The Wall of Silence: A Stress Test of Georgia’s Civil Society in a Pre-Election Period

This report, the ninth installment in the CAT AGI “Knowledge Base” series, departs from previous analyses by employing a unique and unconventional research methodology. It treats a direct communication outreach campaign not as a tool for advocacy, but as a deliberate, asymmetric research instrument — a systemic stress test designed to generate primary data on the operational capacity and response mechanisms of Georgia’s civil society sector.¹ The objective of this study is not to lament the lack of response but to analyze it as a critical indicator of the sector’s health, resilience, and strategic calculus.

The analytical posture of this report is that of a “post-political systemic auditor.”¹ This framework consciously eschews partisan alignment and advocacy-driven narratives. Instead, it focuses on the procedural, the structural, and the functional, examining the Georgian civil society sector as a complex system operating under severe external and internal pressures. The core task is to document and deconstruct the verifiable patterns of behavior that emerge when this system is subjected to a specific, high-stakes stimulus.¹

The central methodological instrument of this stress test is the “Transparency Log,” a concept integral to the CAT AGI project.¹ The Transparency Log is a public record of all official outreach and the corresponding responses — or, as in this case, the lack thereof. This approach transforms the act of communication from a simple request into an empirical measurement. Every email sent and every silence received becomes a data point, collectively forming a dataset that measures the transparency, responsiveness, and ultimately the functional capacity of the targeted institutions.¹ The “NGO Wave,” the outreach campaign at the heart of this report, was therefore designed from its inception as a live experiment to populate this log and provide an unvarnished diagnostic of the sector’s condition.

This report, therefore, addresses a central research question: What does the collective silence of Georgian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in response to a well-documented, precedent-setting human rights case reveal about the sector’s true operational capacity, strategic priorities, and systemic vulnerabilities in a high-pressure, pre-election environment? By analyzing the anatomy of this silence, this study seeks to move beyond surface-level critiques and provide a deep, evidence-based audit of the realities facing one of the most critical pillars of Georgia’s democratic landscape.

To understand the significance of the subsequent silence, it is essential to first analyze the nature of the stimulus. The catalyst for this systemic stress test was the arbitrary denial of entry to the CAT AGI project coordinator, Miraziz Bazarov, and his family at the Sadakhlo land border crossing between Armenia and Georgia on 27 August 2025.¹ While this event had profound personal consequences, its analytical value for this report lies in its systemic implications and the clear, precedent-setting threat it posed to the entire civil society sector in Georgia.

The core of the legal violation was an act of administrative power exercised ultra vires — beyond the scope of legal authority.¹ According to documented accounts, border officials verbally demanded a “work visa” as a condition for re-entry, a category of visa that did not exist in Georgian legislation at the time and was not scheduled for introduction until 2026.¹ This verbal pretext was directly contradicted by the official written refusal document, which cited vague, generic grounds such as “incomplete information.”¹ This discrepancy between the verbal justification and the official record is a hallmark of arbitrary administrative action, designed to be procedurally opaque and difficult to appeal.
This incident was not merely an immigration issue; it was a high-stakes precedent for every CSO operating in Georgia. The case involved a human rights defender whose status and history of persecution were officially documented by United Nations Special Rapporteurs (Communication AL UZB 3/2021).¹ The ability of state authorities to invent and apply a non-existent legal requirement to bar the entry of such an individual, after 11 months of legal residence, signaled a dangerous escalation in the state’s toolkit of repression.¹ It established a new vector of systemic risk, demonstrating that the government could bypass established legal frameworks to physically exclude civil society actors from the country.

This threat was not theoretical; it had immediate and measurable consequences for civil society work. The border denial directly paralyzed two distinct and fully operational projects:

1. “FBK 2.0 (Psy Week):” A humanitarian initiative providing crucial psychosocial support to a community of over 50 vulnerable political migrants and refugees in Tbilisi.¹
2. “AGI CAT:” A non-partisan civic-tech initiative poised to launch its field research phase for monitoring the upcoming Tbilisi mayoral election, with a target of mapping the civic needs of over 3 000 residents.¹

The disruption of these two projects provided empirical proof of the immediate harm caused by the state’s action. The catalyst for the outreach campaign was therefore not a personal grievance, but a clear and present danger to the entire sector. It was a well-documented case study of administrative power being weaponized to disrupt both humanitarian and democratic oversight work, making it a quintessential test of the sector’s capacity for collective self-defense.

This test was administered within a political context where the state had already demonstrated its willingness to use the legal system for political ends, thereby normalizing the risks for any actor contemplating a challenge to its authority. The high-profile arrest and subsequent sentencing of Mzia Amaglobeli, the editor of a major regional media outlet, served as a powerful case study. Despite accounts from protesters suggesting provocation by law enforcement, and the clear lack of severe injury, the state pursued a criminal conviction. This sent an unambiguous signal to the broader civil society and media sectors: direct confrontation with state officials, regardless of the circumstances, would be met with the full force of the judicial apparatus, establishing a clear precedent of risk that would inevitably inform the strategic calculations of CSOs in subsequent cases.

The systemic stress test was executed through a targeted communication campaign, designated “Wave 1: Mobilization of Georgian Civil Society,” conducted between 4 and 15 September 2025.¹ The methodology was designed to be rigorous and multi-faceted, targeting a representative sample of over 20 of Georgia’s most prominent and dozens of other relevant CSOs.¹ The organizations were segmented into professional clusters based on their mandates, including legal and strategic litigation, election monitoring, anti-corruption and transparency, human rights and vulnerable groups, media freedom, and policy analysis.¹

Each communication was highly personalized, framing the 27 August incident through the specific lens of the recipient organization’s mission. For example, legal organizations were approached with an analysis of the ultra vires violation; election monitors were presented with evidence of direct interference in a civic monitoring project; and human rights groups were provided with details of the humanitarian and medical consequences.¹ Every letter was supported by a comprehensive package of evidence, including the official border refusal documents, a detailed legal analysis, and the UN communication verifying the human rights defender’s status. The calls to action were clear and actionable: to consider the case for strategic litigation or public assessment, and to endorse a draft joint statement demonstrating sectoral solidarity.¹

The quantitative results of this meticulously executed experiment were stark and unequivocal, painting a clear picture of systemic non-response.

