reinforcing directorate. Political power, executed by loyalists in the government and parliament, is used to pass legislation that protects the system's assets and to direct state funds through a captured procurement process. These economic resources, managed by a network of family proxies and allied oligarchs, are then recycled to finance the ruling party's political machine and its extensive propaganda apparatus. This entire structure is shielded by a loyalist-staffed security and judicial system that ensures impunity for allies and provides a legalistic justification for the suppression of opponents. This creates a resilient, self-perpetuating cycle of power and capital.

Despite its apparent strength and adaptability, the system possesses several critical, inherent vulnerabilities that could threaten its long-term stability.

First and foremost is its extreme personalization. The entire architecture is built around the personal authority, wealth, and will of a single individual, Bidzina Ivanishvili. The loyalty of his lieutenants is overwhelmingly directed towards him personally, not to the institution of the party, the state, or a shared ideology. His eventual departure from the political scene would almost certainly trigger a severe and destabilizing succession crisis, as the system lacks any institutionalized or predictable mechanism for a peaceful transfer of power. The various factions and clans held together by his patronage would likely turn on one another in a struggle for control over the system's vast resources.

Second, the regime's sharp anti-Western turn has exposed it to escalating international sanctions and isolation. While the system has shown a capacity to adapt—for example, by using tailored “offshore” legislation to repatriate assets and by cultivating new financial and political partners like the United Arab Emirates—targeted sanctions remain a potent threat.¹ The designation of key nodes in the network, such as the leaders of the judicial clan (Murusidze and Chinchaladze) and informal coordinators with FSB ties (Partskhaladze), can disrupt financial flows, create internal friction, and erode the system's international legitimacy.⁷ While the MEGOBARI Act failed to pass in the US, the political will to impose costs on the regime for democratic backsliding persists and represents a key external pressure point.²²

Third, the system’s demand for absolute loyalty creates the potential for internal fractures and elite discontent. The ruthless purging of any figure who demonstrates even a hint of independence, as seen in the cases of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia and former business associate Giorgi Bachiashvili, enforces discipline but also creates a pool of disenfranchised former insiders.¹ The Bachiashvili case is particularly illustrative of this vulnerability. His explosive public allegations of being abducted and illegally rendered to Georgia in an operation personally involving the then-head of the State Security Service have exposed the regime's potentially criminal underpinnings to a degree rarely seen before.³⁸ Such high-level defections and conflicts have the potential to reveal damaging information and undermine the code of silence upon which the system depends.

The political turmoil of 2025 has provided clear evidence of this vulnerability, as the ruling system initiated a wide-ranging purge against figures within its own elite. High-profile officials, many considered loyalists of former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, have been systematically sidelined or targeted in investigations. These include the removal of Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri and Head of State Security Grigol Liluashvili, the arrest of Deputy Economy Minister Romeo Mikautadze on corruption charges, and the targeting of business figures close to the regime like Giorgi Ramishvili. This internal cleansing, extending even to the regional level with the former Adjaran head of government Tornike Rizhvadze being hospitalized with a gunshot wound amid a political shake-up, suggests an intense struggle between internal clans, particularly the consolidation of power by a faction associated with Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze.

Finally, the system’s long-term legitimacy is tied to its ability to deliver economic stability and tangible benefits to the population. A significant economic downturn, exacerbated by international isolation, could erode the public consent that has been partially maintained through patronage and high-visibility infrastructure projects. Widespread economic hardship, combined with the deep-seated pro-European sentiment among a large segment of the population, could fuel the kind of sustained, mass protests seen in 2024-2025, creating a challenge that the coercive apparatus may struggle to contain without resorting to a level of violence that would trigger a definitive and irreversible break with the democratic world.119

An additional systemic factor is the deep fragmentation of the political opposition, which has struggled to present a united front. This was starkly illustrated in mid-2025 by a major strategic split ahead of regional elections, dividing the opposition into two camps: one, led by the United National Movement and the “Coalition for Change,” advocating for a full boycott of the elections to deny the regime legitimacy; the other, led by the “Lelo” and “For Georgia” parties, arguing for participation to challenge the ruling party in urban strongholds. This fundamental disagreement on strategy led to public accusations and infighting, undermining the opposition's collective ability to channel public discontent and presenting the ruling system with a fractured and less effective adversary.

This report is a foundational analysis (v1.0) based on the synthesis of a report made by NOUS AGI, which has been systematically updated, verified, and enriched through a comprehensive OSINT review of over 500 additional public sources. This includes official government records, procurement databases, reports from international bodies (OSCE, European Parliament), findings from reputable non-governmental organizations (Transparency International Georgia, ISFED), platform transparency reports (Meta), academic analyses, and extensive reportage from credible international and local media outlets in both English and Georgian.¹

AI-assisted tools were employed for data processing, enabling the rapid analysis of large volumes of multilingual text, entity recognition, relationship mapping, and the identification of systemic patterns.¹

This analysis is a “living document” intended to establish a baseline understanding. It will be iteratively updated and expanded with primary data gathered through the CAT AGI project's “Transparency Log” of official information requests and the “Citizen Signals Channel” for vetted public submissions.¹ .

1.     CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI


2.     Irakli Garibashvili refutes opposition party plans: "Who should I ..., accessed on September 21, 2025, https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/irakli-garibashvili-refutes-opposition-party-plans-who-should-i-confront/
3.     Ex-PM Garibashvili leaves Georgian Dream, retires from politics - Georgia Today, accessed on September 21, 2025, https://georgiatoday.ge/ex-pm-garibashvili-leaves-georgian-dream-retires-from-politics/
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17.  აპირებს თუ არა ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილი ახალი პარტიის შექმნას? - YouTube, accessed on September 21, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lyw3_fWpy0s
18.  ირაკლი კობახიძე - ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილმა ბევრი რამ გააკეთა ჩვენი ქვეყნისთვის, მათ შორის იმ სამი წლის განმავლობაში, როცა რთული პროცესები გამოვიარეთ - ინტერპრესნიუსი, accessed on September 21, 2025, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/849059-irakli-kobaxize-irakli-garibashvilma-bevri-ram-gaaketa-chveni-kveqnistvis-mat-shoris-im-sami-clis-ganmavlobashi-roca-rtuli-procesebi-gamoviaret/
19.  Georgian Dream's PM Kobakhidze: 'If we have to choose, we'll choose stability over visa-free travel', accessed on September 21, 2025, https://jam-news.net/georgian-dreams-pm-kobakhidze-if-we-have-to-choose-well-choose-stability-over-visa-free-travel/
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