Systemic Audit: The 2025 Tbilisi Mayoral Election as a Diagnostic Lens on Power in Georgia

The Tbilisi mayoral election, scheduled for October 4, 2025, represents more than a contest for municipal leadership; it serves as a critical, time-bound lens for a systemic audit of power in Georgia.¹ This report adopts the posture of a “post-political systemic auditor,” focusing not on partisan outcomes but on documenting the verifiable patterns and instruments through which political control is exercised and maintained. The objective is to produce a durable, evidence-based record of the operational dynamics of the Georgian state for an international audience of diplomats, observers, and researchers.¹

The context for this analysis is defined by a critical “monitoring vacuum”.¹ On September 9, 2025, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) announced that the late invitation extended by Georgian authorities made “meaningful observation impossible”.² This decision, which breaks with a long history of timely invitations for local elections in Georgia, means the October 4 vote will proceed without the scrutiny of a full-scale, long-term international observation mission.² This absence of authoritative international monitoring elevates the necessity of independent, remote analysis and underscores the foundational purpose of the CAT AGI project: to document the electoral environment in a procedural and non-partisan manner.¹

The methodology of this project was itself forged by the administrative pressures it seeks to document. On August 27, 2025, the project's coordinator was denied re-entry into Georgia, an act that transformed the initiative's operational model. This event is framed not as a failure but as a real-world stress test that served as the “catalyst” for the project's current form. It proved the necessity of a monitoring model that is resilient to administrative pressure, pivoting the project from on-the-ground research to a remote-first methodology combining Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) using not only standard LLM tools, but also beta version of NOUS AGI made by the author as the part of his second “indie PhD”, with the use the verification of citizen signals, and, crucially, a public log of formal information requests submitted to state bodies.¹

Therefore, this report does not aim to predict the election’s outcome, which is obvious. Its core task is to systematically document and analyze the key “indicators of power”—media narratives, administrative leverage, digital tactics, international ties, legal and economic instruments, and corporate networks. By examining how these tools are deployed before, during, and after the electoral cycle, this analysis seeks to provide a foundational understanding of the systemic architecture of governance in contemporary Georgia and the way it can be influenced by indirect control methods by the tools developed as the part of the author’s third “indie PhD”.

The October 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election is being conducted within a political environment of extreme polarization and institutional crisis. The landscape is defined by the consolidated power of the ruling party, a strategically fragmented opposition, and a civil society operating under sustained pressure.

The political system is dominated by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, which has controlled all major state institutions since the disputed parliamentary elections of October 2024.¹ The party’s authority is centralized around its honorary chairman and founder, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely regarded as the country's de facto leader and informal center of power. His personal wealth, estimated to be equivalent to one-third of Georgia's GDP, provides a significant underpinning to his political influence.⁶

The incumbent mayoral candidate, Kakha Kaladze, is a key figure within this power vertical. A former international football star, he has served as mayor since 2017 and is seeking a third term.¹ His concurrent role as the Secretary General of Georgian Dream underscores the deep fusion of municipal administration with the party-state apparatus, blurring the lines between civic governance and partisan politics.¹ Kaladze’s campaign is built on the central slogan, “Peace for Georgia, More Goodness for Tbilisi,” a narrative that frames the ruling party as the sole guarantor of stability in a volatile region—a theme that will be analyzed in detail as a core power indicator.⁹

The opposition enters this election in a state of strategic schism, a condition that structurally benefits the incumbent. The opposition is divided into two primary camps: those boycotting the election and those participating.

A significant bloc, led by the country’s largest opposition force, the United National Movement (UNM), has declared a boycott of all municipal elections. This faction views participation as an act that would legitimize a regime, they consider undemocratic, following the contested 2024 parliamentary vote and subsequent government actions.¹ This boycott means that a substantial portion of the traditionally opposition-minded electorate in Tbilisi lacks representation from its primary political vehicle.¹

The participating opposition is led by an alliance of the “Lelo/Strong Georgia” party and former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s “For Georgia” party. They have fielded a joint candidate for Tbilisi mayor, Irakli Kupradze, a former civil society activist.¹ However, this coalition has demonstrated significant organizational weakness. It failed to field mayoral candidates in 28 of Georgia's 64 municipalities, leaving Georgian Dream to run uncontested in nearly half of the country’s local races.¹³ This inability to mount a nationwide challenge highlights a lack of resources and grassroots infrastructure.

This strategic dichotomy reflects a fundamental ideological schism within the opposition movement. The boycottist faction, led by the United National Movement and the Akhali party, operates on the principle that participation would legitimize an undemocratic regime and is futile in the face of systemic electoral malpractice . Conversely, the participating alliance of Lelo and For Georgia adopts a pragmatic stance, arguing that all legal instruments must be utilized to contest power, particularly in urban centers with significant opposition support. According to observations from local political activists, this internal conflict of strategies not only diffuses resources but also disorients the opposition electorate, thereby compounding the incumbent's structural advantage.

The field of candidates is further fragmented by the presence of smaller parties. These include Iago Khvichia of the right-libertarian “Girchi” party, who positions himself as a “third force” critical of both the government and the traditional opposition, and Zurab Makharadze of the ultra-conservative, pro-Russian “Alt-Info” movement.¹ This splintering of the opposition vote has profound systemic implications. The ruling party has recently amended electoral laws to remove the requirement for a candidate to win over 40% of the vote in a majoritarian district; a simple plurality is now sufficient.¹⁴ In this context, the division of the opposition vote among multiple candidates mathematically lowers the threshold needed for the single, unified GD candidate to secure victory, turning the opposition’s disunity into a key structural advantage for the incumbent.