Table 1. Summary of CSO Outreach Campaign and Response Rate (September 2025)
Note: The response from Professor Ghia Nodia of CIPDD is categorized as a “Partial” substantive response. While declining direct public action, it acknowledged the case’s validity and pledged to incorporate it into future analytical work, representing a form of expert-level engagement.¹

As the data demonstrates, out of a broad and representative sample of the sector’s leading organizations, only one — Rights Georgia — provided a fully substantive, constructive, and actionable response.¹ This singular positive outcome serves as a crucial “successful exception,” providing a baseline against which the broader silence can be measured and understood. A qualitative analysis of this interaction reveals the specific conditions under which engagement was possible.

The dialogue with Rights Georgia unfolded in a structured, professional manner. The initial outreach was framed not as a general plea for solidarity but as a direct request for legal representation, perfectly aligning with the organization’s core expertise in strategic litigation.¹

Their response was prompt, empathetic, and procedurally sound. It validated the legal steps already taken by the applicant and clearly outlined the correct sequence of appeal within the Georgian system: first to the superior administrative body (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and only then to the courts.¹

Most significantly, Rights Georgia made a concrete and conditional offer of assistance: “in case of the Ministry’s refusal of your appeal, we can represent your interests and appeal the decision in the City Court.”¹ This was the only such offer received throughout the entire campaign. Having secured this commitment, a strategic pivot was made in the follow-up communication. The request was transformed from a simple ask for a signature on a joint statement to a request for strategic advice on the campaign’s timing and messaging.¹

The organization’s second response was equally valuable. They provided context-aware counsel, advising a delay in the publication of the joint statement due to the “tense” political environment, which would likely drown out the message. They recommended linking its release to a future news hook, such as the formal court filing.¹ This advice, grounded in a deep understanding of the local operational context, was immediately adopted, and the joint statement campaign was paused.

The case of Rights Georgia is analytically vital. It demonstrates that constructive engagement was not impossible. However, it required a precise alignment of factors: a request that directly served the organization’s specific professional mandate, a clear offer of a high-value strategic litigation case, and a communication strategy that treated the organization as an expert partner rather than a signatory. This successful, yet singular, interaction underscores the systemic nature of the silence from the rest of the sector, which could not be overcome even with highly tailored and professionally executed outreach.

The broader political environment at the time of the outreach was characterized by a deep and public fragmentation within the anti-government movement, which likely contributed to the CSOs’ reluctance to engage in a new, externally initiated collective action. The opposition was visibly split into two camps over strategy for the upcoming municipal elections: a “boycott” faction, including major parties like the United National Movement and the Coalition for Change, and a “participation” faction, led by parties such as Lelo and For Georgia. This schism was not a quiet disagreement but a source of intense public polemics and mutual accusations, consuming significant political energy and media bandwidth. For CSOs, an attempt to build a new, unified front on a separate issue would have been exceptionally difficult when their primary political allies were engaged in a debilitating internal conflict.

The near-unanimous silence from Georgia’s civil society is not a simple phenomenon attributable to a single cause. It is, rather, the outcome of a confluence of powerful external pressures and deep-seated internal vulnerabilities. This section deconstructs the primary factors that contributed to this collective inaction, treating each hypothesis as a distinct analytical vector supported by extensive evidence from the 2024–2025 period.

The most significant and immediate factor compelling silence was a rational and calculated fear of state retaliation. By September 2025, the Georgian government’s multi-pronged assault on civil society had created a hostile operating environment where any act of public defiance against state institutions carried significant risk. This pressure was applied through a coordinated strategy of legislative warfare, financial suffocation, and systematic harassment.

The primary tool of this strategy was a series of legislative attacks designed to stigmatize and criminalize independent civil society. In May 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party forced through the highly controversial Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which requires organizations receiving over 20% of their funding from abroad to register as “organizations pursuing the interest of a foreign power.”² This law, widely condemned by domestic CSOs and international partners as the “Russian law” for its similarity to Kremlin legislation, was deemed by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission to be incompatible with international human rights standards as it imposed restrictions that failed the “requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in a democratic society.”⁴ This was followed in March–April 2025 by an even harsher Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which introduced criminal penalties, including up to five years in prison, for non-compliance.⁴ These laws created a potent legal weapon for the state, providing a pretext for investigations and prosecutions against any foreign-funded organization.

This legislative assault was accompanied by a direct strategy of “financial suffocation,” designed to paralyze the operational capacity of key CSOs.¹⁰ In a move that sent a clear and chilling signal across the entire sector, on 27 August 2025 — the very same day as the border denial incident that triggered this study — the Prosecutor’s Office announced that the Tbilisi City Court had frozen the bank accounts of seven of the country’s leading CSOs.¹⁰ The organizations, which included prominent election monitors and human rights groups like ISFED, Social Justice Center, and Sapari, were targeted under a spurious “sabotage” investigation for allegedly using their funds to purchase protective equipment like face masks and goggles for protesters during the 2024 anti-government rallies.¹⁹ The European Union’s External Action Service condemned the move as “an act of political persecution through deliberate financial suffocation, intended to silence and punish dissenting voices.”¹⁵ The timing of this action could not have been a coincidence; it served as a powerful, sector-wide warning that any form of support for dissent or challenge to state authority would be met with immediate and severe operational consequences.

This environment of pressure was further reinforced by systematic harassment. Throughout 2025, the government’s Anti-Corruption Bureau, tasked with enforcing the new laws, launched a series of intrusive inspections, demanding that CSOs hand over vast amounts of internal documentation, including sensitive and confidential data on the beneficiaries of their programs.⁸ This was complemented by a constant barrage of smear campaigns from high-ranking officials and pro-government media, who routinely labeled CSO leaders as “traitors,” “enemies of the church,” and agents of a “Global War Party.”¹⁴ This rhetoric was not merely verbal; it translated into real-world violence, with numerous documented cases of physical attacks on activists and journalists by both law enforcement and unidentified pro-government groups.³⁸

Taken together, these actions constitute a deliberate and coordinated strategy of “administrative warfare.” The legislative, financial, and physical pressures were not isolated incidents but interconnected components of a campaign to induce fear, exhaustion, and self-censorship. The “Wall of Silence” in response to the 27 August case was, therefore, not a sign of apathy but a direct and predictable outcome of this chilling effect. For any organization, the calculus was simple: publicly challenging a decision by the Ministry of Internal Affairs at a time when the state was actively demonstrating its willingness and ability to paralyze CSOs through legal and financial means was an unacceptably high-risk proposition.

This calculus of risk versus reward was shaped by a series of escalating state actions that demonstrated a clear pattern of targeting high-profile opposition figures, thereby raising the perceived cost of any public dissent. In the months leading up to September 2025, the government arrested Zurab Japaridze and Nika Melia, two of the four leaders of the “Coalition for Change,” for refusing to participate in a parliamentary commission they deemed illegitimate. This was followed by the “kidnapping-style” arrest of Melia by state security services, an act widely seen as a flagrant violation of constitutional rights. These were not actions against marginal activists but against central figures of the organized opposition. For any CSO director, the message was clear: if the state was willing to arrest major political leaders in broad daylight, a non-governmental organization was a far softer and more vulnerable target.

Beyond the general risks of confronting the state, the specific characteristics of the case presented to Georgian CSOs made it uniquely and dangerously “toxic” within the country’s hyper-polarized geopolitical context. The Georgian government has systematically constructed and disseminated a powerful propaganda narrative that frames all political opposition and independent civic activity as the work of a malevolent “Global War Party” or as a front for foreign interests, often with an explicitly pro-Russian or anti-sovereignty subtext.¹ In this environment, any association, however tenuous, with Russian politics is a reputational third rail that CSOs are rationally unwilling to touch.

The most significant toxic element of the case was the name of the disrupted humanitarian project: “FBK 2.0 (Psy Week).”¹ Although intended as a satirical reference within activist culture, the acronym “FBK” is inextricably linked in the public mind with the Anti-Corruption Foundation of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. For the Georgian Dream’s propaganda machine, this detail would have been a gift. It provided a ready-made hook to instantly discredit any CSO that defended the case, allowing them to be smeared as “defenders of Russian agents” or collaborators with forces seeking to destabilize Georgia.¹

This fear of association was magnified by the very nature of the CSOs’ primary advocacy battle at the time: the fight against the “foreign agent” law, which is almost universally referred to in Georgia as the “Russian Law” due to its direct parallels with repressive Kremlin legislation.³⁷ This created an acute narrative trap. For a Georgian CSO to publicly defend a case involving a project named “FBK 2.0” while simultaneously campaigning against a law they condemn as “Russian” would have created a narrative contradiction that would be impossible to explain in the public sphere. They would have been forced onto the defensive, spending precious resources and political capital trying to explain a nuanced position — that they were defending a universal human rights principle, not a specific Russian political project.

This is a nuance that the government’s powerful media apparatus would have instantly and deliberately erased.⁶² Pro-government outlets like Imedi TV would have relentlessly hammered a simple, misleading message: “So-called ‘pro-European’ NGOs, who claim to be fighting a ‘Russian Law,’ are now defending a project named after a Russian organization.” This would have undermined their credibility, confused their supporters, and handed a powerful weapon to the government.

Therefore, the decision to remain silent was not merely an act of cowardice or indifference; it was a calculated and strategically sound decision to avoid walking into a carefully laid narrative trap. The CSOs were faced with a choice: engage in a costly and likely unwinnable public relations battle that would distract from and potentially damage their existential fight against the “Russian Law,” or remain silent and conserve their resources for the primary front. They overwhelmingly chose the latter. The geopolitical toxicity of the case made it a strategic liability that the embattled sector could not afford to take on.

Furthermore, the government’s propaganda apparatus had already proven highly effective at conflating any form of opposition with direct threats to national security and stability, a narrative designed to resonate with a population scarred by recent wars. The ruling party’s core message, amplified constantly, was that the opposition and its allied CSOs were actively trying to drag Georgia into the war in Ukraine by opening a “second front.” This narrative, however baseless, created a powerful political deterrent. For a CSO to align itself with a case bearing any perceived link to foreign political actors — especially Russian ones — would be to voluntarily step into the government’s pre-constructed narrative frame, confirming the very accusations of foreign puppeteering that the entire sector was fighting to disprove.

A further layer of explanation for the “Wall of Silence” lies in the internal culture and operational norms of the Georgian CSO community. In an environment characterized by intense state pressure, including documented surveillance and attempts at infiltration, the sector has evolved to operate as a relatively insular, high-trust network.⁴⁰ This inward-looking posture, while necessary for security, makes the community inherently suspicious of unsolicited, “cold” outreach from unknown external actors, particularly on politically sensitive topics.

The outreach campaign, despite its professional execution, originated from an individual who, while having a UN-documented case, was not an established, long-term member of the Tbilisi CSO inner circle. The lack of a “warm introduction” or personal vouching from a trusted intermediary within the network would have immediately raised red flags for many organizations. In a climate of paranoia, where the state actively seeks to entrap and discredit its critics, any unfamiliar approach must be assessed through a security lens.¹

From this perspective, the very professionalism and comprehensiveness of the outreach package could have been counterproductive. The campaign was not a simple, informal email; it was a highly structured, multi-pronged effort complete with detailed legal analyses, a full dossier of supporting documents, and a pre-drafted joint statement ready for signature.¹ To a security-conscious organization, this package might have appeared “too good to be true.” It bore the hallmarks of a sophisticated operation, and in the absence of trusted verification, it would be impossible to distinguish a genuine appeal for solidarity from a well-designed state-sponsored provocation.

The potential risk of such a provocation is significant. By engaging with the case and signing the joint statement, CSOs could be walking into a trap designed to publicly associate them with a “toxic” case, providing the government with ammunition for smear campaigns or even legal action. The state could then claim that the CSOs were participating in a “coordinated, foreign-directed attack on state institutions,” using their own signatures as evidence. This risk is amplified by the deeply polarized nature of public trust in NGOs, which polling data shows is heavily correlated with political and media affiliation; supporters of the ruling party already view the sector with a high degree of suspicion, a sentiment the government actively cultivates.⁶⁶

Faced with this uncertainty, the most rational, risk-averse strategy is non-engagement. Silence is the safest default policy. It avoids legitimizing a potential provocation and protects the organization from unforeseen consequences. The “Wall of Silence” can thus be interpreted, in part, as the functioning of an informal, collective security protocol within the CSO community. The unwritten rule is clear: if an unsolicited, high-risk request arrives from an unknown external source without endorsement from within the network, it is to be ignored. This culture of distrust, born of necessity in a repressive environment, creates a formidable barrier to entry for outsiders and helps explain the systemic failure to respond.