The election is taking place against a backdrop of sustained, nationwide protests that began in late 2024 after the government announced it was suspending the EU accession process.⁴ This period has been characterized by a climate of increasing pressure on civil society and independent media. The government has enacted a controversial “foreign agent” law, modeled on Russian legislation, which targets organizations receiving foreign funding.¹⁶ There have been numerous documented incidents of physical attacks on activists and journalists by both law enforcement and unidentified pro-government groups, contributing to a shrinking space for dissent.¹⁶

Public polling data reveals a deep sense of dissatisfaction and institutional distrust. A May 2025 survey indicated that 57.1% of Georgians believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, a sentiment even more pronounced in the capital, where 81% of residents describe the economy as weak.¹ This disillusionment extends to the political class as a whole, with 64% of citizens reporting that they feel no political party truly represents their interests.¹

This widespread apathy and distrust create a complex electoral dynamic. Despite the disillusionment, the same polling shows that a majority of the population (54.5%) favors participation in the elections over a boycott.¹ This suggests a public that is deeply critical of the status quo but still views the ballot box as a potential, if flawed, avenue for change. It is this contradiction—a desire for an electoral alternative coexisting with profound skepticism about the political system's integrity—that defines the civic landscape in which the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election unfolds.

This section forms the analytical core of the report. It deconstructs the mechanisms of power in Georgia by examining six key indicators, as defined by the CAT AGI framework. Each indicator represents a distinct domain through which influence is exerted to shape the political environment and outcomes.

We document a media environment that, while formally diverse, functions as a highly polarized and instrumentalized arena for political warfare. This landscape is not conducive to fostering an informed electorate; rather, it serves to reinforce partisan loyalties and disseminate targeted narratives that advance the strategic objectives of political actors.¹⁹

The primary narrative deployed by the ruling Georgian Dream party and its affiliated media outlets frames the election as an existential choice between “peace and stability,” which they claim to offer, and the “chaos and war” allegedly sought by the opposition and its Western backers.¹ This narrative is not subtle. Pro-government campaign materials and television segments explicitly juxtapose images of infrastructure projects and peaceful city life in Georgia with graphic, black-and-white footage of wartime destruction in Ukraine.²² This tactic, identified by independent observers as a form of scaremongering, aims to exploit public anxieties about regional instability to consolidate support for the incumbent government.²³

This binary is further extended into a broader anti-Western conspiracy theory, which posits the existence of a “Global War Party” comprising the United States, the European Union, and domestic Georgian opposition forces.²⁵ According to this narrative, this coalition is actively working to drag Georgia into a direct military confrontation with Russia. This framing serves a dual purpose: it deflects from domestic policy failures by focusing on an external threat, and it delegitimizes any and all political opposition by branding it as an agent of this malevolent foreign power.

The effectiveness of this narrative is contingent on its amplification through a controlled media ecosystem. The Georgian television market, the primary source of information for the majority of the population, is dominated by a few politically aligned channels.²⁸

Pro-Government Bloc: The most influential broadcaster is Imedi TV, which is owned by a holding company ultimately controlled by businessman Irakli Rukhadze.²⁹ The EU's East StratCom Task Force, a body dedicated to monitoring disinformation, has described Imedi TV as the “ruling party's most powerful propaganda machine” and a “propaganda megaphone undermining Georgia's EU aspirations”.⁶ It is joined by Rustavi 2 and the online outlet POSTV in providing consistently pro-government coverage.²⁹ The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB), though state-funded and legally obligated to be impartial, has been documented as having a clear pro-government editorial stance, providing disproportionate airtime to the ruling party.²¹

Pro-Opposition Bloc: The primary channels for critical and opposition viewpoints are Mtavari Arkhi, TV Pirveli, and Formula. These outlets are consistently critical of the government’s policies and its record on democracy and human rights, and are often the targets of regulatory pressure and verbal attacks from government officials.¹⁹

It should be noted, however, that the pro-opposition media sphere is not without its own internal critics. According to assessments from within opposition circles, leading critical channels, while playing an indispensable role in preventing a total government information monopoly, often employ methods of counter-propaganda. Their editorial approach can involve biased framing and emotionally charged rhetoric which, while effective in mobilizing the core opposition electorate, also contributes to the further polarization of the information space and blurs the line between objective journalism and political activism.

This deep polarization means that different segments of the population inhabit entirely separate information realities. Viewers of pro-government channels are more likely to believe the country is heading in the right direction and to be concerned with stability, while viewers of pro-opposition channels are more likely to believe Georgia is not a democracy and to prioritize political freedoms.³¹ The media, therefore, does not facilitate a national conversation but rather deepens existing societal divisions.

The control of key media channels is used to execute specific information operations. We document several recent cases:

Targeting of Western Diplomats: In September 2025, Imedi TV broadcast footage it claimed was evidence of a “secret meeting” between two opposition representatives and officials at the British embassy in Tbilisi. This followed earlier reports by the same channel alleging that the British embassy was attempting to fund opposition-linked groups. These stories, similar to the ones used in Russian state TV propaganda in 2010s, which portray Western diplomatic missions as covertly orchestrating opposition activities, align perfectly with the “Global War Party” narrative.⁶

Selective Use of Foreign Sources: Pro-government media, similar to Russian state media propaganda, outlets have been documented selectively quoting or misrepresenting statements from controversial or fringe Western political figures. This creates a distorted impression of international support for GD’s policies and is used to counter the widespread criticism from mainstream EU and US officials.³²

Regulatory Pressure as Censorship: The state’s administrative levers are used to police the language of critical media. In 2025, the Georgian National Communications Commission, a state regulatory body, found opposition channels TV Pirveli and Formula to be in violation of the law for using terms such as “regime,” “oligarch's MP,” and “illegitimate parliament” to describe the government. While no fine was issued, this action establishes a precedent for the state to censor and penalize critical political language used by independent media, effectively chilling free expression.³³

The media landscape thus functions as a critical instrument of power. It is not merely biased; it is a structured system for narrative control, where the largest broadcast platforms are used to amplify a single, fear-based government narrative while regulatory bodies are deployed to constrain and delegitimize dissenting voices. This creates an information environment where objective analysis is scarce and political reality is actively constructed to serve the interests of the ruling party.