This security protocol is not merely a response to the current government but is likely a learned behavior from navigating Georgia’s volatile political landscape over many years. The insider culture of the political and activist class, as described in informal accounts, is rife with conflicts, betrayals, and shifting alliances. For example, prominent figures like Nika Melia and Mirdat Kamadadze are noted to have left their previous party, the UNM, due to internal conflicts. A new youth-led political movement, “12 Sartuli,” emerged in part as a reaction against the perceived “toxicity and lies” of the established political class. In such an environment, where even long-term allies can become political rivals, the default stance toward an unknown entity requesting a high-risk public action would rationally be one of extreme caution and skepticism.

Beyond the primary drivers of fear, fragility, and distrust, a deeper systemic analysis reveals several additional, non-obvious factors that likely contributed to the collective inaction of Georgian CSOs. These “hidden variables” relate to the structural organization of the non-profit sector, the unwritten rules of engagement in a captured state, and the political economy of solidarity itself.

The “Silo Effect” of Specialization
The human rights case at the center of the stress test was intentionally presented as a multi-faceted issue, touching upon administrative law, election monitoring integrity, migrant rights, and freedom of expression.¹ While this demonstrated its broad relevance, this very complexity may have been a structural weakness. The modern, donor-funded CSO sector is highly specialized, with organizations operating within narrowly defined mandates that align with specific grant requirements. This creates a “silo effect,” where cross-cutting issues risk falling into the institutional cracks between specializations.

An election monitoring organization, for instance, might have viewed the case as primarily a migrant rights or administrative law issue, and thus outside its core mandate, despite the direct disruption to a civic monitoring project.¹ Conversely, a migrant rights organization may have been hesitant to engage with the politically charged election monitoring component. A legal aid group might have seen the broader advocacy campaign as beyond its service-provision scope. In an ecosystem where every organization is stretched thin and focused on delivering on its specific grant-funded objectives, no single entity may have felt a sense of full “ownership” over a complex, interdisciplinary problem. The responsibility became diffused across the sector, and as a result, no one acted.

Elite Capture and Strategic Avoidance
A more critical hypothesis posits that the silence was not merely a passive failure but an active, strategic avoidance, influenced by the dynamics of elite capture. The concept of “elite capture,” where state institutions are subordinated to the interests of informal power networks, is well-documented in Georgia.⁶⁷ This analysis extends the question to civil society itself: to what extent do informal “red lines” and strategic calculations govern the sector’s behavior? Are there implicit understandings with donors or factions within the state that discourage CSOs from taking on cases that are “too loud,” too complex, or that could disrupt delicate back-channel negotiations on other fronts, such as the broader fight over the “foreign agent” law?

The response from Professor Ghia Nodia of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) provides a compelling case study of this dynamic. In his reply, Professor Nodia acknowledged the validity of the case, describing the government’s actions as part of a “very deplorable tendency.” However, he explicitly declined to engage in public advocacy, stating that other organizations were better suited for it. Instead, he made a crucial pledge: “I will take this case into account in my analytical work and media appearances.”¹
This response exemplifies a strategy of “containment.” It recognizes the problem but chooses to address it through the controlled, less confrontational channels of expert analysis rather than through direct, public solidarity. This suggests a calculus where the perceived long-term strategic value of maintaining a position as a “reasonable” analyst outweighs the immediate benefit of joining a public outcry, reflecting a form of self-censorship or strategic prioritization common in semi-authoritarian environments.

This dynamic of strategic avoidance is further illuminated by the behavior of opposition politician Giorgi Gakharia, a former Prime Minister from the ruling party. Unlike other opposition leaders who boycotted the Tsulukiani commission, Gakharia chose to attend, using the platform for a direct, televised confrontation with his former colleagues. This was a calculated risk: he was accused by parts of the opposition of legitimizing a sham process, but he judged that the strategic benefit of a public debate outweighed this risk. This case demonstrates that even within the opposition, there is no consensus on the tactics of engagement versus boycott. For CSOs, this political ambiguity makes it even more difficult to act decisively. Joining a public statement could be seen as aligning with the “boycotters,” while ignoring it could be interpreted as siding with pragmatists like Gakharia — making any action a potential political liability.

The “Tokenization” of Solidarity
Finally, the “Wall of Silence” may reflect a broader crisis in the political economy of solidarity. In a resource-scarce and high-pressure environment, solidarity itself can become “tokenized.”⁷⁶ CSOs may be willing and able to engage in low-cost, high-visibility acts of solidarity, such as signing a joint statement on a broad principle or sharing a social media post. These actions serve as important signals of shared values and require minimal institutional investment.

However, the request in this case went further. It implicitly asked organizations to commit significant, unfunded resources — the time of their lawyers, researchers, and communications staff — to engage deeply with a complex, non-funded individual case that would require sustained effort. This represents a high-cost, low-reward proposition from a purely institutional perspective. The silence, in this view, is not a moral failing but a reflection of a rational, if brutal, resource allocation calculus. When faced with existential threats like frozen bank accounts and repressive laws, organizations are forced to triage their efforts, prioritizing their own survival and core programmatic work over costly acts of solidarity for an external case. The capacity for genuine, resource-intensive solidarity becomes a luxury the sector can no longer afford.

The analysis of the multi-faceted reasons behind the “Wall of Silence” allows for the formulation of several systemic conclusions about the state of Georgian civil society and the broader ecosystem of human rights protection in which it operates. The stress test did not merely reveal the sector’s reluctance to act; it provided a clear diagnostic of why it is unable to act, yielding data that refutes dominant political narratives and offers a foundation for future strategy.

A key insight from the CAT AGI project’s broader research is the striking parallel between the failure of the Georgian domestic CSO solidarity system and the previously documented failure of the international emergency grants system for human rights defenders.¹ The project coordinator’s experience prior to the border incident involved outreach to over 18 international emergency grant-making organizations, which overwhelmingly failed to provide assistance.¹ The justifications for refusal were consistently bureaucratic, citing “a high volume of requests” or a mismatch with rigid funding criteria, demonstrating a system paralyzed by its own procedures and incapable of responding to complex, non-standard threats.¹

The failure of the Georgian CSO solidarity system, as documented in this report, mirrors these pathologies on a national scale. It, too, proved to be rigid, risk-averse, and unable to process a hybrid threat that did not fit neatly into pre-defined programmatic boxes. Both systems — one international and one national — designed to protect and support civil society, failed when confronted with a real-world stress test.