A systemic audit of Georgia’s political environment reveals that the media landscape is not a neutral public square but a meticulously structured battlefield. The high degree of political parallelism—where media outlets are symbiotically linked to political factions—has created a deeply polarized information architecture designed to consolidate power and marginalize dissent . This system is built upon three core pillars: a dominant pro-government media network, a smaller but vocal critical counter-bloc, and the state’s strategic use of regulatory and financial levers to maintain control.

At the epicenter of the pro-government media infrastructure lies the nexus between the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and its founder, the nation's informal leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili. This central hub projects its influence through a constellation of major broadcasters that function in concert to amplify state-sanctioned narratives.

Imedi TV stands as the flagship of this media bloc. While formally owned by businessman Irakli Rukhadze through his Media Finance Group B.V., its editorial alignment with the ruling party is direct and unwavering. International observers, including the EU's East StratCom Task Force, have identified it as a primary tool of state propaganda, crucial for disseminating the “Peace versus War” narrative that frames the government as the sole protector of national stability against alleged foreign and domestic threats.

Rustavi 2 and the online outlet POSTV operate in the same orbit, creating an echo chamber that provides consistent, pro-government coverage across multiple platforms, thereby maximizing the reach of the ruling party's messaging.

The Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) represents a unique and critical component of this architecture. Despite its legal mandate for impartiality, its reliance on direct state funding creates an undeniable lever of influence. Media monitoring reports consistently document an editorial bias favouring the ruling party, effectively transforming the public broadcaster into a state-resourced asset for the government’s communication strategy.

Functioning in opposition to this dominant network is a smaller cluster of channels aligned with critical political figures and viewpoints. These outlets serve as the primary platforms for scrutinizing government actions and providing a public forum for documenting the country's democratic backsliding.

This bloc is led by channels such as Mtavari Arkhi, founded by prominent opposition figure Nika Gvaramia, TV Pirveli, and Formula. These broadcasters consistently challenge the government’s policies on democracy, human rights, and foreign relations.

Their critical stance has made them frequent targets of coordinated pressure from the state. As documented by watchdog organizations, these outlets face not only sustained verbal attacks from high-ranking officials but also the constant threat of administrative and regulatory sanctions, forcing them to operate in a politically hostile environment.

The ruling party's dominance is not maintained by ownership alone, but is reinforced by the instrumentalization of state institutions. Two primary mechanisms are used to police the media landscape and ensure systemic alignment:

1. Regulatory Coercion: The Georgian National Communications Commission (GNCC) has been deployed as a tool to chill free expression. A landmark 2025 decision found opposition channels in violation of the law for using “anti-government language,” such as “regime” and “oligarch’s MP”. While no fine was issued, this act established a powerful precedent, granting the state a legal basis to censor and penalize critical political discourse used by independent media, thereby narrowing the scope of acceptable speech.
2. Financial Influence: The aforementioned state funding of the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) ensures that a major national media outlet remains structurally tied to the government's interests, limiting its capacity for independent oversight.

The Georgian media ecosystem is a carefully engineered system of narrative control. It combines the direct influence of politically-aligned ownership with the indirect but powerful leverage of state regulatory and financial bodies. This architecture creates a closed-loop system where pro-government narratives are amplified, critical voices are systematically pressured, and the information environment is actively shaped to serve the strategic goal of maintaining the ruling party’s hold on power.

We document the systematic use of the state’s administrative and legislative powers to construct an unequal political playing field. This is achieved not through overt coercion alone, but through the subtle and procedural re-engineering of the rules governing political competition, resource allocation, and institutional oversight. The objective is to create a system that structurally advantages the ruling party.

A series of amendments to the electoral code, passed by the GD-controlled parliament in 2024 and 2025, have fundamentally altered the mechanics of local elections. These changes, enacted through an expedited procedure without broad political consultation, have been criticized by domestic watchdogs and international bodies as being tailored to benefit the incumbent.¹⁴

1.Abolition of the 40% Threshold: The requirement for a candidate in a majoritarian (single-member) district to win at least 40% of the vote to avoid a second-round runoff has been eliminated. Now, a candidate can win the seat with a simple plurality, regardless of how low their vote share is.¹⁴ This change is systemically significant in a fragmented political field. With multiple opposition candidates splitting the anti-government vote, a unified GD candidate can secure a seat with a minority of the total votes cast.

2.Increased Majoritarianism: The composition of municipal councils (Sakrebulos) has been redrawn to increase the proportion of members elected from majoritarian districts and decrease the proportion elected via proportional party lists. In the 50-member Tbilisi City Assembly, for instance, the split was changed from 10 majoritarian and 40 proportional seats to an even 25-25 split. In other major cities, proportional seats were nearly halved while majoritarian seats increased.¹⁴ This shift is critical because majoritarian systems tend to reward the largest, most organized party, while proportional systems offer better representation for smaller parties. The move towards majoritarianism is a structural change designed to translate GD's plurality support into a disproportionately large majority of council seats.

3.Preferential Seat Allocation: The formula for distributing leftover seats from the proportional vote was changed. Previously, these mandates were allocated to parties with the largest remainder of votes. The new rule gives them directly to the party that garnered the most votes overall, providing an additional bonus to the winning party.¹⁴

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe reviewed these amendments and warned that they “may result in the further entrenchment of the governing party’s position,” calling on Georgia to repeal them.¹⁴ The changes represent a form of procedural gerrymandering, using legislative power to design an electoral system that maximizes the ruling party’s chances of victory before a single vote is cast.

Beyond legislative changes, administrative resources are leveraged to create an uneven campaign environment. International observers, including the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the OSCE, have documented patterns of GD using state resources to bolster its campaigns.³⁵ This includes the mobilization of local government officials for campaign activities and reports of pressure on public sector employees.²⁴ In some cases, this has allegedly extended to threats of withholding social assistance from citizens who do not vote for the ruling party.³⁶

State institutions that are meant to be impartial have also shown signs of politicization. The process for composing the Central Election Commission (CEC) has been altered in ways that have reduced opposition influence and increased concerns about its political bias.³⁶ Furthermore, there is a documented pattern of politically motivated dismissals of civil servants who have publicly supported or participated in the pro-European protests that began in late 2024, sending a chilling message throughout the state bureaucracy.³⁸ In a move that drew public criticism for its lack of diversity, GD’s slate of 25 majoritarian candidates for the Tbilisi City Assembly was composed entirely of men.⁴⁰

This pressure is reportedly felt with particular acuity in regional centers such as Batumi, where dense social networks render political confrontations highly personalized. The instrumentalization of law enforcement and judicial bodies in such environments leads to the rupture of long-standing community ties, a phenomenon starkly captured by one local activist’s description: “I was arrested by my former classmate, and my university lecturer sentenced me”. This illustrates how systemic pressure translates into personal ordeals that corrode the social fabric at a micro-level, exacerbating the overall climate of instability and institutional distrust.

The use of administrative leverage is a core component of the ruling party's power-retention strategy. By altering the rules of the game and deploying the machinery of the state in its favor, GD has created a political environment where the opposition must not only defeat the ruling party’s candidates but also overcome the systemic barriers erected by the state itself.

Furthermore, on-the-ground observers report a qualitative shift in the tactics of security services, especially in the regions. Following a leadership overhaul in the Adjaran government in mid-2025, local activists in Batumi began to document an unprecedented level of police aggression. According to these sources, security units from other regions were deployed to the city, allegedly to ensure a more forceful response to dissent, as these officers lack the personal and community ties that might otherwise temper their actions. This strategy suggests a centralized decision to intensify repressive control and preemptively neutralize potential centers of resistance outside the capital.

We document the use of social media platforms as a primary arena for political influence operations. The digital sphere is not an open forum for public debate but a contested space characterized by state-linked coordinated campaigns, platform manipulation, and the dissemination of targeted disinformation.

Investigations by Meta (the parent company of Facebook and Instagram) have uncovered and dismantled multiple large-scale networks engaged in Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) that were directly linked to the Georgian government. This indicates that such tactics are not fringe activities but an institutionalized, state-sponsored strategy.

●December 2019 Takedown: Meta removed a network of 396 assets, including 344 Facebook Pages, 13 Groups, and 22 Instagram accounts. The investigation linked this activity to Panda, a Georgian advertising agency, and the Georgian Dream-led government. This network used fake accounts, posed as independent news organizations, and spent over $316,000 on advertising to amplify pro-government content and attack the opposition.⁴²

●May 2023 Takedown: Meta removed a second, distinct network of 117 assets (including 80 Facebook accounts and 26 Pages). Crucially, Meta’s investigation explicitly linked this network to the Strategic Communications Department (StratCom) of the Government Administration of Georgia.⁴⁵ This finding confirms that official state bodies are directly involved in conducting covert influence operations against their own citizens.

The tactics employed by these networks were consistent. They used fake accounts, often with stolen or AI-generated profile pictures, to manage pages and groups. They engaged in high-frequency, sometimes automated, posting to make their content appear more popular than it was, and they coordinated to amplify specific narratives, such as the “war-dragging” conspiracy theory, and to conduct smear campaigns against civil society activists and opposition figures.⁴³

The objective of these CIB networks was to manipulate the information environment. A key tactic was the creation of Facebook pages with generic names like “Daily Info,” “NewsHub.ge,” and “OnTime.ge”.⁴² These pages were designed to look like impartial news aggregators but exclusively posted content that was favorable to the government or critical of its opponents, thereby misleading users about the partisan nature of the information they were consuming.

This domestic activity is supplemented by external influence operations. There is evidence of Russian troll farms targeting Georgia with disinformation, particularly during election periods. These campaigns aim to sow discord, undermine trust in democratic institutions, and promote pro-Kremlin narratives, such as the false claim that the United States was planning to rig the 2024 parliamentary elections.²⁵

The documented evidence reveals a clear, top-down strategy to use state resources to create a deceptive digital ecosystem. The direct involvement of a government body like the StratCom department demonstrates that this is not merely political “spin” but the systematic and covert fabrication of grassroots support to manipulate public opinion, attack opponents, and control the digital narrative. This represents a significant feature of digital authoritarianism, where the tools of social media are weaponized by the state against its own democratic processes.