This parallel suggests that the problem is not unique to Georgia but is endemic to the modern, bureaucratized architecture of human rights protection. Both systems exhibit a preference for predictable, low-risk, and easily quantifiable interventions over the messy, unpredictable, and resource-intensive work of responding to acute, politically complex crises. They are systems designed for peacetime, struggling to function in a state of administrative and political warfare.

The empirical results of this stress test provide a powerful, data-driven refutation of the Georgian Dream government’s central propaganda narrative. For years, the ruling party and its affiliated media have sought to legitimize their crackdown on civil society by portraying the non-governmental sector as a powerful, unified, and malevolent “deep state” or as agents of a “Global War Party,” covertly funded and directed by foreign powers to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty.¹ This narrative paints a picture of a formidable, coordinated adversary that necessitates the state’s repressive measures.

The “Wall of Silence” directly contradicts this myth. A powerful, coordinated “deep state” would have responded to the 27 August precedent swiftly, strategically, and collectively. It would have leveraged its supposed networks and resources to launch an immediate and forceful counter-attack. The reality was the polar opposite: paralysis, fragmentation, fear, and an almost total inability to mount even a simple, coordinated public response.

The evidence from this report reveals not a powerful monolith, but a fragile and vulnerable ecosystem. It shows a sector that is financially precarious, institutionally fatigued, strategically defensive, and deeply fearful of the state’s power. The government’s narrative is thus exposed as a political tool designed to justify its consolidation of power by fabricating a powerful enemy. The reality is that the regime is not fighting a formidable foe; it is leveraging the full weight of the state apparatus against a civil society systematically weakened and intimidated.

The most crucial conclusion of this report is the reframing of the experiment’s outcome. From the perspective of traditional advocacy, the “NGO Wave” was an abject failure. From the perspective of a post-political systemic auditor, it was a resounding success. The “Wall of Silence” is not a dead end; it is a rich dataset that provides an unvarnished diagnostic of the system’s true condition.¹

Understanding why the system failed is the key to designing more effective engagement strategies for the future. The failure of the mass outreach model provides a clear blueprint for what not to do. It reveals that in the current Georgian context, broad-based appeals for solidarity are ineffective. The data points instead toward a new protocol for engagement with civil society in repressive environments. This protocol must be built on the lessons learned from the successful interaction with Rights Georgia and the failures elsewhere. It would prioritize:

• Surgical Alliances over Mass Mobilization: focusing on building deep, trust-based relationships with a small number of resilient and demonstrably responsive organizations.
• Value Proposition over Moral Appeal: framing requests not as pleas for solidarity but as professional proposals that offer tangible value to the organization’s specific mandate and mission (e.g., a high-profile strategic litigation case).
• Insider Navigation over “Cold” Outreach: utilizing trusted intermediaries within the local network to vouch for and introduce any new initiative, thereby bypassing the cultural and security-based distrust of external actors.
• Geopolitical De-risking: carefully analyzing and mitigating any potential “toxic” elements of a case that could be weaponized by state propaganda.

By treating the silence as data, this “failure” becomes a productive and invaluable learning experience. It allows for the replacement of hopeful assumptions about civil society solidarity with a clear-eyed, evidence-based understanding of the sector’s actual limitations and capabilities, enabling the design of more realistic and impactful strategies moving forward.

This new protocol must also account for the observed phenomenon of “protest fatigue” and the limits of mass mobilization as a primary tool for change. As noted by on-the-ground observers in Batumi in August 2025, a major protest organized by opposition leaders from Tbilisi failed to attract significant numbers of ordinary citizens, with the crowd consisting mainly of party activists and their affiliates. This indicates that the broader population, while potentially sympathetic, is not easily mobilized, especially in the absence of a clear and achievable objective.
Therefore, future strategies cannot assume the latent potential for mass public outcry as a backstop. Instead, they must rely on the precise, legally grounded, and strategically targeted actions of the “surgical alliances” identified in this report, acknowledging that the battle will be won through sustained institutional pressure, not necessarily on the streets.

The findings of this systemic stress test have profound implications for the ongoing mission of the CAT AGI project and for any international actor seeking to effectively support and engage with civil society in Georgia. The experiment has provided an unvarnished and data-driven assessment of the operational landscape, forcing a strategic recalibration away from conventional models of engagement toward a more nuanced and resilient approach.

The primary lesson learned is that the model of broad-based CSO mobilization, which may have been effective in previous eras of Georgia’s democratic development, is no longer viable in the current climate of intense state pressure. The assumption that a well-documented case of systemic abuse would automatically trigger a collective response from the sector has been empirically disproven. The combination of external threats and internal fragilities has rendered the majority of the sector strategically defensive and risk-averse, prioritizing institutional survival over public acts of solidarity on high-risk issues.

This conclusion validates the core methodological premise of the CAT AGI project. The role of a “post-political systemic auditor” proves to be not only a valuable analytical stance but a necessary operational one.¹ In an environment where direct calls to action are met with silence, the most potent form of engagement is to measure and document that very silence. The “Transparency Log” is therefore affirmed as the project’s central and most powerful tool.¹ Its value lies not in compelling a response, but in creating an unassailable public record of non-response, which itself becomes a critical piece of evidence about the health of the country’s democratic institutions.

Moving forward, the CAT AGI mission must pivot its engagement strategy. The focus will shift from attempting to mobilize the sector en masse to cultivating “surgical alliances” with a select few organizations that have demonstrated the resilience, capacity, and willingness to engage constructively, as exemplified by the case of Rights Georgia. Future collaborations will be built on the principles of mutual value, professional alignment, and trust, rather than broad appeals to shared values.

The project will continue its work of systemic auditing, using its tools not to demand that the system change, but to meticulously document how it actually functions — or fails to function — under pressure. The “Wall of Silence,” therefore, does not mark the end of engagement, but rather the beginning of a more informed, realistic, and strategically sophisticated phase of the CAT AGI mission in Georgia.