An analysis of Georgia's digital sphere reveals that Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) is not a sporadic phenomenon but a strategic, institutionalized capability that is systematically deployed in response to key political triggers. The timeline from 2019 to 2025 demonstrates a clear pattern of escalation, where state-linked influence operations are activated during periods of legislative controversy, popular protest, and electoral competition. This chronology maps the key platform enforcement actions against the political events that likely precipitated them.

Initial Phase: The Unmasking of Coordinated Networks (2019-2020)

The first major public evidence of large-scale, politically motivated digital operations emerged in December 2019, when Meta dismantled a network of 396 assets, including 344 Facebook Pages and 13 Groups. The platform's investigation directly linked this network to the Georgian Dream government and a Tbilisi-based advertising agency, “Panda.” With a documented ad spend exceeding $316,000, this operation demonstrated a significant and centrally coordinated effort to manipulate public discourse.

This period also revealed that such tactics were not exclusive to the ruling party. In April 2020, Meta removed a separate network linked to the “Espersona” media outlet and the opposition United National Movement, indicating a broader adoption of CIB tactics across the political spectrum, albeit on a different scale than the state-sponsored operations.

Escalation Phase: CIB as a Tool of Political Crisis Management (2022-2024)

Beginning in 2022 and continuing through 2025, pro-government digital networks, including those later identified and removed by Meta, were instrumental in the sustained amplification of the “Global War Party” and anti-Western narratives. This long-term campaign aimed to reframe Georgia’s political reality, casting the West as a hostile actor and the domestic opposition as its agents.

This digital machinery was activated with precision during key political flashpoints:

• Spring 2024: With the introduction of the controversial “Foreign Agent” Law, these networks launched intense online campaigns to discredit and stigmatize civil society organizations and independent media that opposed the legislation, demonstrating their function as a tool for suppressing dissent.
• October 26, 2024: During the disputed parliamentary election, the digital space was contested by both domestic CIB and external disinformation campaigns. Russian state actors (SVR) and affiliated pro-Kremlin outlets disseminated narratives claiming the United States planned to rig the election and foment a “Tbilisi Maidan”.
• November 28, 2024: Following the government's decision to suspend the EU accession process, mass protests erupted. Documented CIB networks responded in real-time, working to discredit the protesters and amplify the government's official justifications for its policy shift, showcasing their role as a rapid-response propaganda instrument.

Definitive Confirmation of State Sponsorship (2023)
The most critical turning point in understanding these operations occurred on May 3, 2023. On this date, Meta removed another network of 117 assets, including 80 Facebook accounts and 26 Pages. Crucially, Meta’s investigation did not link this network to an external agency but explicitly attributed it to the Strategic Communications Department (StratCom) of the Government Administration of Georgia. This finding provided definitive, public evidence that covert digital influence operations were not merely state-aligned but were being executed directly by a formal state body against its own citizens.

Current Phase: Electoral Weaponization (2025)
In August-September 2025, during the official Tbilisi Mayoral Election Campaign, these established digital tactics reached a peak of activity. Coordinated networks were fully mobilized to promote the achievements of the incumbent mayor and disseminate negative or discrediting content about opposition candidates, demonstrating the operationalization of this state-level capability for a clear electoral objective.
This chronology reveals an evolving and increasingly sophisticated strategy of digital control, tightly integrated with the political calendar and directly managed from within state structures.

We document the instrumentalization of Georgia’s foreign policy and international relationships as a tool of domestic power. The ruling party's foreign policy orientation is not merely a matter of geopolitical strategy but is actively deployed to consolidate its domestic political base, delegitimize opposition, and insulate the regime from international pressure related to democratic backsliding.

A consistent pattern of anti-Western rhetoric, specifically targeting the United States and the European Union, is a central feature of the political discourse of high-level Georgian Dream officials and their affiliated media.¹⁶ As previously noted, the West is frequently cast as a “Global War Party” that seeks to undermine Georgia's sovereignty and embroil it in conflict.²⁵ This narrative serves a crucial domestic political function: it allows the government to frame all domestic opposition—be it political parties, civil society organizations, or independent media—as “foreign agents” acting on behalf of this hostile external power.²⁵ By creating a siege mentality, the government can portray its actions to curtail civil liberties and consolidate power as necessary measures to defend national sovereignty against foreign interference.

This rhetoric is matched by concrete policy actions that have effectively halted Georgia’s long-stated goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. Although the European Council granted Georgia EU candidate status in December 2023, this was a largely symbolic gesture contingent on reforms.⁵⁴ The Georgian government's subsequent actions have moved the country in the opposite direction. In November 2024, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced the unilateral suspension of EU accession negotiations until 2028.⁴ This decision, combined with the passage of legislation that directly contravenes EU values—such as the “foreign agent” law and anti-LGBT laws—has brought the integration process to a standstill.¹⁷

This democratic backsliding has drawn strong condemnation from Georgia's traditional Western partners. The European Parliament has passed resolutions rejecting the legitimacy of the 2024 elections and calling for targeted sanctions against senior Georgian officials, including Bidzina Ivanishvili and Kakha Kaladze.³⁸ The United States has imposed visa restrictions on officials deemed responsible for “undermining democracy” and is considering further measures through the proposed (but not adopted) MEGOBARI Act, which would include asset freezes.¹⁶

As relations with the West have deteriorated, the Georgian government has actively cultivated alternative economic and political partnerships. This represents a strategic pivot designed to reduce the country’s dependence on Western support and the democratic conditionality that accompanies it.
●Russia: Despite Russia's ongoing occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, the government has pursued a policy of “normalization.” This has led to a significant increase in trade and investment from Russia since 2022, creating new economic dependencies.²⁵
●China: Georgia has deepened its strategic partnership with China. Most notably, the government cancelled a contract with a US-backed consortium to build a strategic deep-sea port in Anaklia and subsequently awarded the project to a Chinese state-owned company that is under US sanctions.¹⁶
●Other Partners: The government is actively seeking investment from other non-Western sources. A high-profile meeting in September 2025 between Bidzina Ivanishvili and the President of the United Arab Emirates resulted in an agreement for a multi-billion-dollar investment in Georgia.⁶⁰

This dual foreign policy serves two distinct but related goals. Domestically, the anti-Western narrative provides a powerful tool for political mobilization and the suppression of dissent. Internationally, the pivot towards Russia, China, and other partners creates a strategic hedge. By diversifying its economic and political relationships, the government aims to create a new geopolitical reality where it is no longer reliant on Western goodwill and is therefore insulated from pressure to uphold democratic norms and the rule of law.

We document the use of the state’s legal and economic apparatus as primary instruments for consolidating power, rewarding political loyalty, and creating systemic barriers for opponents. Legislation is not only used to govern but also to restructure the political and economic landscape in favor of the ruling elite, while public funds are channeled through a system that appears to function as a patronage network.

The GD-controlled parliament has enacted a suite of laws designed to shrink the space for civil society, media, and political opposition.

●The “Foreign Agent” Law: Formally titled the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, this legislation requires non-governmental organizations and media outlets that receive more than 20% of their funding from foreign sources to register as “organizations pursuing the interest of a foreign power”.¹⁷ This law is a direct tool for stigmatizing and creating administrative burdens for the very organizations that are essential for democratic oversight, including election monitoring groups and independent investigative journalism platforms.

●Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly: Following the mass protests that began in late 2024, the government amended the Criminal and Administrative Codes to impose harsher penalties, including increased fines and potential jail time, for violations of public order during demonstrations. These changes have been criticized for containing vague provisions that grant law enforcement broad discretion to detain protesters, thereby chilling the right to peaceful assembly.³⁷

In the spring of 2024, the government passed amendments to the Tax Code that created substantial tax exemptions for individuals and companies transferring assets from offshore jurisdictions into Georgia.⁶¹ The timing and nature of this law suggest it was tailored to serve specific interests. In December 2024, the United States imposed financial sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili for his role in undermining Georgian democracy.⁶¹ Immediately following this, in January 2025, a large-scale restructuring of the Ivanishvili family's vast corporate empire began. Companies previously held through opaque offshore entities in jurisdictions like Belize and Panama were transferred to newly created Georgian joint-stock companies, such as JSC Atu Holding and JSC Terra, controlled directly by Ivanishvili and his immediate family members.⁶¹ This sequence of events strongly indicates that the “offshore law” was a legal instrument created to facilitate the protection of the ruling elite's assets from international sanctions.

Analysis of public procurement data reveals a systemic pattern that strongly correlates political donations to Georgian Dream with the awarding of state and municipal contracts. A comprehensive report by Transparency International (TI) Georgia for the first half of 2025 found that:
●Companies linked to individuals who donated to Georgian Dream won state tenders worth approximately GEL 144 million (about $53 million).
●During the same period, companies linked to donors of all other political parties combined won zero state tenders.⁶²

This pattern is consistent and involves specific, identifiable companies. For example, the construction firms Bondi-2009 and Monoliti-2005, whose owners are major and consistent donors to GD, secured tenders worth over GEL 115 million in the 2024-2025 period alone.⁶³ This dynamic extends to simplified (no-bid) procurement contracts and state agricultural subsidies, which are also disproportionately awarded to companies with financial ties to the ruling party.⁶²

This evidence points to a system where public funds are not allocated through a purely competitive and transparent process. Instead, the state’s legal and economic instruments appear to be deployed in a transactional manner. Repressive legislation is used to neutralize political threats, while preferential legislation is crafted to protect the assets of the elite. Simultaneously, the public procurement system functions as a mechanism to reward corporate allies, who in turn provide the financial resources that fuel the ruling party's political machinery. This creates a closed-loop system of political and economic power that is highly resistant to external challenges.

We document the deep integration of political power and corporate interests in Georgia, mapping the networks that connect key political figures, including those in the Tbilisi municipal administration, with major national business entities. This analysis reveals a system where the lines between public office and private enterprise are blurred, and where economic influence and political authority are mutually reinforcing.

At the apex of this system is Bidzina Ivanishvili. As the founder of Georgian Dream and the country's wealthiest individual, his corporate network is effectively intertwined with the state itself.⁶ His business empire, historically managed through a complex web of offshore companies and trusted relatives, includes assets in banking (JSC Cartu Bank), real estate, manufacturing, and agriculture.⁷ As documented, the imposition of US sanctions in late 2024 triggered a rapid consolidation of these assets from offshore jurisdictions into new Georgian holding companies (JSC Atu Holding, JSC Terra, JSC Lusol, etc.), now under the direct ownership of Ivanishvili, his wife Ekaterine Khvedelidze, and his son Uta Ivanishvili.⁶¹ These holdings control major commercial assets in Tbilisi, including the "Galleria Tbilisi" shopping mall, and nationally significant projects like the "Black Sea Arena" concert venue.⁶¹

Furthermore, his personal charity, the Cartu Foundation, operates on a scale that rivals state agencies, funding major public infrastructure projects, cultural restorations, and social programs.⁷ While framed as philanthropy, this activity also functions as a powerful tool of soft power and patronage, blurring the distinction between private largesse and state responsibility.