The analysis presented in this report is based on a direct communication experiment conducted with a representative sample of Georgia’s civil society sector in September 2025. This primary data, consisting of the outreach campaign materials and the documented responses (or lack thereof), forms the empirical core of the study.¹

To contextualize and enrich these primary findings, a comprehensive Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) review was conducted. This review encompassed over 1000 public sources, with a specific focus on materials published between January 2024 and September 2025 to capture the escalating pressure on Georgian civil society. This included a review of at least 300 sources in the Georgian language to ensure a deep understanding of the domestic political and media discourse.¹

The scope of the OSINT review included:

• Reports from International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations: publications from the European Union (EEAS, European Parliament), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), the U.S. Department of State, the Council of Europe (Venice Commission), Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency International, and Front Line Defenders.⁴
• Georgian and International Media Archives: systematic review of reporting from credible outlets such as Civil.ge, OC Media, JAMnews, Netgazeti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and major international news agencies.¹⁸
• Legal and Legislative Documents: analysis of the texts of the 2024 Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and the 2025 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), along with related legislative amendments and official government statements.²
• Academic Literature: review of relevant scholarly articles and books on civil society theory, donor influence and dependency, NGO behavior in hybrid and authoritarian regimes, state–civil society relations in post-Soviet states, and the specific dynamics of political polarization and elite capture in Georgia.⁴⁰

This multi-layered methodology, combining a direct, real-world experiment with extensive secondary source analysis, allows the report to ground its systemic conclusions in both immediate, empirical data and a deep, contextual understanding of the forces shaping Georgia’s civic space. This report contains 68 citations.

1.     CAT AGI database and analysis by beta version of NOUS AGI
2.     Georgia: Overview of the Foreign Influence Law - ECNL, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://ecnl.org/news/georgia-overview-foreign-influence-law
3.     The impact of Georgia's 'foreign influence' law - House of Commons Library, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10047/
4.     Georgia: Drop Repressive 'Foreign Agents' Bill - Human Rights Watch, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/26/georgia-drop-repressive-foreign-agents-bill
5.     URGENT OPINION ON THE LAW OF GEORGIA “ON TRANSPARENCY OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE” GEORGIA - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe | OSCE, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/d/569922.pdf
6.     Georgia parliament very close to making harsher 'foreign agent' bill a law, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/03/georgia-parliament-very-close-to-making-harsher-foreign-agent-bill-a-law/
7.     Georgia: The Foreign Agents Registration Act - International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL_Brief-on-Georgia-FARA_fv.pdf
8.     Georgian Dream's FARA Takes Effect - Civil Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/684669
9.     Georgia Enacts the Foreign Agents Registration Act: Key Implications and Requirements, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://ge.andersen.com/foreign-agents-act-georgia/
10.  International Reaction to Georgian Authorities Freezing CSOs' Bank Accounts, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/698255
11.  Georgia's Crackdown on Civil Society Deepens as “Foreign Agents” Law Comes into Force, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://protectdefenders.eu/georgias-crackdown-on-civil-society-deepens-as-foreign-agents-law-comes-into-force/?lang=ar
12.  How much power is too much? The answer for Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party seems to be just a little more., accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civicidea.ge/en/how-much-power-is-too-much-the-answer-for-georgias-ruling-georgian-dream-party-seems-to-be-just-a-little-more/
13.  Georgia: Court order on five independent NGOs a blow to freedom of association, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/georgia-court-order-on-five-independent-ngos-a-blow-to-freedom-of-association/
14.  In solidarity with Georgian civil society and the people of Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://transparency.eu/in-solidarity-with-georgian-civil-society-and-the-people-of-georgia/
15.  EU Urges Georgia to 'Immediately' Unfreeze CSOs' Bank Accounts, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/698274
16.  Statement: EU and Its Member States Should Take Urgent, Coordinated Measures to Respond to Georgia's Crackdown on Civil Society and Human Rights Organisations - ReliefWeb, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/statement-eu-and-its-member-states-should-take-urgent-coordinated-measures-respond-georgias-crackdown-civil-society-and-human-rights-organisations
17.  Prosecutor's Office freezes the bank accounts of seven more human rights and civil society organisations | Front Line Defenders, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/prosecutors-office-freezes-bank-accounts-seven-more-human-rights-and-civil-society-2
18.  Georgian civil society organisations to keep working despite accounts freeze - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-civil-society-organisations-to-keep-working-despite-accounts-freeze/
19.  Prosecutor's Office freezes Accounts of 7 Georgian NGOs Over Alleged Role in Violent Protests - BM.GE, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://bm.ge/en/news/prosecutors-office-freezes-accounts-of-7-georgian-ngos-over-alleged-role-in-violent-protests
20.  Prosecutor's Office freezes the bank accounts of seven more human rights and civil society organisations | Front Line Defenders, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/prosecutors-office-freezes-bank-accounts-seven-more-human-rights-and-civil-society
21.  Georgia: Authorities freeze accounts of organizations supporting protesters, to “kill the peaceful protests” - Amnesty International, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/georgia-authorities-freeze-accounts-of-organizations-supporting-protesters-to-kill-the-peaceful-protests/
22.  Georgia: Statement by the Spokeperson on the authorities' decision to freeze the bank accounts of seven Civil Society Organisations | EEAS, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokeperson-authorities%E2%80%99-decision-freeze-bank-accounts-seven-civil-society_en
23.  Georgia: Bank accounts of several human rights organisations frozen, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/georgia-bank-accounts-of-several-human-rights-organisations-frozen
24.  NGOs condemn asset freeze of organizations, pledge to continue work - 1TV, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/ngos-condemn-seizure-of-organizations-pledge-to-continue-work/
25.  Georgian NGOs vow to continue work despite court-ordered bank account freezes, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://frontnews.ge/en/news/georgian-ngos-vow-to-continue-work-despite-court-ordered-bank-account-freezes
26.  Authorities Freeze Bank Accounts of Seven NGOs in 'Sabotage' Criminal Probe - Civil Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/698002
27.  Georgian Authorities Freeze Bank Accounts of NGOs, Including Groups Working on Media Freedom | Safety of journalists platform, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107642904
28.  Georgian authorities freeze accounts of seven NGOs - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-authorities-freeze-accounts-of-seven-ngos/
29.  Prosecutor's Office freezes the bank accounts of seven more human rights and civil society organisations | Front Line Defenders, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/prosecutors-office-freezes-bank-accounts-seven-more-human-rights-and-civil-society-0
30.  Georgian prosecutors continue questioning NGO heads - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-prosecutors-continue-questioning-ngo-heads/
31.  Dozens of CSOs Report New Inspections Under Amended Law on Grants - Civil Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/701772
32.  “Georgian Dream” continues its persecution of civil society organizations - Social Justice Center publishes the written explanation submitted to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/kartuli-otsneba-agrdzelebs-samokalako-sazogadoebis-organizatsiebis-devnas-sotsialuri-samartlianobis-tsentri-antikoruftsiul-biuroshi-gagzavnili-tserilobiti-ganmartebis-teksts-akveqnebs
33.  Georgia's Foreign Agents Law: A Grave Threat to Democracy | Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://eap-csf.eu/articles/georgias-foreign-agents-law-a-grave-threat-to-democracy/
34.  Georgia's FARA Would Cause 'Grave and Unjustified' Damage to Civil Society, CoE Body Warns, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/698023
35.  EXPERT COUNCIL ON NGO LAW CONF/EXP(2025)5 25 August 2025 *The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the - https: //rm. coe. int, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://rm.coe.int/coe-expert-council-opinion-on-the-law-of-georgia-foreign-agents-regist/48802814ec
36.  Georgian authorities launch FARA probe into seventh NGO - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-authorities-launch-fara-probe-into-seventh-ngo/
37.  The Troubling March of “Foreign Agents” Laws - Open Society Foundations, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/the-troubling-march-of-foreign-agents-laws
38.  2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia - U.S. Department of State, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/georgia
39.  World Report 2025: Georgia | Human Rights Watch, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/georgia
40.  www.ssoar.info State-NGO Relations Under Georgian Dream: From Discursive Confliction to Institutional Deadlock, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/97816/ssoar-caucasusad-2024-139-kamilsoy-State-NGO_Relations_Under_Georgian_Dream.pdf?sequence=1
41.  Georgia's Foreign Agent Law Could Presage a Geopolitical Realignment, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/georgia-protests-geopolitics?lang=en
42.  What Georgia's Foreign Agent Law Means for Its Democracy, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-georgias-foreign-agent-law-means-its-democracy
43.  Georgian Democracy Is Under Threat | Wilson Center, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/georgian-democracy-under-threat
44.  Defying Controversial 'Foreign-Agent' Law, Georgian NGOs Are Ready To Fight, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-ngos-foreign-agent-law/33090157.html
45.  Battered but resilient | Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum - Eap-csf.eu, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://eap-csf.eu/articles/battered-but-resilient/
46.  Rethinking Foreign Aid (From the Inside) - The Ideas Letter, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.theideasletter.org/essay/rethinking-foreign-aid-from-the-inside/
47.  NGO perspectives on the challenges and opportunities for real-world evaluation: a qualitative study - PubMed Central, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9487959/
48.  Georgia's 'Foreign Influence' Law Isn't What You Think - The Moscow Times, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/03/georgias-foreign-influence-law-isnt-what-you-think-a85029
49.  www.ssoar.info State-NGO Relations Under Georgian Dream: From Discursive Confliction to Institutional Deadlock, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/97816/ssoar-caucasusad-2024-139-kamilsoy-State-NGO_Relations_Under_Georgian_Dream.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
50.  (PDF) State-NGO Relations Under Georgian Dream: From Discursive Confliction to Institutional Deadlock - ResearchGate, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385907050_State-NGO_Relations_Under_Georgian_Dream_From_Discursive_Confliction_to_Institutional_Deadlock
51.  Drifting towards Russia: an acute political crisis in Georgia - Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-04-22/drifting-towards-russia-acute-political-crisis-georgia
52.  Uncertain times for NGOs and foreign assistance in Georgia - Global Voices, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://globalvoices.org/2025/02/10/uncertain-times-for-ngos-and-foreign-assistance-in-georgia/
53.  Nonprofit Burnout: Causes, Symptoms, and Solutions for 2025 - Goodera, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.goodera.com/blog/coping-with-nonprofit-burnout
54.  The Nonprofit Workforce is in Crisis - Johnson Center for Philanthropy, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://johnsoncenter.org/blog/the-nonprofit-workforce-is-in-crisis/