The incumbent Mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, also has a significant business background that predates his political career. In 2008, he founded Kala Capital, an investment company with a primary focus on the energy sector.⁸ His subsequent appointment as Georgia's Minister of Energy in 2012 raised serious conflict of interest concerns, as Kala Capital held a substantial stake in SakHidroEnergoMsheni, a major hydropower construction company. Although these shares were reportedly sold, the episode highlights the close ties between Georgia's political leadership and its key economic sectors.⁸ Kaladze's family also maintains significant private wealth, including high-value real estate assets abroad, such as a reported €3.5 million apartment in Paris purchased in 2022.⁶⁷

The most tangible evidence of the fusion between corporate and political networks lies in the previously discussed pattern of state procurement. A clear and consistent transactional loop is observable:
1. A select group of major companies, primarily in the construction and development sectors, make substantial and regular financial donations to the Georgian Dream party.
2.These same companies are subsequently awarded a disproportionately large share of public procurement contracts, including those issued by Tbilisi City Hall and other state bodies.

Key companies within this nexus include the construction giants Monolith 2005 and Bondi-2009, the construction materials supplier Nova LLC, and the construction firm Arsakidze-2000.⁶² This system creates a network of corporate entities whose financial success is closely tied to the political fortunes of the ruling party. It functions as a mechanism for converting state funds into political financing, ensuring that the party has the resources to maintain its dominance while rewarding its corporate allies with profitable, state-funded projects.

This analysis demonstrates that the political and corporate spheres in Georgia are not merely adjacent but are systemically integrated. Key political actors are themselves major economic players, and a system of reciprocal obligation has been established where corporate entities provide financial support to the ruling party in exchange for preferential access to state-controlled economic opportunities. The Tbilisi mayoral election, therefore, is not just a contest for political office but a contest for control over this lucrative nexus of power and capital.

A systemic analysis of governance in Georgia reveals a deeply integrated architecture where the boundaries between state authority, political party machinery, and corporate interests are systematically blurred. This nexus of power is not an incidental feature of the political landscape but a deliberately constructed system designed to ensure political continuity and mutual enrichment. The entire network is anchored by key political figures, whose public roles are inseparable from their vast private and corporate interests. The following analysis deconstructs this architecture by mapping its core components: the central power verticals and the transactional patronage cycle that sustains them.

The Ivanishvili Power Vertical: Fusing State and Capital
At the apex of this system is Bidzina Ivanishvili, who functions as Georgia's informal center of power. His influence radiates through both the formal political structure of the Georgian Dream (GD) Party, which he founded, and a sprawling corporate empire that is intertwined with the national economy.

A critical event that laid bare the mechanics of this fusion was the post-sanction consolidation of his assets in early 2025. Following the imposition of U.S. sanctions, a rapid restructuring was initiated, utilizing a purpose-built 2024 “offshore law”. This legislation facilitated the tax-exempt transfer of assets from opaque offshore entities—such as Visalia Enterprises Ltd. (Belize) and Limestone Finance S.A. (Panama)—into newly established Georgian holding companies, including JSC Terra and JSC Atu Holding . These new entities, now under the direct ownership of Ivanishvili and his family members, wife Ekaterine Khvedelidze and son Uta Ivanishvili, consolidated control over major national assets, demonstrating the use of legislative power to protect the ruling elite's wealth from international pressure.

The Kaladze Network: Political Office and Business Interests
A key node within this system is Kakha Kaladze, who holds the dual roles of Tbilisi Mayor and Secretary General of the Georgian Dream party, embodying the fusion of municipal administration and party apparatus. His political career is interwoven with a significant business background, primarily centered on his investment company, Kala Capital. His previous tenure as Georgia's Minister of Energy raised documented conflict of interest concerns due to his former ownership stake in SakHidroEnergoMsheni, a major hydropower construction firm, highlighting the persistent overlap between his public duties and private financial interests.

The Transactional Core: The Donor-Contractor Patronage Cycle
The most dynamic and self-perpetuating mechanism within this nexus is a transactional loop that converts state resources into political financing. This patronage cycle operates through a clear, observable process:

1. Corporate Donations to the Ruling Party: A select group of major companies, predominantly in the construction and development sectors, make substantial and regular financial donations directly to the Georgian Dream Party. Key entities identified within this circle of donors include construction giants Monolith 2005 and Bondi-2009, and construction materials supplier Nova LLC.

2. Awarding of State Contracts: Subsequently, these same corporate donors are awarded a disproportionately large share of lucrative public procurement contracts by state entities, including the Government of Georgia and Tbilisi City Hall, which is controlled by Kaladze.

The systemic nature of this reciprocal relationship is evidenced by stark data. According to an investigation by Transparency International Georgia covering the first half of 2025, companies linked to GD donors secured state tenders worth over GEL 144 million. During the same period, firms linked to the donors of all other political parties combined received zero.

This analysis maps a closed-loop system where public office is leveraged to direct state funds to politically allied corporations, which in turn provide the financial resources that fuel the ruling party's dominance. This nexus of power and capital creates a self-reinforcing and resilient structure that systematically marginalizes opponents and ensures the entrenchment of the ruling elite.

This systemic audit of the 2025 Tbilisi mayoral election, utilized as a diagnostic lens, reveals a political system in Georgia characterized by the advanced consolidation of power through the integration of state institutions, corporate networks, and media narratives. The analysis does not seek to predict the electoral outcome but rather to document the underlying structural dynamics that shape it. The key findings point to a governance model that is increasingly diverging from democratic norms.