55.  The Impact of COVID-19: The Phenomenological Effect of Burnout on Women in the Nonprofit Sector and Implications for the Post-Pandemic Work World - MDPI, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2673-8104/2/4/23
56.  Helping nonprofit workers navigate burnout and uncertainty - Candid, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://candid.org/blogs/nonprofit-workers-burnout-uncertainty-mental-health-well-being/
57.  This Year's State of Nonprofits Highlights Mounting Concern About Burnout, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://cep.org/blog/this-years-state-of-nonprofits-highlights-mounting-concern-about-burnout/
58.  Nonprofit Leaders Cite Burnout as a Top Concern in a New Study on the State of U.S. Nonprofits | The Center for Effective Philanthropy, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://cep.org/news/press-releases/nonprofit-leaders-cite-burnout-as-a-top-concern-in-a-new-study-on-the-state-of-u-s-nonprofits/
59.  Marginalized Opposition Could Fuel Political Instability in Georgia | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/09/georgia-opposition-backsliding?lang=en
60.  Russian Influence Operations in Georgia: A Threat to Democracy and Regional Stability, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russian-influence-operations-in-georgia-a-threat-to-democracy-and-regional-stability/
61.  Russian Interference Shatters Georgia's EU Aspirations: Western Resolve Can Put the Pieces Together Again, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://alec.org/article/russian-interference-shatters-georgias-eu-aspirations-the-west-can-help-rebuild/
62.  Owner of Georgian broadcaster called country’s ‘propaganda megaphone’ is based in London, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/21/owner-of-georgian-broadcaster-called-countrys-propaganda-megaphone-is-based-in-london
63.  Georgia's NGOs refuse to comply with 'Russian' foreign agent law - VOA, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/georgia-ngos-refuse-to-comply-with-russian-foreign-agent-law/7654730.html
64.  NGOs in Georgia Fear Future Amid Controversial "Foreign Interference" Law, Dubbed the "Russian Law" - YouTube, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=thCrTnLd0QI&pp=0gcJCa0JAYcqIYzv
65.  Why Georgian civil society wants to remain mobilised despite the withdrawal of the 'foreign agents' law - Equal Times, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.equaltimes.org/why-georgian-civil-society-wants
66.  Datablog | Trust in NGOs in Georgia has grown increasingly polarised - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/datablog-trust-in-ngos-in-georgia-has-grown-increasingly-polarised/
67.  A three-pillar strategy for US democracy assistance in Central and Eastern Europe, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-three-pillar-strategy-for-us-democracy-assistance-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
68.  High-level corruption and state capture in the South Caucasus | Global Initiative, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/high-level-corruption-and-state-capture-in-the-south-caucasus/
69.  Georgia's Fight for Freedom: A Defining Moment for the West - European Democracy Hub, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/georgias-fight-for-freedom-a-defining-moment-for-the-west/
70.  After the Revolution: State, Civil Society, and Democratization in Armenia and Georgia - Frontiers, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political-science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2021.719478/full
71.  An Open Government Approach to Rebuilding Citizen Trust, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/trust/an-open-government-approach-to-rebuilding-citizen-trust/
72.  OGP 2.0: Adapting to our New Geopolitical Context - Open Government Partnership, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/ogp-2-0-adapting-to-our-new-geopolitical-context/
73.  Elite Capture and Corruption of Security Sectors | United States Institute of Peace, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/elite-capture-and-corruption-security-sectors
74.  Session Report: Addressing Polarization in the Eastern European Neighbourhood - Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://kpsrl.org/sites/kpsrl/files/2023-07/Georgia%20Session%20Report%20-%20Polarization%20in%20the%20Eastern%20EU%20Neighbourhood.pdf
75.  Locating the role of civil society in anti-corruption - Intersections, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://intersections.tk.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/937/442
76.  (PDF) Potential Implementation of Blockchain Technology by Non-Governmental Organizations and the Legal Framework of the Tokenization for Donations Introduction - ResearchGate, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365183577_Potential_Implementation_of_Blockchain_Technology_by_Non-Governmental_Organizations_and_the_Legal_Framework_of_the_Tokenization_for_Donations_Introduction
77.  The Future of Crowdfunding for NGOs: Trends and Innovations - fundsforNGOs, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www2.fundsforngos.org/articles-searching-grants-and-donors/the-future-of-crowdfunding-for-ngos-trends-and-innovations/
78.  Potential Implementation of Blockchain Technology by Non-Governmental Organizations and the Legal Framework of the Tokenization, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/37018/1/6-2022-10-NIBLeJ-10.pdf
79.  The Role of Blockchain in Transforming NGO Revenue Models - fundsforNGOs, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www2.fundsforngos.org/articles/the-role-of-blockchain-in-transforming-ngo-revenue-models/
80.  Tokenizing Social Impacts: Bridging Philanthropy and Blockchain | by Cultchain Foundation, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://medium.com/@cultchain/tokenizing-social-impacts-bridging-philanthropy-and-blockchain-51bc64e3d761
81.  (PDF) Blockchain in Service of NGOs and Charities - ResearchGate, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366578961_Blockchain_in_Service_of_NGOs_and_Charities
82.  Inclusive Peacebuilding: Recognised but not Realised - Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/DD63_DHF_final_web.pdf
83.  CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan - Concord, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/csos_on_the_road_from_accra_to_busan_final.pdf
84.  The Chaos of Humanitarian Aid: Adhocracy in the Republic of Georgia - ResearchGate, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254947482_The_Chaos_of_Humanitarian_Aid_Adhocracy_in_the_Republic_of_Georgia
85.  APPROACHES TO PARTICIPATORY POLICYMAKING PROCESSES: - United Nations Industrial Development Organization, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/unido-publications/2022-12/PPM-WEB-final.pdf
86.  MULTI-ACTOR OWNERSHIP - DiVA portal, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1327081/FULLTEXT01.pdf
87.  Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Justice Toolkit: Volume 1 Internal Organization Practices - Hudson River Watershed Alliance, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://hudsonwatershed.org/wp-content/uploads/DEIJ-Toolkit-Volume-1_-Internal-Organization-Practices.pdf
88.  The human rights situation in Georgia: Joint Statement to the OSCE, September 2025, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-human-rights-situation-in-georgia-joint-statement-to-the-osce-september-2025
89.  EU: Georgia's Rights Crisis Needs Urgent Response - Human Rights Watch, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/10/eu-georgias-rights-crisis-needs-urgent-response
90.  Rights organizations urge EU to pressure Georgia on repression of civil society - Jurist.org, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/09/rights-organizations-urge-eu-to-halt-georgia-repression-of-civil-society/
91.  Georgia: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/freedom-world/2024
92.  Georgia: Government Creating Rights Crisis, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/16/georgia-government-creating-rights-crisis
93.  Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Georgia | Human Rights Watch, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/23/submission-to-the-universal-periodic-review-of-georgia
94.  Statement: EU and Its Member States Should Take Urgent, Coordinated Measures to Respond to Georgia's Crackdown on Civil Society and Human Rights Organisations, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/10/statement-eu-and-its-member-states-should-take-urgent-coordinated-measures-to
95.  Another French Photojournalist Denied Entry to Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/695582
96.  Former American Diplomat and Expat Denied Entry into Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/692000
97.  Georgia launches probe into NGO grants following FARA inquiries - OC Media, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgia-launches-probe-into-ngo-grants-following-fara-inquiries/
98.  Georgia's political turmoil remains on full display - Global Voices, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://globalvoices.org/2025/09/16/georgias-political-turmoil-remains-on-full-display/
99.  Prosecutors Summon NGO Heads to Testify in 'Sabotage' Probe - Civil Georgia, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/698476
100. Post-Soviet Civil Society: Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States - Routledge, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.routledge.com/Post-Soviet-Civil-Society-Democratization-in-Russia-and-the-Baltic-States/Uhlin/p/book/9780415444057
101. Adapting to survive or thrive? Civil society, the third sector and social movements in 'post-soviet' spaces, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/208392/1/VSR_Special_Issue_Intro.pdf
102. Civil Society Weakness in Post-Communist Europe: A Preliminary Assessment - Collegio Carlo Alberto, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.carloalberto.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/no.198.pdf
103. Thirty Years of Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet States - Cambridge University Press, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/thirty-years-of-nationbuilding-in-the-postsoviet-states/60AC8A0F29CAB4C042ABDA07F4B5D0B4
104. Full article: Civil society and external actors: how linkages with the EU and Russia interact with socio-political orders in Belarus and Ukraine - Taylor & Francis Online, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21599165.2021.1873780
105. The rise of illiberal civil society in the former Soviet Union? - The Foreign Policy Centre, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/the-rise-of-illiberal-civil-society-in-the-former-soviet-union/
106. Environmental NGOs in Emerging Democracies, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2024-04/2024_1_Bolkvadze%20et%20al.pdf

1. 107. AN ASSESSMENT OF GEORGIAN CIVIL SOCIETY Report of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index 2010, accessed on September 23, 2025, https://www.civicus.org/downloads/CSI/Georgia.pdf