Key Finding 1: Systemic Capture and Institutional Weaponization. The evidence documents a condition of systemic capture, where key state institutions designed to ensure democratic competition and accountability—including the electoral administration, regulatory bodies, and to some extent, the judiciary—are being instrumentalized to serve the interests of the ruling party. The series of amendments to the electoral code, passed without broad consensus, represents the most salient example of this phenomenon. These are not minor adjustments but a fundamental re-engineering of the rules of political engagement to create a structural advantage for the incumbent, effectively insulating it from electoral challenges.

Key Finding 2: The Self-Perpetuating Loop of Power and Capital. A closed, self-reinforcing loop between political power and economic resources has been documented. The analysis of public procurement data demonstrates a clear and consistent pattern: political power is leveraged to direct state and municipal funds to a network of allied corporate entities. These entities, in turn, provide the financial lifeblood for the ruling party through political donations. This transactional relationship creates a powerful patronage system that solidifies the ruling party's resource advantage and marginalizes economic actors not aligned with its interests. Legislation, such as the “offshore law,” is tailored to protect the assets of this elite, further entrenching the nexus of political and economic power.

Key Finding 3: Narrative Control as a Central Pillar of Governance. The control of the information environment is not an auxiliary tactic but a central pillar of the current governance model. The domination of the broadcast media landscape by politically aligned channels allows for the relentless amplification of a single, state-sanctioned narrative—one that frames political competition in existential terms of “peace versus war.” This is complemented by the institutionalized use of covert digital influence operations, directly involving state agencies, to manipulate public discourse, fabricate consensus, and discredit all forms of opposition. This strategy is essential for managing public opinion in a climate of widespread dissatisfaction and for justifying the government's anti-democratic actions as necessary for preserving national sovereignty.

Key Finding 4: Internal Consolidation Through Elite Purges. Recent events suggest the power consolidation process has entered a new phase: a shift from suppressing external opposition to conducting internal purges and managing conflict between elite clans within Georgian Dream itself. A series of high-profile dismissals and arrests of senior officials once considered core to the power vertical—including former ministers and heads of security services—points to a centralization of authority around a more hardline faction associated with Prime Minister Kobakhidze and the newly appointed head of the State Security Service, Mamuka Mdinaradze (whose figure we analyze in our Report #7). This internal struggle is not necessarily a sign of systemic weakness but can be interpreted as a symptom of a maturing authoritarian vertical, which no longer requires a broad elite coalition and is transitioning to a more rigid and centralized model of control.

Based on the documented evidence, two potential systemic trajectories can be outlined for Georgia’s political development. These are not predictions, but scenarios based on the continuation or disruption of the observed patterns.

Trajectory A: Entrenchment of Illiberal Rule. If the documented patterns of institutional capture, economic patronage, and narrative control continue unabated, the most likely trajectory is the further consolidation of an illiberal, single-party dominant state. In this scenario, the 2025 Tbilisi election would serve as a procedural step to formalize and extend this control to the municipal level in the nation's capital. This trajectory would likely see a continued pivot away from Euro-Atlantic integration, a deepening of economic and political alignment with non-Western powers like Russia and China, and a further shrinking of the space for independent civil society, media, and political opposition. The system's internal logic would continue to drive it towards greater centralization of power and insulation from both domestic and international accountability.

Trajectory B: Emergence of Systemic Stress. While the current system appears robust, several points of potential friction could introduce systemic stress. Persistent and widespread public discontent over economic conditions and democratic backsliding, as evidenced by ongoing protests, could evolve into a more organized challenge, particularly if economic conditions worsen.¹ Furthermore, increased and coordinated international pressure—such as the expansion of targeted sanctions, the suspension of the visa-free travel regime with the EU, or the withholding of financial assistance—could impose tangible costs on the ruling elite.¹⁷ While the capacity of these stressors to fundamentally alter the system's trajectory is currently limited by the opposition's fragmentation and the government's strategic pivot to alternative partners, they represent the primary countervailing forces to the trajectory of entrenchment. The system’s response to these pressures will be a key indicator of its resilience and future direction.

This report is a foundational analysis (v1.0) produced through a multi-stage research process designed to ensure analytical rigor and objectivity. The methodology integrates a primary source document providing an initial situational assessment with an extensive body of open-source intelligence (OSINT) to verify, update, and enrich the analysis using not only stardard LLM services but own beta version of NOUS AGI made as the part of author’s second “Indie PhD”.¹

The research process involved the systematic collection and synthesis of publicly available data from a wide range of sources, including: reports from international bodies (OSCE, Venice Commission), findings from reputable non-governmental organizations (Transparency International Georgia, ISFED), platform transparency reports (Meta), academic analyses, and reportage from credible international and local media outlets. All factual information, including names, dates, and political events, has been updated to be current as of the date of this report's last update.
AI-assisted tools were employed in the data processing phase. These tools, including NOUS AGI facilitated the rapid analysis of large volumes of text in multiple languages, the identification of key entities and relationships, and the clustering of related information. This technological assistance enabled the detection of systemic patterns and correlations across disparate datasets, such as the link between political donations and public procurement awards.

It is critical to acknowledge the limitations of this preliminary study. As a v1.0 report, its findings are based exclusively on open-source data. It does not incorporate primary data from direct interviews or confidential sources. This report is therefore intended to be a "living document." It establishes a baseline understanding that is designed to be iteratively updated and deepened with new information gathered through the CAT AGI project's primary data collection mechanisms: the “Transparency Log” of official information requests and the “Citizen Signals Channel” for vetted public submissions. The ongoing work of the CAT AGI platform is essential for building a more complete and granular audit of the systems of power in Georgia.¹

1.     CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI
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